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Abstract 
The Intelligence process has increasingly found itself in the public eye in 
modern times. The Al Qa’eda attacks against the USA in September 2001 led 
to a rapid spread of other international terrorist attacks. The invasion of 
Afghanistan occurred soon afterwards, followed by the invasion of Iraq in 
2003. All of this resulted in the Intelligence community and their processes 
being pushed into the spotlight of the global media. Central to all Intelligence 
work is the Intelligence cycle, in whatever form it might take.  
This thesis investigates the effectiveness of the UK’s 6-stage Intelligence 
cycle in counter-terrorism work. Definitions of two key terms, Intelligence and 
terrorism are dissected at length, and the merits and shortcomings are 
outlined. Accusations of Intelligence failure have been levelled at both the UK 
government and at the country’s law enforcement, Intelligence and security 
agencies. Intelligence gaps and Intelligence failures will be described, and the 
differences between these key terms highlighted. 
All counter-terrorism work in the UK takes place within the environment of the 
government’s counter-terror strategy called CONTEST. The six pillars of the 
strategy are explained, and examples are used to show where Intelligence fits 
into it. Two UK-based case studies (Operation CREVICE and Operation 
RHYME) are used to highlight how Intelligence is used to protect the public 
from terrorist attacks. 
A thorough examination of the Intelligence cycle is conducted and some of the 
common difficulties and challenges encountered in the cycle are presented. It 
shows what can, and sometimes does, go wrong in the Intelligence cycle, and 
why this happens. Various models of the Intelligence cycle are compared and 
their intrinsic components discussed.  
The thesis benefits from a unique collection of personal insights from a 
number of serving and retired Intelligence specialist, all with personal 
experience of working in counter-terrorism. This adds valuable material to the 
considerations of the strengths and weaknesses of the model. The conclusion 
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provides some recommendations for the enhancement and strengthening of 
the Intelligence cycle, resulting in a more robust and applicable model for the 
UK’s counter-terrorism work. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Rationale for study 
“Intelligence merely provides techniques for improving the basis of 
knowledge.  As with other techniques, it can be a dangerous tool if its 
limitations are not recognised by those who seek to use it” (Butler, 
2004:14). 
 
The Intelligence cycle in some form or other has been used for decades as a 
tool by the Intelligence agencies of most countries in the world. The earliest 
pictorial representation of a model of the Intelligence cycle appears to be one 
published in 1948, in a book written by two U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonels 
who had both seen service in World War 2 and were both instructors at the 
U.S. Command and General Staff College (Glass & Davidson, 1948:5).1 
 
                                            
1
 There are earlier references to various Intelligence processes, but the Davidson-Glass model is the earliest known 
pictorial depiction of a cyclical model. Omand, for example, cites Wheaton in positing that a cycle may have existed 
in training delivered at Fort Leavenworth, but there is no evidence of this to confirm the theory  (Omand 2013, p.62).  
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1  The earliest known version of a printed Intelligence cycle, 1948 
 
The Davidson-Glass model of the Intelligence cycle from 1948 contained four 
components: direction, collection, processing and use. Nowadays, there are 
many versions of the Intelligence cycle and even different agencies within the 
same country often use different models, such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the USA. The 
role of the Intelligence cycle is paramount to this study, as it has formed the 
theoretical basis of the Intelligence process for several decades. Counter-
terrorism work is absolutely dependent upon Intelligence, without which it 
cannot function. It is Intelligence-led, more so than other areas of Policing or 
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Law Enforcement. If the Intelligence cycle is flawed, or is unfit for purpose, it 
follows that Intelligence-led operations will suffer, either by going awry, by 
being ineffective, or even being directed against the wrong target. In counter-
terrorism, the potential stakes are very high and the impact of mistakes for the 
authorities can be large-scale loss of life. 
This study investigates the effectiveness of the 6-stage Intelligence cycle as a 
valid model, specifically examining its utility within counter-terrorism work 
carried out by the Intelligence, security and law enforcement community of the 
UK. It will conduct a thorough examination of the Intelligence process, 
analysing the typical difficulties encountered by the various agencies in their 
efforts to produce Intelligence. It will consider what can, and often does, go 
wrong in the Intelligence cycle, and why this happens.  
The concept of Intelligence-led counter-terrorism contains two words which 
are notoriously difficult to satisfactorily define, either academically or legally - 
Intelligence and counter-terrorism. Both of these terms will be unpacked in 
detail, and a wide selection of the various definitions for each term will be 
considered. Defining Intelligence has become something of an academic 
pursuit, and entire essays have been devoted to this subject, such as those 
by Warner (2002) and Davies (2002). Attempts to frame the concept of 
Intelligence encounter difficulties with scope, boundaries, politicisation, 
process and structure to name but some. Academic discussion, especially by 
Davies (2012), has also tried to place these definitions on various axes, such 
as “broad-narrow”, “informational-organisational” and “analytical-operational”, 
some of which are briefly outlined in this paper. In a lecture given by Davies 
(2005) he categorised a number of Intelligence definitions using the following 
spectrum: 
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BROAD INTERMEDIATE NARROW 
Kent Godson (Considered by Davies to 
slide from Broad to Intermediate) 
Elliott 
Hoover / US 
DoD 
 Robertson 
Wilensky  Herman 
Sims  Butler 
US DoD (1979)  Schulsky 
Richelson   
Capel-Dunn   
J.B. Lockhart   
Table 1: Categorisation of Intelligence definitions on a Broad-Narrow 
continuum, according to Davies (2005). 
 
Attempting to define terrorism is even more contentious than attempting to 
define Intelligence and the debate arouses strong opinions. Any effort to 
define terrorism will necessarily be done through one conceptual lens or 
another and this debate will continue for the foreseeable future. Chomsky  
(2003) captured the essence of the debate on terrorism probably more 
concisely than anyone, when he wrote : 
 
“It is important to bear in mind that the term "terrorism" is 
commonly used as a term of abuse, not accurate description. 
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It is close to a historical universal that our terrorism against 
them is right and just (whoever we happen to be), while their 
terrorism against us is an outrage. As long as that practice is 
adopted, discussion of terrorism is not serious. It is no more 
than a form of propaganda and apologetics.”2  
 
As one journalist wrote, shortly after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the 
USA: “Immediately beyond Al Qaeda, the high moral condemnations of global 
terrorism rapidly become relative, and the definition blurred” (Schmemann, 
2001:2). The politicisation of the issue is almost inescapable and yet it 
constitutes one of the most globally recognised crimes. Before considering the 
UK’s counter-terrorism policy and the role that the Intelligence cycle plays in 
it, the concepts of Intelligence and terrorism must first be taxonomically 
dissected if we are to gain a deeper understanding of these issues, 
particularly the highly polarised topic of terrorism.  
Interviews have been used as a valuable and unique primary source of 
experience and knowledge regarding the role of Intelligence in counter-
terrorism. These interviews were conducted with serving and retired 
practitioners with a spread of experience including the UK’s Intelligence 
agencies, the Armed Forces and law enforcement. This material adds a richer 
insight into the actual experiences of Intelligence practitioners who use the 
cycle in their daily counter-terrorism work. 
This study makes a comparison of some models of the Intelligence cycle in 
use by different agencies, not only those within the UK. The component 
elements of the Intelligence cycle are dissected and discussed in turn, 
examining common problems encountered in Intelligence work, and how 
these relate to the cycle. The collection, analysis and use of Intelligence by 
the law enforcement, security and Intelligence agencies is a complex process 
                                            
2
 From an interview printed in an unidentified Kurdish newspaper. 
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which has come under increasing scrutiny in the UK since the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003. Accusations of Intelligence failure have been levelled at both the UK 
government and at the country’s Intelligence community. Intelligence gaps 
and Intelligence failures are described, and the differences between these key 
terms highlighted. The paper draws conclusions from these findings, 
regarding the suitability of the current UK Intelligence cycle and it proposes 
some changes to strengthen the model and to make it yet more robust for its 
function within UK counter-terrorism. Finally, some recommended areas for 
future research are identified, to help pave the way for other scholars who 
may wish to build on this paper’s new contributions to the corpus of existing 
knowledge in this area. 
1.2 Overview of Research 
This paper answers a number of research objectives. The Intelligence cycle is 
described, and an examination is made of some different models in use. To 
further explore the differences, various models are analysed, comparing and 
contrasting them to the model used by the agencies of the UK Intelligence 
community. This leads to a critical assessment that answers the question of 
whether the 6-stage model of the Intelligence cycle, as described in detail in 
this paper, is still an effective tool for UK counter-terrorism work. The sources 
and methods used by Intelligence agencies are examined, and an 
assessment made of their relative merits and weaknesses, with particular 
reference to how they contribute to the Intelligence cycle, and how they 
interact with other sources and methods. Some of the inherent problems 
faced in conducting and managing the process of Intelligence analysis are 
scrutinised, examining whether it is possible to factor out these problems and, 
if this is considered possible, to what degree.  
A wide range of vulnerabilities and issues has been identified by scholars 
such as Heuer (1999), Sheptycki (2004), Heuer & Pherson (2011), Krizan 
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(1999), Trent (2007) and Hutchins (2007), which are all of relevance to an 
analysis of the Intelligence cycle’s effectiveness. These vulnerabilities can 
include bias (which can take many forms, such as hindsight, cognitive, 
selective), interpretation, group-think, expressions of uncertainty, anchoring, 
perception of correlation, competing hypotheses, persistence of impressions 
and evidence. A full analysis of these vulnerabilities is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, as it constitutes a very large research topic in itself, but the general 
nature of vulnerabilities is discussed, and this paper groups them in three 
taxonomical sub-classes to show that the majority of them are actually human 
factors. 
The differences between an Intelligence gap and an Intelligence failure are 
described, in an attempt to explain why the use of these two terms is so 
commonly mistaken in the mainstream media. Definitions by Schulsky 
(Schulsky & Schmitt, 2002:63) together with O’Connor’s taxonomic 
classifications (O’Conner, n.d.) are the key works in this area. 
While the collection of Intelligence is conducted by the organs of the UK’s 
Intelligence machinery, it is crucial to consider that both the finished 
Intelligence product and, on occasion, the raw Intelligence material, may find 
their way into a senior politician’s in-tray. The politicisation of Intelligence can 
have a significant impact upon national security and community safety, both 
real and perceived. Various forms of politicisation are covered, along with 
some of their academic definitions (Treverton, 2008), which then provides a 
summary of the dangers posed by such politicisation, and the concomitant 
effects that this has upon the effective utility of Intelligence-led counter-
terrorism. 
All Intelligence communities are hampered by “stovepipes” or “silos” to some 
degree, and this affects the releasability and dissemination of Intelligence to 
customers.3 The problem of such stovepipes is a recurrent one for many 
                                            
3
 While the term “releasability” is not found in the dictionary, its use is widespread in the “five eyes” community 
comprising the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It describes whether an agency or country can 
release the Intelligence to another agency or country.  
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commercial organisations (Ensor, 1988b) and for most Intelligence 
communities. This report will consider the impact of this in relation to the 
effectiveness of the UK’s counter-terrorism policies, capabilities and 
operational capacity.  
Having considered these factors, and using a variety of lenses such as 
transparency, legality, proportionality, oversight and the public interest, this 
paper will identify and propose recommendations for the collective 
improvement of the use of the Intelligence cycle by the UK’s Intelligence 
community, in order to enhance national security and community safety in the 
UK. 
1.3 Thesis Question 
The thesis of this paper is that the 6-stage UK Intelligence cycle, insofar as it 
is used within the UK Intelligence community, remains a valid and effective 
model for use in counter-terrorism.  
1.4 Guide to Chapters 
Chapter one presents the overarching topics of the thesis and it 
contextualises the rationale for the work covered. The chapter begins by 
explaining the reasons for writing this thesis. An overview of the research is 
provided, followed by a framing of the thesis question. The theoretical 
framework of the research is also outlined. Chapter one also explains some 
important background information about the UK Intelligence community. Since 
the Iraq war of 2003, the UK Intelligence agencies have been subjected to 
considerable and relatively continuous criticism from multiple fronts, including 
the British public, world opinion, the media, UK parliamentarians and various 
groups both inside and outside government. An accurate understanding of 
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this community and its associated machinery is essential to contextualise the 
thesis question. Without an understanding of the Intelligence agencies, their 
inter-relationships, the legislation which governs them and the oversight which 
keeps them as transparent as possible (while at the same time making sure 
that national security is not compromised), the role of the Intelligence cycle 
and its effectiveness as a tool in UK counter-terrorism cannot be reasonably 
assessed. The roles of the three primary UK Intelligence agencies are 
explained and the overview then moves to the inner workings of the 
Intelligence machinery.  
The JIC is central to this machinery, as it is the JIC papers which carry so 
much weight when presented to the Prime Minister and his inner circle of 
advisers. The JIC in particular was singled out for criticism in the Butler 
Report, after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The three Intelligence agencies no 
longer operate in complete secrecy, devoid of oversight or robust and 
effective legislation. Chapter one describes the genesis of this legislation, how 
it came into being and why it is necessary for the UK to have such legislation. 
The legislation of Intelligence activities without the accompanying oversight is, 
however, something of a toothless tiger. The oversight arrangements of the 
Intelligence agencies are covered in this chapter, with a brief explanation of 
how and why they came into being. This introductory chapter also defines the 
problem statement: “How effective is the Intelligence cycle as a model in UK 
counter-terrorism?” The relevance of this research paper to the current 
position of the topic within Intelligence studies is discussed in this chapter.  
Chapter two describes the methodology of the research paper, expanding 
upon the research objectives of the paper. It explains how the paper’s 
research was operationalised and covers the methods of analysis. This 
chapter also contains a literature review, which introduces the framework of 
the paper’s research and its focus. Some of the key writings on Intelligence 
and counter-terrorism are reviewed, to highlight the current body of academic 
knowledge in this area of study. This research paper necessarily covers a 
wide area of academic material, due to the number of essential components 
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that must be covered, in order to ensure that any overview of the Intelligence 
cycle and the entire Intelligence process is meaningful. Relevant points from 
the various UK inquiries are extracted and discussed. This chapter also lays 
out the detailed methodology of the research paper, covering the main source 
materials and the interviews. 
Chapter three provides the theoretical framework of the paper. This includes 
key academic discussions on the attempts to define Intelligence and 
terrorism, the difficulties these attempts encounter, and the academic and 
political landscape in which some of these definitions have been crafted. A 
selection of definitions is pictorially represented using models with varying 
axes, to provide some explanation of the academic arguments surrounding 
many of the definitions. It compares a wide range of definitions and examines 
what, if anything, is missing. It further considers how the definition of 
Intelligence used by an agency can affect the Intelligence it collects and the 
processes it is subjected to. Current thinking on the Intelligence cycle and 
Intelligence-led counter-terrorism are also dissected. These two areas are 
brought together later in the paper, to prepare for a more detailed examination 
on the effectiveness of the Intelligence cycle as a model. The concept of 
terrorism and the various definitions of it are examined in detail in this chapter 
and it describes the problems which have been faced by the many attempts to 
encapsulate a definition of terrorism. A brief summary is provided at the end 
of the chapter on the differences between an Intelligence gap and an 
Intelligence failure, using a combination of academic definitions and real-world 
experience. 
Chapter four describes CONTEST, the UK government’s counter-terrorism 
strategy that was first introduced in 2006. The principles of the strategy are 
examined, including the latest policy update announced in June 2011. The 
four central pillars of the CONTEST strategy are known as PREVENT, 
PURSUE, PROTECT and PREPARE, and these are described in detail, 
explaining the aims of each pillar and providing examples of the work involved 
in each of them. The CONTEST strategy is a crucial backdrop to the use of 
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the Intelligence cycle in counter-terrorism, as this policy underpins the model 
as used by the UK Intelligence community. Some aspects of the CONTEST 
policy have been subjected to intense media scrutiny, especially when high-
visibility raids (such as Operation VOLGA in Forest Gate, London, in June 
2006) have not culminated in a successful prosecution (Glass, 2006).  
Chapter five concentrates on a deep analysis of the cycle itself, examining the 
Intelligence process and the difficulties which agencies face in their collection, 
production, reporting and use of Intelligence. It begins with direction, detailing 
the process that takes place before an agency or an asset can be tasked with 
collecting Intelligence. The collection process is described, covering overt and 
covert sources. Some of the strengths and limitations of these sources and 
methods are also covered. Collation is often overlooked or even ignored by 
some Intelligence staff, yet it is a fundamental piece of the Intelligence cycle. 
It brings together all available material already held on a target, and puts it 
into a format or formats best suited to assist with the analytical process. More 
than any other aspect of the Intelligence process, evaluation was singled out 
for criticism in the UK government’s inquiry (Butler, 2004) and considerable 
space is devoted to the importance of evaluation within the cycle. Analysis 
forms the core of Intelligence work and it usually receives the most attention, 
especially in the area of published works, yet it is co-dependent upon the 
other aspects of the cycle. Inaccurate direction can lead to the collection 
process being misdirected, and following the collation of material already held, 
the analysts can only work with the material provided. Incorrect, faulty or 
incomplete analysis likewise has a direct result on the production of a finished 
Intelligence product that may then be disseminated to customers.  
Chapter six presents for discussion some of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Intelligence cycle. In this chapter, common problems with analysis are 
examined, and their potential impact discussed. It also takes the recurrent 
problems and accepted pathologies of Intelligence sharing, as well as the 
wider Intelligence process and discusses them in detail, with examples 
provided where practicable. Intelligence “stovepipes” or “silos” are often 
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necessary for the protection of sensitive Intelligence, but they can also be a 
contributing factor to Intelligence failures. The strengths and weaknesses of 
the cycle are described, with the additional benefit of primary source material. 
This is derived from personal, semi-structured interviews with retired and 
serving Intelligence officers covering a wide spectrum of agencies and 
departments. Most of these have considerable experience in counter-
terrorism Intelligence and have been personally involved in all aspects of the 
cycle. Their opinions and experiences are a valuable resource of first-hand 
understanding of how the cycle functions in the real world, and how effective it 
is in counter-terrorism.  
Chapter 7 consolidate the essential elements of this research and details the 
paper’s conclusions, returning to the thesis question of how effective the 
Intelligence cycle is, as a model for UK counter-terrorism. Suggested changes 
are provided, which make the Intelligence cycle still more robust for its 
continued deployment in the field. This final chapter also identifies areas for 
future research in this field of study.  
 
 
1.5 Theoretical Framework 
1.5.1  The Composition of the UK Intelligence Community. 
The UK’s Intelligence machinery is made up of the three primary Intelligence 
collection agencies (SIS, GCHQ and the Security Service), together with the 
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), Defence Intelligence (DI) and the 
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centralised Intelligence machinery of the Cabinet Office (Cabinet Office, 
2010b:1).4 
The three primary agencies are responsible for the collection of secret 
intelligence. The first two are the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), often 
referred to as MI6, and the Security Service, often referred to as MI5. Both 
these agencies are covert and the identities of the majority of their staff are 
not released publicly. The majority of the UK’s mainstream media agrees to 
abide by a voluntary code regarding publication of material concerning the 
national security of the UK. Defence Advisory Notice 5 (often referred to as a 
“D Notice”) specifically covers, amongst other topics: 
 
“the identities, whereabouts and tasks of people who are or 
have been employed by these services or engaged on such 
work, including details of their families and home addresses, 
and any other information, including photographs, which could 
assist terrorist or other hostile organisations to identify a 
target” (Ministry of Defence, 2008). 
 
The third agency is the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 
Whilst the nature of GCHQ’s work is also secret, it is not classed as a covert 
agency but an overt one. That is not to say that the work it carries out is overt, 
rather that the UK’s Intelligence machinery classifies it differently because 
GCHQ staff are not subject to same rules on disclosing where they work, as 
officers from SIS and the Security Service. 
SIS works primarily as a HUMINT Agency, collecting secret intelligence 
abroad and mounting covert operations abroad to support the UK government 
in areas such as counter-terrorism, national security and interdicting serious 
crime. In addition, it has a highly developed technical intelligence collection 
                                            
4
 In 2009, the organisation known as Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) was renamed to Defence Intelligence (DI). 
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capability. The activities conducted by SIS are legislated by the Intelligence 
Services Act 1994 (ISA), (Parliament, 1994). SIS (2011) describes its 
missions as:  
 
“to give the UK advantage, acting secretly overseas to make 
the country safer and more prosperous…by… obtaining 
secret intelligence on critical security and economic issues to 
inform better policy decisions…operating overseas to disrupt 
terrorism and proliferation and helping to prevent and resolve 
conflict…using covert contacts overseas to shape 
developments and exploit opportunities in the UK's interests”.  
 
The Security Service is the national security Intelligence agency of the UK 
and is responsible for “protecting the UK against threats to national security 
from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of 
foreign powers, and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine 
parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means” (Security 
Service, 2011). The agency is legislated by the Security Services Act 1989 
(Parliament, 1989). It also holds an advisory capacity, providing advice on a 
range of security threats to other organisations, and this function extends to 
installations designated part of the UK Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).5 
The Security Service has been carrying out a gradual expansion beyond the 
physical confines of London and to date it has eight regional centres in the 
UK, plus an additional Headquarters in Northern Ireland, based in Belfast.  
Of these three primary intelligence collection agencies, officers from the 
Security Service work more closely and more frequently with the UK Police 
than the others, yet officers from the Security Service have no powers of 
                                            
5
 The UK’s Critical National Infrastructure is broken down into ten key areas. These are: communications, emergency 
services, energy, finance, food, government and public services, health, public safety, transport and water. See 
chapter 4.3.1 
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arrest, have no executive powers and are not issued warrant cards. Officers 
from the Security Service have traditionally worked in very close co-operation 
with Special Branch officers, (especially during the height of the terrorist 
campaigns in Northern Ireland, and more recently with the rise of Islamist 
terrorism).  
GCHQ has two primary roles. The first is to conduct Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT) in support of UK national security and the economic well-being of 
the UK, as well as supporting the operational capacity of the UK Armed 
Forces and the UK Law Enforcement community. The second role is 
conducting Information Assurance (IA), which aims to secure and protect the 
sensitive information of the UK government and its associated entities. This 
role falls to the Computer Electronic Security Group (CESG) which holds the 
responsibility of being a national technical authority on IA within the UK. A key 
role of CESG is in protecting UK government and defence computer networks 
from external attacks and intrusions, from cyber-vandals, Hostile Intelligence 
Services (HIS) and hackers (GCHQ, 2011).  Together with SIS, the 
operational activities of GCHQ are covered by the ISA, and the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). 
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) is the newest organ of the UK’s 
formal intelligence machinery, having been created in June 2003, and its role 
is described as follows: 
 
“JTAC analyses and assesses all intelligence relating to 
international terrorism, at home and overseas. It sets threat 
levels and issues warnings of threats and other terrorist-
related subjects for customers from a wide range of 
government departments and agencies, as well as producing 
more in-depth reports on trends, terrorist networks and 
capabilities” (Security Service, 2015). 
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JTAC was a ground-breaking body when it was formed, as it brought together 
for the first time a truly multi-agency workforce in a centralised location, all of 
which had access to their own agencies’ intelligence products, systems and 
procedures. A key strength of JTAC is that in addition to its full-time, core 
workforce from sixteen agencies and government departments, it can draw 
upon other agencies and assets, depending upon the nature of the work it 
carries out. The London terrorist attacks in July 2005 were an example of this, 
when several other agencies contributed staff to the post-incident work of 
JTAC. Some of these agencies are not traditionally involved in intelligence 
work, but their sector expertise was necessary in the post-attack phase.  
Defence Intelligence (DI) is a component part of the UK Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) and not an independent organisation. It is headed by a serving 3-star 
officer of the UK Armed Forces, who also holds the post of Chief of Defence 
Intelligence (CDI). Until 2009, DI was called the Defence Intelligence Staff 
(DIS). DI staff members are either civilian or military, and the military staff 
members are drawn from all branches of the Armed Forces.6 The official 
website (MOD, 2015) describes DI and its role thus: 
 
“…an integral part of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the 
main provider of strategic defence intelligence to the 
department and the Armed Forces. It provides timely 
intelligence products, assessments and advice to guide 
decisions on policy and the commitment and employment of 
the Armed Forces; to inform defence research and equipment 
programmes; and to support military operations”. 
 
The primary function of DI is not to serve as an intelligence collection agency 
per se, but to conduct all-source analysis across a wide range of intelligence 
                                            
6
 In 1964, the Intelligence staffs of the Army, Navy and Air Force were combined with the civilian-staffed Joint 
Intelligence Bureau (JIB) to form the Defence Intelligence Staff. 
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feeds, both overt and covert. Notwithstanding this, it does fulfil some 
intelligence collection functions, though these are usually in support of either 
military operations conducted by the UK Armed Forces, or in support of the 3 
primary intelligence collection agencies. An additional key function of DI is the 
provision of Geospatial Information Services (GIS).    
1.5.2  How the UK Intelligence machinery functions 
In the UK, the primary Intelligence agencies (SIS, Security Service and 
GCHQ) are tasked by a central core of Cabinet Office inner machinery which 
is led by the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), who also 
holds the position of Permanent Secretary for Intelligence, Security and 
Resilience. The tasking is carried out according to the intelligence priorities 
agreed by the JIC, and is conducted according to the agreed requirements, 
which are subject to approval by the NSC Committee for Threats, Hazards, 
Resilience and Contingencies. 
The JIC was created in 1936 to bring together the Heads of the intelligence 
collections agencies, plus other related departments such as the Ministry for 
Economic Warfare. The responsibility of compiling the strategic Intelligence 
assessments for the government has lain with the JIC for more than 60 years. 
The role of the JIC is to provide the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers and 
other senior government officials with “co-ordinated inter-departmental 
Intelligence assessments on a range of issues of immediate and long-term 
importance to national interests, primarily in the fields of security, defence and 
foreign affairs” (Cabinet Office, 2010b:23). A report written for the JIC in 1945, 
on the future composition and direction of the group in the post-war world, 
used a term which had as much relevance for the JIC in 1945 as it still does 
today. The report, entitled “The Intelligence Machine”, considered that all of 
the departments producing Intelligence should have no reason to refrain from 
sharing their material at “the anvil of discussion and appreciation” (Herman, 
2011:17).  
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The JIC Chairman also holds two other posts: Professional Head of 
Intelligence Analysis (PHIA) and Head of the Joint Intelligence Organisation 
(JIO). As Chairman of the JIC, he reports directly to the Prime Minister for the 
overall supervision of the JIC’s output. His role as Head of the JIO charges 
him with the supervision of the Assessments Staff (AS). The AS are 
responsible for producing draft JIC papers, as well as other all-source 
assessment papers covering issues relating to UK national security. The AS is 
made up of analysts from a range of government bodies and departments, 
and they have access to intelligence reports produced by SIS, Security 
Service and GCHQ, plus diplomatic cables, military reports and relevant open 
source reports.  
The Chief of the Assessments Staff is responsible for the “provision of timely, 
accurate and objective all-source intelligence assessments and through 
provision of a tailored service of policy-relevant intelligence to senior readers”, 
and also acts as the leader of the Assessments Staff team.(UK Government 
2015). According to Davies, the Chief of Assessments Staff is “of "three-star 
equivalent" seniority, hence of roughly the same rank as Chief of Defence 
Staff” (Davies 2012a). The Chief’s primary customers are the JIC Secretariat, 
the Cabinet, the NSC, COBR and ultimately the Prime Minister. 
 
 
 
These draft JIC assessments are themselves subject to further assessment 
conducted by Current Intelligence Groups (CIGs), in a similar manner to that 
of a peer review in the academic community. The CIGs are staffed by 
analysts and experts from the intelligence agencies as well as from other 
government departments. A former Director of GCHQ described the JIC 
process as follows: 
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“The JIC process is, as far as I know, unique around the 
world. One reason may be that the process involves close 
interaction between the senior policy makers and the 
intelligence community, examining the most sensitive 
intelligence in the course of producing JIC papers. But the 
reason the JIC emerged during the Second World War as it 
did was to bring greater rationality into bitter strategic debate” 
(Omand, 2005:7-8). 
 
In March 2005 a report was presented to Parliament, outlining the changes 
which were to be made in the field of Intelligence and security. One of these 
was the establishing of the post of PHIA. According to the report (Cabinet 
Office, 2005:09-10), the role of PHIA is to:  
 
 “advise in the security, defence and foreign affairs fields on 
gaps and duplication in analyst capabilities, on recruitment of 
analysts, on their career structures and on interchange within 
and beyond Government; to advise on analytical methodology 
across the intelligence community; and to develop more 
substantial training than hitherto on a cross-Government basis 
for all analysts working in these fields”. 
 
The role of PHIA came about because of a recommendation from Lord 
Butler’s review. He saw a need for an Intelligence analysis professional to 
“provide a “champion” for analysts, and to establish a distinct career 
specialism for this group” (Howells, 2009:32-32). The role of PHIA is clearly a 
key one and the ISC were keen that this should constitute an independent 
role. Butler’s review generated intense public interest in the various issues 
around the Intelligence upon which the decision to invade Iraq was ultimately 
based. It was therefore surprising when the government of the day decided 
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not to make the PHIA post an independent one, but to leave it combined with 
the role of JIC Chairman. Given the accusations of politicisation which were 
prevalent at the time, it was a curious decision. The ISC (Howells, 
2009:para.114–115) made their disagreement and displeasure very clear in a 
strongly worded paragraph of their Annual Report which stated:  
 
“We are therefore very concerned that the post remained vacant 
since Jane Knight (the first post-holder) retired in August 2007. 
We are particularly concerned that the progress achieved during 
the previous two years may be lost. Although we note that the 
Deputy Professional Head has been covering both posts during 
this time, we question the extent to which one person can 
adequately cover two demanding posts at the same time. The JIC 
Chairman told us in January 2008 that thought was being given to 
the future of the Professional Head post – whether it should be a 
separate post, or whether it should be amalgamated within the 
JIC Chairman role. The Cabinet Office has since told us that a 
decision has been made to subsume the role within the JIC 
Chairman role.  Given the importance of the Professional 
Head of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA) post, we are very 
concerned by the plan to subsume the role within the Joint 
Intelligence Committee Chairman’s post as this may actually 
lessen the priority given to this crucial role. The Committee 
is disappointed that the PHIA post has not been maintained 
as a distinct and separate role”.7 
 
The concept of professionalising a top-level role at the apex of the Intelligence 
analysis community is not new. Lord Franks made the same point in his 
                                            
7
 Text in bold as emphasised by the ISC in the original report. 
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review for the government of the day, of the circumstances which led to the 
Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands (Aldrich, 2009:238). 
1.5.3 Legislation and oversight of the UK Intelligence Community 
Whilst the covert agencies of the UK Intelligence machinery (SIS and the 
Security Service) have been in existence for over a century at the time of 
writing, the concept of wider accountability for the UK intelligence machinery 
is a relatively new one. Gill (2011:46-47) defines Intelligence oversight as “the 
scrutiny of agencies’ actions, whether contemporaneously or after the event, 
in order to ensure their effectiveness, legality and propriety on behalf of the 
public”. A key driver in the push for greater oversight of the Intelligence 
machinery was the growing concern across Britain’s left-wing political 
landscape that the Security Service was employing its powers of investigation 
and surveillance to intrusively monitor left-wing political entities under the 
umbrella of countering subversion of the State. During the 1970s and the 
1980s, this concern focused on some of the major political issues of that era. 
Allegations were made that bodies targeted by the Security Service included 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the National Union of Miners 
(NUM), the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
(ASLEF), a number of Labour Members of Parliament and even Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson. The situation was not helped by the response of 
former Prime Minister Jim Callaghan when giving evidence before the 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee. When questioned on whether he felt 
that the accountability of UK intelligence agencies was satisfactory or not, he 
replied: 
 
“I am not sure what its accountability is to Parliament…….I 
am going to give you a very unsatisfactory answer, I do not 
know…..I think the ethos of those particular services is 
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probably as important as the degree of accountability that you 
can visit upon them…….I am going to give you a very 
unsatisfactory answer, I do not know” (Norton-Taylor, 1995:1; 
Griffith, 1987:982). 
 
The Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA) was introduced in the 
UK as a result of a challenge in the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Strasbourg, after the case of Malone v. UK in 1984(European 
Court of Human Rights, 1985).8 The introduction of IOCA covered only the 
lawful intercept of postal mail and telephone calls, thus leaving additional 
interception methods (such as intrusive bugging) outside this legislation and 
thus regulated only by Home Office guidelines (Phythian, 2009:338). The 
legal case of two prominent Labour Party members taking their complaint to 
the European Commission of Human Rights in 1985, plus other cases, 
prompted the UK government to enact the Security Services Act of 1989 
which placed the Security Service on a statutory footing for the first time.9  
                                            
8
 The case of Malone v UK went before the ECTHR in 1984 and the verdict was delivered in Strasbourg on 26 April 
1985. The complainant, Malone, “asserted that his telephone conversation had been tapped on the authority of a 
warrant signed by the Secretary of State, but that there was no system to supervise such warrants, and that it was 
not therefore in ‘accordance with law’. The taps were based on a non-binding and unpublished directive from the 
Home Secretary to the Director-General of the Security Service. The directive did not have the force of the law, nor 
did its contents constitute legally enforceable rules governing the operation of the Security Service”. It was held that 
“the interception pursuant to such a warrant was an ‘interference by a public authority’ with the right to a private life. 
English law did not meet the requirement that any interference must be ‘in accordance with the law’. The law must 
indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with 
sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate 
protection against arbitrary interference. English law does not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner 
of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities. To that extent, the minimum degree of legal 
protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society is lacking. The Court would 
reiterate its opinion that the phrase ‘in accordance with the law’ does not merely refer back to domestic law but also 
relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law” (SWARB, 2014).  
9
 Harriet Harman was a Labour MP in 1985, and a practising Solicitor. Patricia Hewitt was a former Secretary 
General of the National Council for Civil Liberties, an organisation which MI5 had classed as subversive. Following 
the revelations from an MI5 whistle-blower, Cathy Massiter, that MI5 had placed both Harman and Hewitt under 
surveillance (which included intercepting their telephone calls), both Harman and Hewitt began a joint action in 1986 
to take the UK government to the European Commission of Human Rights, claiming that the surveillance breached 
the following rights: the right to privacy (covered in Article 8); the right to freedom of expression (covered in Article 
10); the right to freedom of association (covered in Article 11);  and the right to an effective remedy for breaches 
(covered in Article 13).  in respect of the violations arising from the nature and consequences of the surveillance to 
which they had been subjected by MI5. In May 1988, the legal application for the case was declared admissible. In its 
final report, the Commission found in favour of Harman and Hewitt, concluding by a majority verdict, that: “….given 
the existence of practices in the United Kingdom permitting secret surveillance and given further the reasonable 
likelihood that the applicants were the subjects of surveillance the compilation and retention by the Security Service 
of information concerning the private lives of the applicants constituted an infringement of their right to privacy under 
Article 8 (1) of the Convention. The Commission further concluded that the domestic law of the United Kingdom 
contained neither legal rules formulated with sufficient precision nor a framework indicating with the requisite degree 
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SIS was not formally acknowledged as an Agency until 1992, when the Prime 
Minister at that time, John Major, admitted its existence openly. The 
Intelligence Services Bill of 1993 was enacted into UK law as the ISA on 26 
May 1994 and it included mechanisms for additional oversight of SIS and 
GCHQ, plus some additional caveats on Security Service warrantry. The 
purpose of the Act, as described in the long title, is: 
 
“to make provision about the Secret Intelligence Service and the 
Government Communications Headquarters, including provision for the 
issue of warrants and authorisations enabling certain actions to be taken 
and for the issue of such warrants and authorisations to be kept under 
review; to make further provision about warrants issued on applications 
by the Security Service; to establish a procedure for the investigation of 
complaints about the Secret Intelligence Service and the Government 
Communications Headquarters; to make provision for the establishment 
of an Intelligence and Security Committee to scrutinise all three of those 
bodies; and for connected purposes” (Parliament 1994, p.3).  
 
Section 10 of the Act (Intelligence Services Act, 1994:7) legislated for the 
establishment of an Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), the remit of 
which was to provide an oversight and investigative function, regarding the 
“expenditure, administration and policy of (a) the Security Service; (b) the 
Intelligence Service; and (c) GCHQ”. The introduction, composition, 
responsibility and reporting lines of this committee generated spirited debate 
in Parliament at the time. There was resistance to the validity of the ISC from 
the leader of the Labour opposition, who accused the government of the day 
                                            
of certainty the scope and manner of the exercise of discretion by the Security Service in the carrying out of secret 
surveillance activities to render interference “in accordance with the law” within Article 8 (2). Finally the Commission 
concluded that since no information was forthcoming in relation to how the United Kingdom had chosen to provide an 
effective remedy under its domestic law that the applicants did not have an effective remedy as required by Article 
13” (ECHR, 1993) 
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of creating Prime Ministerial oversight as opposed to parliamentary oversight, 
stating: 
 
“Whatever the status of the committee, it should not be able to interfere 
in operational matters….I am also concerned that the committee will 
apparently not have the power to call witnesses and commission papers 
to be brought before it. That is another weakness for a committee that is 
seriously expected to deal with scrutiny or oversight…Furthermore, it is 
proposed that the committee should not report to Parliament but to the 
Prime Minister. I do not regard that as parliamentary scrutiny or 
oversight, because the Prime Minister has the right to veto sections of its 
report—I call it prime ministerial oversight and scrutiny. If we are to have 
an effective parliamentary watchdog to oversee such matters and to 
probe and scrutinise, it should report to Parliament. It cannot legitimately 
be called a parliamentary committee unless it does so” (HC Deb, 22 
February 1994:col.171). 
 
The government countered this argument, pointing out that the ISC would be 
free to make public their displeasure with the way in which things were being 
handled by the Intelligence agencies, stating: 
 
“Somebody asked earlier where the teeth were. The teeth consist of the 
fact that the committee, staffed by very senior Members of the House, 
will have the right not to publish stuff that would damage national 
security—which it would not want to do—but to write a report saying, 
"We believe that things are not being handled properly, and that 
Ministers are not responding properly." No Government in their senses 
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would want to risk such criticism. That is why the committee will be 
powerful” (HC Deb, 22 February 1994:col. 240). 
 
The ISC published its first annual report in 1995 (King, 1995) and it has 
carried out this function each year since its inception. 
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Chapter 2 Methodology 
2.1 Theoretical Framework and Argument 
 
“If you want to understand what a science is you should look in the 
first instance not at its theories or findings and certainly not at what 
its apologists say about it; you should look at what the practitioners 
of it do” Geertz (1973:5).  
 
 
The Intelligence cycle was developed as a model to describe the Intelligence 
process and, with various refinements, has been taught within the UK 
Intelligence community for several decades. Following the 11 September 
terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001, and the subsequent invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, considerable criticism has been levelled at the 
Intelligence processes which underpinned the decisions to go ahead with 
offensive military action against the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
Intelligence agencies also conducted their own internal reviews of their 
processes, their checks and balances, even their very structures. External 
criticisms have been levelled at the Intelligence cycle and questions have 
been raised about its suitability for purpose (Hulnick, 2006; Warner, 2002; 
Treverton, 2001). In order to conduct a meaningful examination of the 
Intelligence cycle’s effectiveness as a model in UK counter-terrorism, the 
intricacies of the various concepts of Intelligence and terrorism need to be 
examined. 
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2.2 Operationalising the Research Question  
The methodology employed in this thesis will include both primary and 
secondary sources of data. The UK’s Intelligence machinery and the systems 
and processes which it uses have been described in considerable detail within 
several UK government inquiries (Butler, 2004; Hutton, 2004; Taylor, 2003; 
Foreign Affairs Committee, 2003). The material contained in the various 
reports was provided by the Intelligence agencies and other government 
departments to these inquiry bodies in response to formal requests. 
Collectively this public record of information now comprises an accurate and 
concise insight into the inner workings of these agencies, including 
organisational structures, inter-agency co-operation, the tasking process, 
limitations of various Intelligence sources, and other areas of interest to this 
paper.  
In writing this paper, the author has also drawn extensively on the personal 
experiences gained during his 30-year career in Intelligence, national security 
and counter-terrorism work. Since the author retired from the Intelligence 
community in 2009, he has continued to engage in the academic study of 
Intelligence, allowing him to straddle both the internal and the external 
viewpoints of the wider Intelligence community. His own personal knowledge 
and experience have been combined with the knowledge and experience of 
other Intelligence practitioners. A number of practitioners agreed to give 
personal interviews to the author, to provide unclassified and non-sensitive 
background material covering the key areas of the paper’s research. This has 
provided the author with unique access to the views of officers deeply 
involved in Intelligence and counter-terrorism work on behalf of the UK 
government. This type of first-hand experience is seldom published.  
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2.3 Ethical Issues and Problems Encountered 
As this research is centred on a topic which is sensitive in nature, the ethical 
considerations were carefully taken into account. After working for many years 
in a classified area, it is only natural that a classified body of knowledge is 
built up by anyone in this position. When this thesis was begun, the author 
was working in an Intelligence role overseas. The need to ensure that 
classified information did not inadvertently stray from the realms of memory 
into the body of the research was of paramount importance. This paper has 
been rigorously checked before submission, and has also been reviewed by 
more than one of the practitioners interviewed, to ensure that no sensitive 
information was contained within it. The author’s personal experiences of 
using the Intelligence cycle, together with his impressions of the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the model, have been incorporated into this 
research. These are more general observations and they do not rely on 
sensitive examples which would require an unacceptable level of detail to be 
revealed.  
All of the respondents who provided interview material are either currently 
working in, or have previously worked in, areas including Intelligence 
collection, analysis, reporting, law enforcement, covert surveillance, policing, 
customs or the Armed Forces. All have long experience in their fields and a 
number of them have had training in media handling, under whichever term it 
falls within the various organisations (e.g. Public Information, media relations, 
defence media, etc.) The start of each interview consisted of a lengthy 
summary provided by the author, regarding the boundaries of the research, 
and the fact that the research itself was unclassified. The Author agreed with 
all interviewees that any audio recordings would be securely scrubbed 
electronically, after the interviews were transcribed. It was also agreed with 
interviewees that all written transcripts would be securely shredded after the 
thesis was submitted. The shredding was completed using a 1mm diamond-
cut shredder, resulting in the same level of physical destruction as that 
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employed within government establishments. This meant that all interviewees 
were assured of the data security measures implemented around the 
recording of interviews. 
Compared with many Western countries, the UK has now placed into the 
public domain a substantial amount of previously classified documentation 
relating to the Intelligence world. Much of this has come from several  
government inquiries, some of which are covered in detail in this paper 
(Butler, 2004; Hutton, 2004). Some documents have been declassified in the 
public interest while others have been leaked and are now widely available on 
the internet (Rice, 2010).10 This has resulted in a previously unavailable body 
of classified material being made available to the academic corpus which 
studies Intelligence processes. Some of the declassified material, such as the 
“Downing Street Memo” (Rycroft, 2002) was singularly illuminating in 
informing public opinion of the perceptions of senior UK policy makers 
involved in discussions with the U.S. government, prior to the Allied invasion 
of Iraq in 2003.11 The unauthorised release by Chelsea (formerly Bradley) 
Manning, of classified material into the public domain, through the Wikileaks 
website, was previously unprecedented. The scale of the leaks and the viral 
spreading of the information on global “mirror sites” has meant that almost a 
million classified documents are now permanently located in the public 
domain. As one Intelligence officer remarked about these massive leaks: “we 
can’t put the genie back in the bottle this time” (Source_12, 2011). 
The potential for personal bias was also considered, due to the Author’s 
previous work. A large quantity of academic literature was reviewed before 
the writing of this thesis began, to provide as neutral an assessment as 
possible of the current and previous academic landscapes in the area of 
study. The thesis question was deliberately designed to cover a review of the 
model, to keep the outcome and conclusions open until all the research had 
                                            
10
 See Annex A for an example of a leaked U.S. Government report 
11
 See chapter 6.1.1  
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been completed. The subject of personal bias in research presents a field of 
study in itself, but it would be useful to note some key points here. Denzin 
(1989:12) believes that “interpretive research begins and ends with the 
biography and self of the researcher”, arguing that our own personalities 
dictate how we approach our research. According to this theory, removing all 
personal bias is impossible as our experiences have already preconditioned 
the ways in which we think about things. Mehra (2002:1) takes the argument 
further, arguing that even if the researcher tries to stop personal bias from 
entering their research, it will ultimately still affect it:  
 
“(the) qualitative research paradigm believes that (the) researcher is an 
important part of the process. The researcher can't separate himself or 
herself from the topic/people he or she is studying, it is in the 
interaction between the researcher and researched that the knowledge 
is created. So the researcher bias enters into the picture even if the 
researcher tries to stay out of it”. 
 
The framing of the thesis question was aimed at assessing whether or not the 
model of the Intelligence cycle remains effective. An assessment of this type 
is subjective by nature, but this does not necessarily imply a negative 
connotation. Heuer (1999:41–42), one of the most influential voices on the 
psychology of analysis, states that:  
 
“One might speculate that the analyst who seeks greater objectivity by 
suppressing recognition of his or her own subjective input actually has 
less valid input to make. Objectivity is gained by making assumptions 
explicit so that they may be examined and challenged, not by vain 
efforts to eliminate them from analysis”. 
 
The sourcing of opinion and comment from a range of senior and experienced 
practitioners from the Intelligence field adds a deeper and richer context to the 
academic framework of this study. Several academics have written papers on 
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the Intelligence cycle, but a number of them are written with no practical 
insight into this area. The addition of personal insight from a spectrum of 
Intelligence disciplines brings a unique layer of context within which this 
assessment can be viewed. The value of practitioner experience was 
highlighted by Geertz (1973:5) who said: “If you want to understand what a 
science is you should look in the first instance not at its theories or findings 
and certainly not at what its apologists say about it; you should look at what 
the practitioners of it do”.  
2.4 Literature Review 
There are several journals and publications which concentrate on Intelligence 
studies, counter-terrorism, and the government organisations which carry out 
this work. These include, but are not limited to, “Studies of Intelligence”, 
“Cambridge Review of International Affairs”, “International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence”, “Intelligence and National Security”, 
“Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism”, “Journal of Peace 
Research, “Journal of International Law” and the “Journal of Strategic 
Studies”. Additionally available material includes individual academic papers 
on Intelligence studies, position papers, newspaper articles, television 
documentaries, academic and non-academic books, UK legislation, political 
discussions in the Houses of Commons and Lords, and internet-based articles 
covering Intelligence and terrorism.  
One of the biggest difficulties in Intelligence research has always been the 
availability of official documents relating to this subject matter. In addition to 
the UK governmental inquiries mentioned previously, the past decade has 
seen an increase in academic research in the field of Intelligence studies. This 
paper, although focused on the UK, draws on personal experiences in using 
Intelligence within an operational context in the UK and overseas. This 
provides an additional degree of context regarding the peculiar difficulties 
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encountered in using the Intelligence cycle in hostile environments such as 
Iraq and Afghanistan, compared to UK-based operations. 
The review of literature gives a high-level view of the current body of 
knowledge around the area of the thesis and serves three purposes. First, it 
identifies the extent of the key writings from the current literature available. 
Second, it was very useful in ensuring that there was no case of information 
overload when the research for the thesis began, as the key writings and 
findings had already been identified and extracted. Third, this body of key 
literature was assessed to elicit what areas it covered, the gaps which it did 
not cover at all (or covered but not to a satisfactory degree) and it was 
critically analysed for its relevance and contribution to the thesis question.  
The “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction” published by 
Lord Butler in July 2004 described the Intelligence process in some detail in 
its first chapter (Butler, 2004:7-16). In its conclusions, the report covered 
broad topics such as general summaries about the UK Intelligence machinery, 
Intelligence assessments and the use and validation of Intelligence. The 
enquiry focused on “Intelligence coverage available in respect of WMD 
programmes in countries of concern” among other areas (Butler, 2004:1). 
While some areas of the Intelligence process were put under the microscope 
by this enquiry, the scope of the report was more broad than narrow.  
The “Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of 
Dr David Kelly C.M.G.” published by Lord Hutton in January 2004 (Hutton, 
2004) contained a critical analysis of the provenance of Intelligence in the so-
called “September dossier”. This was a declassified summary of the UK 
Government’s evidence that Saddam Hussein was developing a WMD 
programme. As the provenance of Intelligence is a key factor in the 
Intelligence cycle, the Hutton Inquiry also provided a wealth of source material 
for scholars and academics of Intelligence studies (Hutton, 2004:119–124). 
The Hutton Inquiry dissected the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr 
Kelly, but stopped short at voicing concrete recommendations. Lord Hutton 
explained his reasons for this, in the final chapter of the report, stating that: “I 
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have decided that it is unnecessary for me to make any express 
recommendations because I have no doubt that the BBC and the Government 
will take note of the criticisms which I have made in this report” (2004:327). 
The Hutton Inquiry did, however, further ignite the public debate about the 
government’s use of Intelligence, the “spin” that was believed to have been 
put on it, and the wider politicization of Intelligence. 
Lefebvre’s paper (2004), “A Look at Intelligence Analysis”, is a suitable start 
point for looking at the process of analysis, covering ground such as the role 
of the Intelligence analyst and how analysts deal with uncertainty. He also 
asks a pertinent question, whether terrorism should be analysed differently, 
although the paper is not detailed enough to attempt anything more than a 
brief consideration of this question. 
A RAND paper from 2008, “Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis”, 
covers similar ground to Lefebvre’s paper, but with a distinctly US-centric 
approach (Gabbard & Treverton, 2008). Most of the paper’s recommendations 
only concern the U.S. Intelligence community and the training and productive 
employment of Intelligence analysts therein. The recommendations 
themselves are more conceptual than practical, such as “a set of basic 
software tools common to the analytic community would facilitate joint 
analysis. An analyst from one agency could move to a task force or another 
agency and be able to “plug and play,” without first having to master a new 
analytic workstation” (Gabbard & Treverton, 2008:37).12  
A useful collection of academic essays is contained in “Secret Intelligence: A 
Reader” (Andrew et al., 2009). Warner’s essay (2002) dissects the problem of 
concisely defining Intelligence and he compares and contrasts a selection of 
definitions from narrow to broad, dating from 1955 to the present day. He 
concludes with his own definition of Intelligence as: “…secret, state activity to 
                                            
12
 When this author worked in a national Intelligence agency, he had login details for almost 30 separate software 
tools and programs, and in addition, used another 20 or so which did not require a login. Many tools, as defined 
within the RAND report, are specific to task, discipline or repository. A SIGINT agency, for example, has extremely 
specific tools which would not be suitable for use in other agencies, such as a HUMINT agency.  
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understand or influence foreign entities” (Warner, 2002:21).13 Davies presents 
a paper discussing some of the differences in British and U.S. definitions of 
Intelligence, and the importance this makes, specifically in how the 
Intelligence agencies of the two countries have traditionally approached the 
business of Intelligence collection and use ( 2002). Davies (2009:13) provides 
a detailed consideration of his topic, although some statements are 
inaccurate, such as “While U.S. Intelligence analysis is professionalized, in 
British practice it is really no more than the ordinary work of government 
departments and ministries”. A highly detailed and well-researched paper by 
Aid (2009:40–77) examines the use of SIGINT in the field of international 
counter-terrorism, in which he usefully draws on examples of both U.S. and 
UK SIGINT collection against terrorist targets such as Al Qa’eda operatives. 
Aid’s paper is all the more interesting for providing this detailed technical 
analysis on the topic of SIGINT, which is so rarely written about with such 
factual credibility. Aid also covers more wide-ranging topics related to SIGINT 
and counter-terrorism, such as the issues surrounding the dissemination of 
SIGINT material to customers, the problems encountered within inter-agency 
co-operation and the analytic shortcomings of the system due to problems 
such as a shortage of trained linguists. 
Two essays by Jervis (2006:193-228) and Aldrich (2009:229–244) 
respectively cover Intelligence failures and four of the recent enquiries in the 
UK within which Intelligence became a key factor. Jervis (2006:193) 
introduces his paper with a hard-hitting statement on the Iraq WMD issue:  
 
“The investigations are marred by political bias and excessive 
hindsight. Neither the investigations nor contemporary 
Intelligence on Iraqi WMD followed good social science 
practices. The comparative method was not utilized, 
confirmation bias was rampant, alternative hypothesis were 
                                            
13
 See chapter 3.2 for a detailed analysis of various definitions of Intelligence 
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not tested, and negative evidence was ignored. Although the 
opportunities to do better are many, the prospects for 
adequate reform are not good”.  
 
Jervis discusses two types of Intelligence failure, both equally important and 
equally relevant in counter-terrorism Intelligence. The first type of failure he 
classes as “the mismatch between the estimates and what later information 
reveals to have been true” (Jervis 2006:197), and he classes the second type 
as “a falling short of what we could expect a good service to have done” 
(2006:198). The term “Intelligence failure” is now widely used in the media 
when reporting on both failed and successful terrorist plots. The questionable 
usage of the term by the media has resulted in the public perception of this 
word being critically distorted. What is often reported in a media report as an 
Intelligence failure is actually an Intelligence gap, and the distinctions between 
these terms, are covered in this paper.14  
Aldrich’s essay examines the approaches taken by, and the conclusions of, 
four separate Intelligence inquiries undertaken by various elements of, or on 
behalf of, the UK government between July 2003 and July 2004. Aldrich’s 
work (2005; 2009) has direct relevance to a number of areas in this research 
paper, as he states:  
 
“Although the enquiries have been useful in underlining the 
extent of genuine “Intelligence failure”, wider reflections about 
the nature and direction of UK Intelligence have been 
conspicuously absent. None of the enquiries has dealt with 
the difficult issue of how Intelligence analysis might interface 
with modern styles of policy-making. More broadly, it is 
argued that there is a growing mismatch between what 
                                            
14
 See chapter 3.2.1 and chapter 6. 
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Intelligence can reasonably achieve and the improbable 
expectations of politicians and policy-makers” (2005:1).  
 
 
Another detailed collection of essays lies in “Learning from the Secret Past: 
Cases in British Intelligence History”, edited by Dover and Goodman. The 
essays cover four central themes: the organisation and oversight of 
Intelligence; political interference in Intelligence; counter-insurgency and 
counter-terrorism; avoiding surprise. The essays include work by notable 
academics including Aldrich, Gill, Goodman, Herman, Phythian and Scott, 
among others. Adding particular interest to this collection is the inclusion of 
actual Intelligence documents upon which each essay is based. This lends an 
additional, historical focus to the work and brings academic insight to 
important documents such as “The Intelligence Machine” (Cavendish-
Bentinck & Capel-Dunn, 1945) and “The JIC and Warning of Aggression” 
(Nicoll, 1981), known as the Nicoll Report. 
Schindler (2009) writes on the relationship between Intelligence and strategy 
in respect to counter-terrorism and the Islamist threat. He briefly examines 
three case studies in counter-terrorism: Yugoslavia, Israel and Algeria. Even 
though specific links to Intelligence material within these campaigns are very 
thin, it is Schindler’s conclusions that they are of more interest and relevance. 
Schindler muses on “the way ahead” (2009:255), pondering the limits of 
countering terrorism through offensive measures such as financial interdiction, 
the targeted assassination/detention of top-tier terrorist figures, and a publicity 
drive to counter the propaganda message of the salafist-jihadist publicity 
machine. He advocates the covert penetration of terrorist groups to prevent 
them co-operating with other groups and to deny them the opportunity of 
increasing their operational capability and effectiveness. He also makes a 
valid point that has direct relevance to UK counter-terrorism. Discussing 
President Bush’s call for a 50% increase in CIA operations officers, Schindler 
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comments: “Mere numbers cannot compensate for missing expertise or 
ability, nor will it fix a broken tradecraft model” (2009:256). His statement is of 
equal relevance to the directive that the UK’s Security Service should 
increase its manpower by 50%, as a post-incident response to the London 
bombings of July 2003. A director of the Security Service, speaking in a public 
lecture, confirmed in 2006 that this increase had been achieved 
(Manningham-Buller, 2006).  
In “Intelligence-Led Policing”, Ratcliffe introduces the origins of the concept 
(2008:16–40), before delving into the tricky issue of actually defining it 
(2008:65–88). His work examines the analytical frameworks surrounding 
Intelligence-led policing, and he covers several useful models, such as Gill’s 
cybernetic model (2000:22), the UK National Intelligence Model (NIM) (NCIS, 
2000) and Ratcliffe’s own 3-i model (2003:109). As Ratcliffe’s work focuses on 
policing and not counter-terrorism specifically, he understandably places a 
greater emphasis on the UK’s National Intelligence Model. He provides a 
thorough and detailed examination of the components of the NIM, how it is 
deployed, the composite products enshrined by it and what benefits it should 
provide. Much of his writing equally applies to policing and to counter-
terrorism. Writing on the relationship between Intelligence and the general 
public, Ratcliffe (2008:49) considers the situation in the US, describing: 
 
 “a growing recognition of the need to redefine community 
policing (where it is still practised) within an Intelligence-led 
policing framework for counter-terrorism purposes, even 
though most local law enforcement officers have never had 
intelligence training and thus would be hard-pressed to 
recognise, or know how to share, information pertaining to 
terrorism that they may receive from the public”. 
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A duo of well-regarded writers on various aspects of policing and Intelligence, 
Clive and Karen Harfield, have produced a detailed work on the role of 
Intelligence in Policing, and the relevant legislation pertaining to it. Their work 
starts with a discussion of the concepts of Intelligence-led Policing (Harfield & 
Harfield, 2008:4–5), before moving on to a deeper examination of the 
problems with trying to define Intelligence (2008:50–68). Only four pages are 
devoted to a description of the Intelligence cycle itself (Harfield & Harfield, 
2008:63–66), but their deeper discussions surrounding the use of Intelligence 
are most useful. The book deals with the Intelligence process and it devotes 
an entire chapter to the UK National Intelligence Model, as it is central to 
Intelligence-led Policing and to counter-terrorism in the UK (Harfield & 
Harfield, 2008:91–93). 
An educational research consortium called the Transnational Terrorism, 
Security and the Rule of Law (TTSRL) was established by the European 
Commission (EC) in Brussels. One area of their research for the EC is on 
“Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society” and a TTSRL-
authored paper covers the difficult issue of defining terrorism (TTRSL, 2008). 
This policy brief begins by stating the case for arriving at a common definition 
of terrorism, recognising that “in today’s globalized world, it is impossible to 
fight terrorism effectively without functional cross-border cooperation” 
(2008:1). It explains why an agreed definition is essential, in areas such as 
extradition or cross-border prosecution, and also makes a relevant connection 
between defining terrorism and ensuring transparency in deciding upon 
eligibility for refugee status. The report is hard-hitting and practical, and it 
does not shy away from criticising EU member states which it considers could 
do more.  The UK is included in this category by the TTSRL consortium 
(2008:3). The most useful addition the policy brief makes is the identification 
of six key points, referred to as definitional elements, which the TTSRL 
considers necessary inclusions for any sound definition of terrorism. The brief 
also highlights why the EU’s current “framework” definition is not effective, 
and why it needs to be strengthened (TTSRL, 2008:2). 
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As a writer on terrorism, Richard Jackson is prolific and controversial and he 
considers that terrorism is poorly defined and poorly characterised (2007:1). 
Jackson adds that the field of critical terrorism studies (CTS), on which he 
writes, is “characterised by a set of core epistemological, ontological and 
ethical commitments” (2007:1). He expands on this theme, analysing what he 
calls the “politically constructed nature of terrorism”, and provides harsh 
criticism of four weaknesses which he contends have had a continual and 
negative effect upon the academic study of terrorism (Jackson, 2007:1).  
The targets of Jackson’s criticism are: poor and/or weak research 
methodology in the previous academic studies of terrorism, its root causes 
and definitions; the “accepted” body of knowledge being “highly contestable 
and largely unsupported by empirical research”; the linkages between many 
researchers of terrorism and the State-funded institutions which support them, 
and the lack of perceived neutrality or transparency which this can portray 
(the RAND corporation, for example, is singled out for particularly harsh 
criticism for what Jackson perceives as its lack of neutrality); finally, current 
models of approaching terrorism come from a “problem-solving” perspective, 
which assumes that the current status quo of the global political arena 
remains stable, a fact which Jackson sees as being a major contributory 
factor to the lack of a clear definition of terrorism (Jackson, 2007:1-7). 
Although there is a clear academic grievance in Jackson’s criticisms, 
especially against the various works of Schmid, Silke, Jongman and other 
academics of Intelligence studies, he does make some valid points and 
justifies them accordingly. He presses for a “broad, epistemological 
orientation” in the field of terrorism studies, demanding to know who the 
research is primarily for, and how it will assist (Jackson, 2007:3). 
A paper by Jones (2007) on terrorism studies takes as the centre point for its 
study the failure of the academic branch of terrorism studies to have 
satisfactorily moved the debate on to an explanatory level. On the contrary, 
the report, consisting of a critical examination of the literature in the field of 
terrorism studies in the period 2000-2007, suggests that the study of terrorism 
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has not benefited from the amount of academic effort which has been put into 
it.  
Schbley’s paper (2003) on “Defining Religious Terrorism” recommends an 
interesting change in emphasis in the search for an acceptable, academic 
definition of terrorism. While retaining the focus on the methods used by 
terrorists, she proposes examining the actus reus of terrorist actions, rather 
than continuing with the more usual focus on the mens rea of those actions 
(Schbley, 2003:106).15 Schbley considers that a definition of terrorism needs 
to be “removed from politics and placed into the realms of criminal justice and 
future international criminal court(s)” (2003:106) and she provides her own 
definition of terrorism as: “Terrorism is any violent act upon symbolic civilians 
and their properties” (2003:107). 
While the detail of Schbley’s paper adds much to the academic debate, her 
definition of terrorism adds less. Under the above definition, for example, an 
attack by a gang of hooligans upon a city Mayor and his official vehicle would 
be construed as terrorism. Schbley argues that the jus in bello of any such 
attack can never be justified by the counter-theory of jus ad bellum, although 
this leaves her own definition somewhat open to question (2003:107).16  
Furthermore, she postulates that any definition of terrorism must “focus on a 
corpus delicti of irrefutable and uncontroverted facts that constitute its spirit 
and parameters” (Schbley, 2003:106).17 From Schbley’s perspective, this 
would remove any possibility for legitimacy or justification of the terrorist 
                                            
15
 The terms actus reus and mens rea refer respectively to concepts usually translated as “guilty act and “guilty 
mind”. The concepts have their genesis in a legal principle stated by Edward Coke (1552-1634) which declared 
“actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”. Roughly translated, the principle states that the act alone does not make 
someone guilty, unless the mind also is guilty. 
16
 Laws such as the 1949 Geneva Convention stipulate certain conditions which warring nations must abide by in the 
engagement of war, such as the wearing of a standardised and easily recognisable uniform, the treatment of 
prisoners of war and the safeguarding of historically significant buildings. These constitute the jus in bello, or the 
acceptable limits of conduct during war. The justification on which it is considered acceptable to go to war constitutes 
the jus ad bellum.  
17
 The term corpus delicti (meaning “body of crime” in Latin) relates to the principle that, before an individual can be 
convicted of committing a crime, that crime itself must be proven to have taken place. According to Black's Law 
Dictionary, corpus delicti is defined as "the fact of a crime having been actually committed". 
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offence being claimed, and ultimately, she considers that: “a terrorist for one 
must be perceived as a terrorist for all” (2003:106). 
2.5 Collecting the Raw Data and Methods of Analysis 
The primary question which this thesis seeks to answer is whether the 
Intelligence cycle is still an effective and fit-for-purpose model for the UK’s 
counter-terrorism needs. A major benefit of the author’s previous experience 
is the access to a wide-ranging network of practitioners, retired and serving, 
who all have long experience in the fields of counter-terrorism and/or 
Intelligence. To exclude personal bias as much as possible, none of the 
people who were approached to be interviewed had at any time acted in a 
work capacity as either the superior or the subordinate of the author. None of 
the interviewees are related to the author. Each individual was approached 
because they had the necessary experience and knowledge to make a 
valuable and unique contribution to the further study of the Intelligence field.  
A total of eighteen individuals were approached, and all agreed to participate 
in the interviews. Of these, three were unable to do the interviews, either due 
to travel abroad, operational commitments and workload, or a combination of 
both these factors. It was accepted from the outset by the author that such a 
small number could not be described as constituting a representative sample, 
and indeed this was not the aim of the interviews. Rather, the aim was to use 
the filter of the personal perception of actual practitioners in Intelligence. This 
provided a unique perspective on the opinions of people who are or were 
recently actively engaged in counter-terrorism and/or Intelligence, regarding 
the effectiveness of the Intelligence cycle.  
The majority of interviews were conducted in 2012, with a small number being 
done in 2013 and 2014. All interviewees were asked if they consented to the 
interview being recorded, for the sake of accuracy and transcription. All 
agreed, with the majority requesting that the audio recordings be securely 
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erased after the interviews were transcribed, and the written transcripts 
destroyed after the thesis was submitted, due to the nature of the topic. In the 
event, this policy was implemented for all of the audio and written records, to 
ensure fairness and parity. 
While it would undoubtedly add to the clarity of the interview material if every 
comment was referenced to a particular interviewee, it was agreed with the 
interviewees that this would only be done in the case of generic comments 
which did not reveal any of their personal backgrounds. The interviewees’ 
combined amount of service totals almost 300 man-years of work in the areas 
of policing, security, sensitive Intelligence, counter-terrorism, counter-
narcotics and law enforcement. In order to preserve the anonymity of the 
sources, no ranks, grades, appointments or seniorities have been divulged in 
this thesis, and neither have their exact number of years’ service or 
experience been given. What can be said, however, is that none of the people 
interviewed have less than twenty years of operational experience in their 
respective fields and they have current or previous experience working in the 
following organisations: Security Service; SIS; GCHQ; the Police forces of the 
UK; Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise; Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA) (now the National Crime Agency); Special Forces; Intelligence Corps 
(British Army); Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); Defence 
Intelligence Staff (DIS) (now Defence Intelligence (DI)). Some have 
experience in more than one agency but this has not been disclosed in the 
thesis, to preserve their anonymity. Each interviewee was carefully selected 
for their experience, knowledge and field of operational activities. The author 
knows each of them personally. 
2.6  Interview structure and interview questions 
All interviewees were provided with an interview background form prior to the 
interviews being conducted. A sample of the form is provided at Annex B. The 
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form was designed by another Doctoral Student on the same course, who 
generously provided permission to use this template after his successful 
graduation (Bhayani, 2013). This form explained a number of key areas. The 
abstract of the thesis was provided, which explained the aim of the paper and 
highlighted why the interviews were a key component of the research. As the 
interviewees all come from operational backgrounds, the principles of 
confidentiality and anonymity were very important, both to them and to the 
author. The form explained that any information which they might provide 
would only be included in the thesis if they agreed to its inclusion, having 
been made aware of the context in which the information would be used. It 
also reassured them that their identities, ranks/grades and other identifying 
information would be omitted, to ensure that any aggregated background 
information could not be analysed in the future, to reveal their identities or 
their specific roles at a defined point in time. These conditions were related 
verbally to the interviewees when they were initially approached about their 
willingness to contribute to the research, and they were related again at the 
start of the interview process.  
It was agreed that an audio recording would be made of each interview, for 
the purposes of accuracy. On several occasions, a number of interviewees 
asked for the recording to be stopped so that they could discuss a sensitive 
topic, usually concerning an operation. On some occasions, it was requested 
that both the audio recording was stopped, and that no written notes were 
made. On other occasions, it was requested only that the audio recording was 
stopped, but the making of written notes was permitted, as the topic was less 
sensitive. As all of the interviewees are known personally to the Author, none 
of them requested to see a transcript of the finished interview. 
It was initially planned to conduct each interview for around 90 minutes, to 
allow sufficient time to discuss the Intelligence cycle and its effectiveness. 
Two interviews lasted just under an hour, due to time constraints of the 
interviewees. Several lasted in excess of three hours, with one being 
conducted over a period of two weeks, due to the sheer amount of material 
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covered. Geographic location and operational availability meant that two 
people were interviewed on more than one occasion. The interview was 
structured around seven questions, which were listed by the author at the 
start of each interview. The questions were asked as follows: 
 
1. What model of the Intelligence cycle do you use in your 
workplace? 
2. Is Evaluation included as a stage in the model which 
your workplace uses? 
3. In your experience, what are the things which go wrong 
in the use of the Intelligence cycle? 
4. Do you feel that the things which go wrong are usually 
in the same parts of the cycle? 
5. In your opinion, could the Intelligence cycle be 
improved? If so, how? 
6. Is the Intelligence cycle fit for purpose in your area of 
work, and in UK counter-terrorism? 
7. Do you have any final thoughts on what has been 
discussed? 
 
The breakdown of the interviewees was as follows: 
 
Source Agency  
Interview 01 Police 
Interview 02 Police 
Interview 03 GCHQ 
Interview 04 Police 
Interview 05 SIS 
Interview 06 SIS 
Interview 07 Special Forces 
Interview 08 Security Service 
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Interview 09 Defence Intelligence 
Interview 10 Army 
Interview 11 GCHQ  
Interview 12 GCHQ 
Interview 13 SOCA (now NCA) 
Interview 14 FCO 
Table 2 List of interviewees and their primary agencies 
 
This chapter covered the methodology of the research, outlining the 
theoretical framework and the sources of information used. The importance 
was described, of using individual perspectives from serving and retired 
officials experienced in working with the model. Ethical considerations were 
then covered, with emphasis given to the care which has been taken to 
ensure that sensitive information was not inadvertently included in the finished 
research. The issue of personal bias in research was discussed and 
examples were quoted from notable academics in this field, describing the 
academic conflict inherent in conducting research, yet trying to ensure that 
personal bias does not exert an undue influence on the material collected, the 
interpretation of it, or the final conclusions of the research. A copy of the 
participant consent form was included and discussed, to demonstrate the 
information provided to each individual for reasons of disclosure and 
transparency. Finally, the process of the semi-structured interviews was 
outlined, showing where the conversations flowed from. 
The next chapter describes the theoretical framework in detail. Two key terms 
are used in the thesis question: Intelligence and terrorism. While it is standard 
practice to define such terms, it is clear that these two key terms have 
inherent difficulties associated with defining and using them, especially the 
label of terrorism. The theoretical framework conducts a deep analysis of both 
terms. Many different definitions are provided as examples, and the merits of 
each are discussed. Defining the term of Intelligence has challenged 
government agencies and experienced academics equally. Some academics 
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have employed various continua to contrast different definitions, while others 
have considered whether Intelligence is a structure, a process, a product, or a 
combination of any or all of these three concepts. Still others, primarily from 
government bodies, have crafted definitions which are products of the age in 
which they were made, such as those written in the immediate years after the 
Second World War or at the height of the Cold War.  
Definitions of terrorism are even more politically, socially, legally and morally 
charged. The examination of the concept of terrorism takes in a wide range of 
thinking, of definitions, of academic argument and of the use of the term as an 
accusation. The cases of individuals are discussed, all of whom were directly 
associated with, or participated in, terrorism. Two of them were subsequently 
awarded the Nobel Price for Peace. These cases are included to illustrate the 
sheer complexity involved in attempting to define terrorism. Even the 
combined resources of the United Nations have been unable to craft an 
agreed definition of terrorism. It appears to be something which most of us 
think we recognise, but would struggle to describe it accurately, inclusively, 
fairly and succinctly. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework: Defining Intelligence and 
Terrorism 
 “And Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan, and said 
unto them, Get you up this way southward, and go up into the 
mountain: And see the land, what it is; and the people that dwelleth 
therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many; And what 
the land is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad; and what 
cities they be that they dwell in, whether in tents, or in strong holds; 
And what the land is, whether it be fat or lean, whether there be 
wood therein, or not”.18 
 
Chapter 2 provided a brief outline of the methodology of this thesis, starting 
with an introduction to the theoretical framework. Some of the problems 
encountered in the research were described, such as the problem created 
with the unauthorised release of a huge quantity of classified documents to 
the Wikileaks website, together with their usefulness to the academic study of 
Intelligence. An extensive literature review followed, providing an assessment 
of a curated selection from the current landscape of academic writing in the 
areas of terrorism and Intelligence. The mechanism of collecting and 
processing personal experiences from interview subjects was then described, 
as this primary source material constitutes a critical part of the thesis. The 
personal insights collected from serving and retired counter-terrorism and 
Intelligence professionals constitute a unique body of knowledge in a subject 
which has relatively few practitioners studying it academically. The ethical 
considerations of the interviews were described, with considerable detail 
explaining the necessary security measures taken to safeguard the identities 
                                            
18
 King James Bible, Numbers 13:17-20. This quote is often seen on the desks and walls within the UK intelligence 
community. It is also an excellent example of the “direction” phase of the Intelligence cycle. 
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of the interviewees, as well as the original records of the interviews, some of 
which were audio and some written. Chapter 3 advances this overview by 
moving into a detailed study of the definitions of the two key terms in the 
thesis question: terrorism and Intelligence. It also considers the inherent 
problems encountered with trying to define these terms and with the 
subsequent employment of them.  
No serious analysis of the Intelligence cycle in counter-terrorism can be 
conducted before a thorough examination of the various definitions of these 
two terms has first been carried out, including the component parts of the 
definitions and the issues which revolve around them. The first half of this 
chapter takes the definition of Intelligence as its subject, looking at a number 
of definitions, analysing the component parts of them and considering their 
effectiveness in terms of practicality and employability. A brief summary is 
then provided, of the difference between an Intelligence gap and an 
Intelligence failure. Some definitions and causes are considered, using 
examples from works by Schulsky (Schulsky & Schmitt, 2002), O’Connor 
(n.d.), Laquer (1985), Lowenthal (2003) and Treverton (2008). The second 
half then considers the definition of terrorism, a highly political topic and one 
which is regnant in the academic communities of terrorism studies and 
Intelligence studies. A wide selection of terrorism definitions is then examined, 
and a number of issues are identified and discussed, which primarily emanate 
from the vagaries of these definitions.  
3.1 Defining Intelligence 
Attempting to define concepts as complex as terrorism and Intelligence 
creates problems which have troubled writers and practitioners for decades.  
It is often written, incorrectly, that the eminent military strategist von 
Clausewitz considered Intelligence to only add to the “fog of war”, thus 
consigning Intelligence to the bottom drawer. While this maxim has now 
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entered contemporary perceived wisdom, particularly in the military 
community, the phrase “fog of war” was not actually used by von Clausewitz 
in his book “On War”. He wrote: “all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind 
of twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to makes things seem 
grotesque and larger than they really are” (Clausewitz, 1976:140). Clausewitz’ 
main point, however, is directly relevant to the area of study concerned with 
definitions of Intelligence. 
Although the collection of Intelligence has been around for millennia, it can be 
argued that we are no closer to a generally accepted definition of the concept. 
Gill (2009) states that there are three compelling reasons for a comparative 
study of Intelligence. First, the rationale for even conducting such a 
comparative analysis in the first place is a prerequisite, and he uses Bayley’s 
argument (1999:3–4), that: “…all science is comparative in the sense of 
depending upon analysis of multiple cases. Science is the systematic 
observation of many instances of a phenomenon”. Second, he considers 
classification to be “the first step of any science”, thus the classification of 
Intelligence and its related systems is of importance (Gill, 2009:83). Finally, 
the empirical body of evidence regarding the various definitions, systems, 
agencies, etc. should produce both differences and similarities which can be 
further studied and more deeply analysed (Gill 2009, p.83). He uses a 
thought-provoking comment from Herman (2001:138), namely that 
intelligence is not “an isolated activity. It is an integral part of government. It 
reflects the character of national constitutions and the societies in which it is 
set”. This comment is of direct relevance to the chapter on the UK’s counter-
terrorism strategy (CONTEST) for Herman’s point is very true; it is impossible 
to separate the Intelligence process from the governmental processes of the 
country conducting it.  
An oft-quoted maxim in Intelligence agencies says that “Intelligence is finding 
out other people’s secrets”, but while this encapsulates a core principle, it 
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does not suffice as a definition.19 Many definitions of Intelligence can be 
placed on an axis stretching from broad to narrow. At the broader end of the 
spectrum, definitions tend to include the entire intelligence process, up to and 
including all-source fusion, while at the narrower end of the spectrum, 
definitions focus more upon the actual collection itself. Warner (2002), Davies 
(2002) and others argue that this also provides a roughly equivalent spectrum 
upon which can be mapped the differing definitions of Intelligence which are 
held by the U.S. and UK. This theory holds that U.S. definitions generally tend 
to the broader end of the scale, while UK definitions tend to lean towards the 
narrower end. Davies writes at great length on this particular continuum and 
holds the opinion that broad definitions are less desirable as he believes that 
the resultant product from agencies using broad definitions will be competitive 
instead of complimentary. The end result, according to Davies, is “conflict, not 
consensus” (Davies cited in Treverton et al. 2006:21). 
Another method expresses these definitions in a span ranging from 
“analytical” at one end, to “operational” at the other. Additional axes have 
been employed to assist with the mapping of definitions of Intelligence, such 
as the one spanning from “informational” at one end, to “organisational” at the 
other. Warner (2002:16) in particular considers some definitions being firmly 
entrenched at the informational end of the spectrum, something he considers 
ironic as these definitions are all the product of elements of the U.S. 
Intelligence community, or reports prepared on their behalf. Davies (2009:14) 
goes one stage further, arguing that the U.S approach considers information 
as “a specific component of Intelligence, while Britain approaches Intelligence 
as a specific type of information”. 
While these models only place a definition of Intelligence somewhere between 
two ends of a scale, Kent’s position (1949:60) as early as 1949 was that 
Intelligence comprises three distinct types of substantive content, which he 
named as “descriptive”, “current-reportorial” and “speculative-emulative”. 
                                            
19
 The author first heard this in 1984 and it has continued to be quoted since then. No attribution has been found for 
this maxim. 
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Descriptive was identified as being essential to the other two components, 
adding that descriptive is “the groundwork which gives meaning to day-to-day 
change and…without which, speculation into the future is likely to be 
meaningless” (Kent, 1949:60) and he considered it the “most important 
complicated element of strategic intelligence” (Kent, 1949:viii). Current-
reportorial he described as “keeping track of the modalities of change” (Kent, 
1949:30), thus encouraging the analyst to constantly update his or her own 
knowledge on a target or subject as the picture changes. This is behaviour 
which is still strongly encouraged to this day within GCHQ, SIS and the 
Security Service. Kent’s speculative-evaluative component is the trickiest of 
the three to describe and assess, focusing as it does on the analyst’s ability to 
answer the fundamental question of the entire Intelligence process: “so 
what?” Kent’s own description (1949:39–40) of the speculative-evaluative 
aspect states that it is “far more speculative than…the basic descriptive and 
current reportorial…” adding that it “…puts a very high premium on the 
seeker’s power of evaluation and reasoned extrapolation”. 
It is a useful exercise to examine some definitions to compare and contrast 
them, and to understand the difficulties in trying to define Intelligence. The 
following definition comes from the U.S. National Security Act of 1947 
(Senate, 1947:sec.3): “The term foreign intelligence means information 
relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or 
elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons”. This definition 
was cast in the immediate post-war years and carries with it the introspective 
focus, even the obsession and paranoia, then prevalent regarding U.S. 
concerns about the Soviet threat. Particularly in the aftermath of the post-
2001 September attacks upon the USA and the terrorist threat which many 
countries now face from within the ranks of the population of their own 
nationals, the above definition does not bound the concept of Intelligence with 
sufficient inclusiveness. The terrorist attacks on the London transport system 
on 07 July 2005 (and the subsequent foiled attacks on 21 July 2005) were a 
stark reminder of the domestic terrorist threat which the UK faces. A definition 
   
65 
 
exclusively focused on foreign elements falls far short of what is now required 
for an effective and workable definition of Intelligence for the UK.  
Two years after the introduction of the National Security Act 1947, Kent 
attempted to frame Intelligence in a paper on U.S. foreign policy in 1949, 
writing (1949:vii) : “Intelligence, as I am writing of it, is the knowledge which 
our highly placed civilians and military men must have to safeguard the 
national welfare”. This definition was rather vague but to be fair to Kent, the 
focus of his paper was not an academic discussion of what Intelligence 
consists of, rather it was a broader look at strategic Intelligence, within the 
context of U.S. foreign policy in the highly charged years immediately 
following the end of World War Two, and the descent of the “iron curtain” 
across Eastern Europe.  
Six years later in 1955, the Clark Task Force (1955:26) made the following 
definition: “Intelligence deals with all the things which should be known in 
advance of initiating an action”. This definition is so broad as to be of almost 
no practical use. Intelligence has a major role to play in informing decision-
making, and the Intelligence cycle functions to provide the required product 
which can assist decision-making. Intelligence agencies, however, are rarely 
(if ever) in possession of all the facts desirous of being known by those 
directing the Intelligence process. Intelligence only assists the decision-
makers. It does not, and cannot, make the decision by itself. The Clark Task 
Force definition considers that all things needing to be known prior to 
beginning a course of action fall under the term “Intelligence” yet this definition 
presages accusations of Intelligence failures because of its very wording: if 
we should know something prior to taking action, and we don’t know it, this 
would be termed as an Intelligence failure by the Clark definition, rather than 
an Intelligence gap. 
Some things on the Intelligence “shopping list” will never be known, despite 
the Intelligence community throwing all its resources at a problem. This leads 
to a discussion perennial in the world of Intelligence analysis: the topic of 
secrets and mysteries. Secrets are those things which the Intelligence 
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community tries to uncover through all the means at their disposal. Mysteries 
are much less straightforward and may never be known.  Nye (1994:88) 
provides a slightly different description of the distinction, that: “a secret is 
something that can be stolen by a spy or discerned by a technical sensor … A 
mystery is an abstract puzzle to which no one can be sure of the answer”.  
A simplified example of the difference between a mystery and a secret could 
be as follows: a secret is the disposition of Soviet strategic rocket forces 
during the Cold War, while a mystery is the mind-set of the Soviet leader at 
that time, and how he was expected to react, given a particular scenario. 
Andrew (2004:4) considers that collectively, analysts need to consider the 
past before trying to predict the future, noting that: “during the twentieth 
century we were frequently very good at discovering our opponents' secrets 
when it mattered most but more confused than we should have been by the 
mysteries of what they intended to do”. Treverton (2009:9) notes a particular 
difficulty in collecting Intelligence for counter-terrorism, stating that: “Cold War 
espionage practices will not work against terrorist targets because ... Al 
Qaeda operatives do not go to embassy cocktail parties”. Butler (2004:14) 
contributed to this argument, taking the discussion further by considering how 
a mystery cannot be converted into a secret by the Intelligence process, 
stating:  
 
“A hidden limitation of intelligence is its inability to transform a 
mystery into a secret. In principle, intelligence can be expected 
to uncover secrets. The enemy’s order of battle may not be 
known, but it is knowable. The enemy’s intentions may not be 
known, but they too are knowable. But mysteries are essentially 
unknowable: what a leader truly believes, or what his reaction 
would be in certain circumstances, cannot be known, but can 
only be judged. JIC judgements have to cover both secrets and 
mysteries. Judgement must still be informed by the best 
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available information, which often means a contribution from 
intelligence. But it cannot import certainty”. 
 
The Clark Task Force definition is very broad in its terms of reference and it 
focuses on Intelligence as information, as opposed to Intelligence as process, 
or even as activity. Yet it also introduces the idea of action, something which 
has become a prime focus of the UK and U.S. Intelligence agencies since the 
11 September attacks by Al Qa’eda. This focus was borne out of the need to 
take what was initially highly classified Intelligence and to sanitise it 
sufficiently that it could actually be used by those closer to the front-line 
operational areas, often described by soldiers as “where the flesh meets the 
metal”.20  
Vernon Walters (1978:621) was Deputy Director of U.S. Central Intelligence 
when he crafted the following definition in 1975: “Intelligence is information, 
not always available in the public domain, relating to the strength, resources, 
capabilities and intentions of a foreign country that can affect our lives and the 
safety of our people”. Walters joined the Army as a soldier and was quickly 
commissioned, becoming an Intelligence officer and subsequently a diplomat. 
The influence of these different careers can be seen in his definition which 
encompasses the politico-military and economic spectrum while retaining the 
inclusion of the intentions and capabilities of other powers. Another former 
U.S. military Intelligence officer provided a definition in his published 
dictionary of Intelligence terms (Carl, 1990). In his book, Carl (1990; cited by 
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 The need for Intelligence to be sanitised to the lowest possible level was arguably driven by the U.S. Intelligence 
community prior to Operation Desert Storm, the Allied invasion of Iraq in 1991. The U.S. rolled out a wide-ranging 
effort called “Intelligence Support to the War Fighter”, aimed at sanitising Intelligence to provide it down to as low as 
Squad level (This is roughly equivalent to Platoon level in UK parlance, consisting of approximately 30 fighting 
troops). When briefed into Orders for a forthcoming operation, the Intelligence contributed to the “Actions On” 
section, such as “actions on enemy forces” or “actions on ambush”.  When briefed into “Orders” for a forthcoming 
operation, the Intelligence contributed to the “Actions On” section, such as “actions on enemy forces” or “actions on 
ambush”. Even before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UK had already introduced the “Tear Line Report” as a 
mechanism to provide an immediate, sanitised version of a sensitive Intelligence report. The idea was to be produce 
a report at SECRET or TOP SECRET classification, and at the end of the highly classified section a dashed “tear 
line” was printed, below which was a sanitised version, usually CONFIDENTIAL (before this was replaced in the UK 
by the new classifications of OFFICIAL in 2014), which could literally be torn off and given to others who were only 
cleared to this lower level of access. This was the forerunner of what subsequently came to be known as the “Action 
On” report used so frequently in the Iraqi and Afghan theatres of operations post-2001. 
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Muskingum University n.d.:para.2) describes Intelligence as: “the product 
resulting from the collecting and processing of information concerning actual 
and potential situations and conditions relating to domestic and foreign 
activities and to domestic and foreign or U.S. and enemy-held areas”. His 
definition begins with clarity but ends with a slightly mangled bounding of the 
definition, which renders it cumbersome. 
The Central Intelligence Agency took a radical step in 1993, with its 
publication of “A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence” (CIA, 1993). This 
publication was designed to assist Intelligence customers in using, digesting 
and operationalising the Intelligence produced by the CIA. As the Intelligence 
community takes on new staff each year, many of whom have little or no 
understanding of Intelligence sources and methods, collection capabilities or 
the limitations of Intelligence, it is important for the CIA to educate the 
analysts and other staff in the agencies and departments of the areas of U.S. 
government which are customers of CIA Intelligence reporting. The guide 
included explanations of important topics such as the language of probability 
and possibility and it provided definitions on some key terms, one of which 
was a definition of Intelligence: “Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is 
knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us. The prelude to 
decision and action by U.S. policymakers” (CIA, 1993:vii). 
This definition feels closer to the essence of Intelligence, and feels more 
useful in the everyday work of the Intelligence process. The terms “knowledge 
and foreknowledge” encompasses two important concepts. Knowledge of the 
world around us can consist, in Intelligence agency terms, of a large volume 
of material which shows us the status quo as far as it is believed to be 
accurate, of a country, an area, a situation or similar. The term “knowledge” 
implies that we have a body of reference material available, which can paint a 
sufficient background picture to allow us to form a detailed view of an 
Intelligence target. More important than this, however, is the term 
“foreknowledge”, as this concept lies at the heart of Intelligence work. UK and 
U.S. Intelligence agencies expend a significant proportion of their efforts (in 
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terms of manpower, budget, assets and time) on obtaining and refining 
actionable intelligence. During the Cold War, a large part of Intelligence 
collected by both sides consisted of initially discovering, then repeatedly 
confirming, the locations and dispositions of troops and equipment holdings of 
the adversary. Contemporary Intelligence, especially in the UK’s counter-
terrorism sector, has an intense focus on this actionable Intelligence, as it is of 
critical importance in the combined work of the agencies in carrying out the 
work of the PREVENT strategy. As one senior member of a UK Intelligence 
agency was fond of saying, “the only Intelligence is actionable Intelligence, 
everything else is history”.21  
This informal definition is a close relation to a short and very succinct 
definition by Professor John Grieve CBE QPM who has made major 
contributions to the field of Intelligence, both in UK policing and in the 
academic study of Intelligence. Grieve (2004:25) defines Intelligence simply 
as: “information designed for action”. A former national co-ordinator for the 
Anti-Terrorist Squad, he was also the first Director of Intelligence for the 
Metropolitan Police, so the influence of his operational experience upon his 
definition is quite clear. 
The CIA definition does not include the element of secret information, which 
some scholars such as Herman consider necessary. In contemporary 
Intelligence collection, open source Intelligence (OSINT) is now considered a 
discipline in itself and it can be argued that a focus on exclusively secret 
material is now outdated and inappropriate. The counter-argument to this is 
that the discipline of OSINT can be excluded from a definition of Intelligence, 
due to the fact that, by its very nature, OSINT material is in the public domain 
and attempts have not been made to conceal it. Where OSINT can really 
make a difference is in the identification of a piece (or multiple pieces) of 
information in the public domain which may not appear significant in 
Intelligence terms, but actually is significant. The subsequent analysis of such 
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 Anonymous. 
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information can allow the analyst to draw a reasonable conclusion about 
something which either was not contained in the original information, or which 
inadvertently leads to such a conclusion, unplanned by both the author of the 
material and the party with something to hide.  
A classic example occurred in March 2010, when an analyst studying open-
source defence contracts and tenders read about a planned shipment of 
military ordnance from the U.S. mainland to the island of Diego Garcia in the 
Indian Ocean. The consignment consisted of 387 bombs of the 
nomenclatures BLU-110 and BLU-117, commonly known as “bunker busters”. 
The most powerful of these weapons, designated the “super penetrator”, is 
designed to pierce up to 6 metres of reinforced concrete before detonating. 
The explosion of this weapon creates a camouflet, and the resulting debris 
buries the subterranean target in a massive quantity of displaced earth. The 
U.S. Air Force maintains a large airbase on Diego Garcia, which it leases from 
the UK. At the time of the shipment, tensions between the U.S. and Iran were 
especially high, following repeated Iranian non-compliance with United 
Nations nuclear inspection requirements. This was in addition to increasing 
friction between Israel, the U.S. and Iran. All of this took place against the 
backdrop of the publication by the US, the UK and France in September 2009, 
of a summary of their secret Intelligence concerning the construction of a 
covert uranium enrichment facility called the Ferdo nuclear site, near to the 
city of Qom. The island of Diego Garcia has previously been used as a launch 
base for U.S. airstrikes in several conflicts and the researcher examining the 
defence contracts and tenders realised that such a large consignment of 
“bunker buster” bombs had a high probability of being used in contingency 
planning for airstrikes on Iranian targets (Middle East Security Ltd, 2011). The 
story was published and resulted in considerable embarrassment for the U.S. 
administration, but it clearly illustrated the value of OSINT. The parties 
involved in releasing the contract information saw nothing compromising in 
the tender. All that was required was the background knowledge of an 
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analyst, together with some educated guesswork, to put the pieces together 
and to produce an accurate supposition.  
The collection of secret Intelligence usually relies on covert methods to carry 
out the collection. The analysis of the collected material must also be 
classified, to prevent the target from realising that the material has been 
successfully collected. Otherwise, the target would almost certainly close the 
gaps to prevent future collection, either using the same method or using the 
same point of entry, whether physical or virtual. The difference with OSINT is 
that the material has already been placed in the public domain, or is at least 
freely available. 
Macartney (1995:3–4) defined Intelligence as “a dedicated and usually 
tailored foreign information support service for government policymakers, 
planners and implementers”. This definition also has an exclusive focus on 
foreign targets, similar to previous ones. It includes the concept of a product 
being tailored, which could be considered to include an analytical process but 
could likewise be considered to simply be filtered, having undergone no 
analytical process. This definition also excludes non-governmental customers. 
The absence of any domestic aspect of the U.S. government’s Intelligence 
needs is also a major omission. 
The next definition, also organisational, was produced by the Aspin-Brown 
Committee between 1995 and 1996 in the US. The commission was 
established for the purpose of conducting a government inquiry into  the 
status of the U.S. Intelligence community and its agencies, with a particular 
focus on how those agencies should be adapted (if necessary), to respond to 
the new global dynamic which followed the demise of communism and the 
break-up of the Warsaw Pact. The Commission (Brown & Aspin, 1996:5) 
defined Intelligence: “…simply and broadly as information about things foreign 
– people, places, things and events – needed by the Government for the 
conduct of its functions”.  
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In order to contextualise the Commission’s definition, it is important to 
understand the key drivers taking place contemporaneously, which resulted in 
the decision to appoint a commission to examine the U.S. Intelligence 
community. Two incidents were of specific importance. On 26 February 1993, 
the World Trade Center in New York was attacked, when a massive truck 
bomb was detonated beneath the North Tower by a group of terrorists (FEMA, 
1993). Later that same year, U.S. forces were deployed to Somalia in support 
of a United Nations intervention there, aimed at establishing sufficient security 
to enable the distribution of humanitarian aid to the areas most affected by 
famine and drought (UNSC, 1993).22  A contingent of U.S. Forces found 
themselves cut off in surrounded in the Baraka Markets area of Mogadishu, 
while attempting to capture General Mohammed Farah Aidid (UN, n.d.). In a 
48-hour battle between U.S. forces and militia forces loyal to General Aidid, 
19 U.S. troops and between 1,500 and 2,000 Somalis were killed (Stewart, 
2003). The American public saw news footage of the corpses of several U.S. 
soldiers and aircrew being dragged behind pickup trucks through the streets 
of Mogadishu. Public opinion in the U.S. rapidly swung towards a withdrawal 
of U.S. forces from Somalia.23 In the aftermath of “the battle for Mogadishu”, 
questions were asked about whether Task Force Ranger (the main body of 
U.S. troops involved in the operation) had sufficient and accurate Intelligence 
before the failed operation to capture Aidid took place.24 The Aspin-Brown 
inquiry took place against the backdrop of this deployment and the 
subsequent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia. President Clinton 
announced the end of the U.S. deployment to Somalia just 2 months after the 
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 A mission under the auspices of the United Nations, designated UNOSOM II (also designated Operation 
CONTINUE HOPE by the U.S. Armed Forces) was created by the United Nations Security Council on 26 March 
1993, under the authorisation of UN Resolution 814. The UNOSOM II mission formally began on 04 May 1993, when 
the preceding UNITAF force was disestablished.  
23
 Although not academic books, two works that adequately cover the “Battle for Mogadishu” are first-hand accounts. 
One is “Blackhawk down” (Bowden, 2000), the other is “In the Company of Heroes”, written by one of the U.S. 
helicopter pilots who was shot down, captured and tortured by the Somali militia (Durant, 2004). The battle, the 
capture of the U.S. pilot and the rescue attempt dominated the military-political landscape in the UK and U.S. 
headquarters for several months afterwards and is still used as a case study in military operational planning, 
especially in the subject of “centres of gravity”. 
24
 Although much internal debate took place, there have been no open source reports on this. 
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Battle of Mogadishu, and on 03 March 1994, U.S. forces completed this 
withdrawal (1998:33). 
The Aspin-Brown Commission was open about the fact that it considered its 
definition to be simple and broad. In the same way as the Clark Task Force’s 
definition focused on foreign targets, the Aspin-Brown definition contains no 
reference to domestic Intelligence targets, concentrating only upon “things 
foreign”. The Aspin-Brown definition is vaguer than the Clark Task Force one, 
which is strange. When considering that the purpose of the Aspin-Brown 
Commission was to evaluate the status of the U.S. Intelligence agencies, it 
would be natural to assume that this body would devote significant effort to 
the understanding and defining of Intelligence, before beginning any 
examination of the community tasked with providing it. If this definition 
provides the foundation for an inquiry into the Intelligence agencies, it is a 
shaky foundation. The Aspin-Brown definition contains no reference to the 
collection of Intelligence or to the dissemination of it. It does, however, specify 
that the ultimate customers of the product are the Government, although it 
does not contain any reference to the expectation or otherwise that the 
Intelligence process itself is conducted by government elements. The 
definition does not add anything of substance to the debate and it was a 
missed opportunity for an influential U.S. body to compose a useful and 
encompassing definition of Intelligence for the U.S. Intelligence community. 
The Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) describes itself as “an independent, 
nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher” (CFR, n.d.). 
It is an influential and established think tank, covering a wide range of the 
international political spectrum. In 1996, the CFR published a paper 
(Haas,1996:8-9) on “Making Intelligence Smarter”, which included the 
Council’s own definition: “Intelligence is information not publicly available, or 
analysis based at least in part on such information, that has been prepared for 
policymakers or other actors inside the government”. 
The CFR definition retains the focus on the end product being provided to 
policymakers and other governmental entities, and includes the fact that 
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information used to produce Intelligence is either not in the public domain, or if 
it is, that this has been taken into account. As a definition, it is more useful but 
still lacks the wider perspective which has become more necessary in the 
present day, due in large part to the way in which the terrorist threat has 
morphed in the last 20 years or so. 
Another user guide was published in 1997 and it defined Intelligence as “…the 
knowledge – and ideally, the foreknowledge – sought by nations in response 
to external threats and to protect their vital interests, especially the well-being 
of their own people” (Jentleson et al., 1997:365). This definition was fixed 
firmly at strategic level, placing Intelligence at national level and focusing on 
external threats, yet establishing the aim of such Intelligence as protection of 
national interests. Once again, the domestic aspect is missing but the well-
being of the population has been included. Today, the protection of CNI is a 
national priority for the UK’s National Security Strategy, as the national 
livelihood could be significantly disrupted by a successful terrorist attack 
against infrastructure such as the national grid, the water supply and other 
elements of the CNI (CPNI, 2010:5).25 
In the USA, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) comprise the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(VCJCS), plus the Heads of the various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces - 
the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Army, the Air Force and the National Guard. 
As in the UK, the U.S. Armed Forces are a primary collector, producer and 
user of Intelligence. The JCS produced their own, all-arms definition of 
Intelligence in 2001 just five months before the Al Qa’eda attacks against the 
USA in September of that year. Their definition differs from most of the 
previous ones in that it considers more fully the actual process of Intelligence, 
including the composite elements of the U.S. military Intelligence cycle (as it 
was at that time). It also did not restrict itself to external threats only. The irony 
is that the U.S. Armed Forces could be expected to have had a more external-
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 The UK’s Critical National Infrastructure, and the Intelligence requirements pertaining to the safeguarding of it, is 
covered in Chapter 4.3.1. 
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looking focus at that time, while some of the previous crafters of definitions 
could conversely have been expected to consider domestic and external 
threats equally. Yet the opposite was in fact the case. The JCS (Gortney, 
2014:208) defined Intelligence in two ways: 
 
“1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available 
information concerning foreign countries or areas. 
2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained 
through observation, investigation, analysis or understanding”. 
 
The Al Qa’eda attacks against the USA in September 2001 resulted in 
evaluations of the entire U.S. Intelligence landscape in the aftermath. These 
included the organisations, cultures, structures and processes, plus an 
analysis of any and all relevant Intelligence which could have been available 
prior to the attacks. A paper was presented to the U.S. Congress in 2004 
outlining various options for changes within the FBI, in the wake of the Al 
Qa’eda attacks. Instead of attempting to use various layers of aspects, as 
other definitions had done, this paper framed Intelligence in three categories, 
which it extracted from existing U.S. legislation: 
 
 “Three formal categories of intelligence are defined under 
statute or regulation: 
 Foreign Intelligence. Information relating to the capabilities, 
intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements 
thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons.   
Counterintelligence. Information gathered, and activities 
conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence 
   
76 
 
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 
behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist 
activities.   
Criminal Intelligence. Data which has been evaluated to 
determine that it is relevant to the identification of and the 
criminal activity engaged in by an individual who or 
organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in 
criminal activity. (Certain criminal activities including but not 
limited to loan sharking, drug trafficking, trafficking in stolen 
property, gambling, extortion, smuggling, bribery, and 
corruption of public officials often involve some degree of 
regular coordination and permanent organization involving a 
large number of participants over a broad geographical area)” 
(Cummings & Masse, 2004:appx.1).  
 
The definition is haphazard and while it does provide some principles, it 
implies that some factors are exclusive to the domain under which they are 
described. The category of criminal Intelligence, for example, is the only 
category which makes any mention of an analytical process, including 
evaluation, of the Intelligence. The implication is that analysis and evaluation 
counter-Intelligence, and in what this definition describes as foreign 
Intelligence.  
The RAND Corporation is a US-based think-tank and describes itself as 
independent and non-partisan (RAND, n.d.). The origins of RAND come from 
the military research and development programmes which were still running 
as the Second World War came to a close in 1945. A part of the Douglas 
Aircraft Corporation was spun off into a separate project which took its name 
from a contraction of the terms “research and development” and its aim, as 
specified in the Articles of Incorporation for the new entity, were stated as 
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follows: “To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable 
purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of 
America (RAND n.d.). At the time of its inception, all RAND staff would have 
had a US government security clearance. Today RAND publishes frequent 
papers in the area of defence and national security. In 2005, RAND UK 
published a paper (Hannah et al., 2005) focused on the legislation of 
Intelligence and security, within the context of security sector reform (SSR). 
Within this paper (Hannah et al., 2005:iii) RAND provided their own definition 
of Intelligence as: 
 
“a special kind of knowledge, a specialised subset of 
information that has been put through a systematic analytical 
process in order to support a state’s decision and policy 
makers. It exists because some states or actors seek to hide 
information from other states or actors, who in turn seek to 
discover hidden information by secret or covert means. Within 
a security sector reform context, intelligence has also been 
defined as the ‘production of unbiased information about 
threats to the national vision”.26 
 
This definition includes the analytical process, and includes the term 
“systematic” when describing it, indicating that some model of process is 
followed, whether cyclical or otherwise. Its focus is once again on Intelligence 
being used to support State actors, and it adds an interesting dimension to the 
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 Despite its claims to be independent and non-partisan, RAND’s independence has been seriously questioned in 
the academic arena, most notably in an academic paper by Burnett and Whyte, writing in the Journal for Crime, 
Conflict and the Media (2005:9). In their paper, the authors described the nexus between the RAND Corporation and 
the St. Andrews University Centre for Studies in Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV). They question the validity 
of peer-reviewed research articles published by the Centre, writing that: “Many of the top editorial positions of this 
journal are occupied by RAND employees, and Magnus Ranstorp and Paul Wilkinson of the CSTPV have positions 
on the editorial committee of the journal. What this effectively means is that, in this context, peer reviewed 
publications are dominated by academics connected by this nexus of influence. Whilst we are by no means 
suggesting that the system of peer review being used is in any way corrupted or less rigorous than it is in other 
publications, if we consider that two of the key journals in the discipline are dominated by scholars from the RAND-St 
Andrews nexus, then this does say something about their ability to impose their influence upon the field” (Burnett & 
Whyte, 2005:9). 
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definition by including the fact that Intelligence comes from information which 
others necessarily want to keep secret. It follows up on this by adding that the 
discovery process itself is covert. The final part of the definition was included 
as the paper’s focus was on SSR. The inclusion of the word “unbiased” is of 
note, as it did not feature in any of the previous definitions described. The 
principle of the information being unbiased is sound, and is one which any 
credible Intelligence agency should strive for. As we have seen, however, this 
principle is not always upheld.  
In July 2004, the UK government published its “Review of Intelligence on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction”, referred to as the Butler Report (Butler, 
2004). The report provided a valuable repository of information for those 
involved in the academic study of Intelligence, as it included not only 
previously classified Intelligence material, but also the resulting Parliamentary 
commentary upon this Intelligence. As could be expected, the Butler Report 
included a section wherein it defined Intelligence. It also discussed the 
component parts of the Intelligence cycle and it highlighted some of the 
common problems encountered in the world of Intelligence, notably including 
validation in this section (Butler, 2004:99–102). Butler’s (2004:7) definition of 
Intelligence was: 
 
“Information acquired against the wishes and (generally) 
without the knowledge of its originators or possessors is 
processed by collation with other material, validation, analysis 
and assessment and finally disseminated as ‘intelligence’. 
 
Like the Rand definition, this one also includes the idea that the collected raw 
product is something which its owners do not want to be revealed. Similarly, 
this definition clearly states that the information, once acquired, is subjected to 
a process before it can be considered to be Intelligence, but it goes one step 
further than RAND, adding crucial elements of validation and assessment to 
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it. In the UK, the AS play a crucial part in assessing the most sensitive 
Intelligence for UK government customers and it is highly likely that the 
familiarity with the work of the AS coloured this definition. It also makes a 
distinction between information and Intelligence, placing information at the 
start of the process and Intelligence at the end, implying that the actual end 
product of Intelligence only comes at the end of the cycle. 
It may be more useful to consider Intelligence not just as a process but as a 
combination of factors, regardless of how we define it. Ratcliffe (2003:3) 
considers that: “a broader view of intelligence could incorporate the view that 
intelligence is a structure, a process and a product”. While accepting the six 
stages of the Intelligence cycle form the process, Ratcliffe considers that the 
cycle produces a product, in the form of finished Intelligence, and also has to 
have a structure for it to operate. The Harfields (2008:60) develop this 
concept, describing it as a “triptych conceptualisation of Intelligence” which 
they describe in more detail through the use of a table, shown below: 
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Intelligence 
as: 
Defining Characteristics 
Structure The existence of an Intelligence unit or department as an 
individual entity within an organisational framework, 
equipped with people, skills, methods and organisational 
structure 
Process A continuous cycle of tasking, information collecting, 
analysis, evaluation, dissemination leading to intervention 
action or the identification of an Intelligence gap requiring 
further tasking. 
Product The output of the Intelligence process, the processed 
information, such as a Subject Profile or a Tactical 
Assessment, intended to inform decision-makers. 
2  Harfields’ triptych conceptualisation of Intelligence, based on 
Ratcliffe (2003). 
 
The Harfields (2008:60) make an important observation in their conclusions, 
which helps to explain why different people may have different ideas of what 
Intelligence is, when they are discussing it:  
 
 “even within a single theoretical model, Intelligence can have more than 
one conceptual (as well as literal) meaning and that it is important, when 
debating issues and considering strategy and tactics to be certain that all 
parties understand which meaning is under consideration at any given 
moment”. 
 
Clearly, much of this debate is primarily of relevance to the English-speaking 
world, and there will be other interpretations of the definition of Intelligence in 
other languages which are more difficult to assess and compare, partly due to 
the fact that they will necessarily also be influenced by the particular 
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translation selected. There remains a considerable gap between the 
Intelligence concepts, methods and definitions used by the UK and the USA 
and a detailed description of these differences is beyond the scope of this 
work.27 
3.1.1 Intelligence Failures or Intelligence Gaps? 
In addition to defining Intelligence itself, another closely related but key 
distinction needs to be examined: the difference between an Intelligence gap 
and an Intelligence failure. This is relevant because, as Chapter 6 explains, 
Intelligence failures are often held up as examples of a weakness in the 
Intelligence cycle or process, but such so-called Intelligence failures are often 
Intelligence gaps. The subject of Intelligence failures has become a common 
topic for discussion in the UK, largely as a result of media coverage which 
tends to see almost any negative development in the counter-terrorism space 
as an Intelligence failure. Schulsky’s definition of an Intelligence failure is 
frequently cited by writers such as Warner (2002), Phythian (2008) and 
others. Schulsky defines an Intelligence failure as: “any misunderstanding of a 
situation that leads a government or its military forces to take actions that are 
inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests” (Schulsky & Schmitt, 
2002:63). The definition does not have the all-encompassing characteristics 
one might expect to find, based on some of the definitions of terrorism. The 
inclusion of the word “misunderstanding” does not, for example, permit the 
classification of Intelligence failure in circumstances where the necessary 
information was already residing in the data repositories of one or more 
agencies, but through human error or linkage blindness, connections and 
resultant conclusions were not made which should have or could have been. 
Nonetheless, it provides a useful start point of reference.  
                                            
27
 For a detailed examination of the differences between the UK and the US approaches, see Davies’ two-volume 
work (Davies 2012a; Davies 2012b) 
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A CIA definition of Intelligence failure (2005:6) is given as “systemic 
organizational surprise resulting from incorrect, missing, discarded, or 
inadequate hypotheses”, compared to an “Intelligence error” which it 
describes as “factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting from poor or missing 
data”. Gormley (2004) considers an Intelligence failure “to be virtually assured 
when a predisposed analytic mindset is combined with predictable overhead 
collection systems”. 
O’Connor (n.d.) adds considerably to an understanding of Intelligence failures 
by drawing together multiple strands of research such as that done by Laquer 
(1985) and Lowenthal (2003) and categorising what he considers to be the 
ten root causes of Intelligence failures, shown below in table form. 
Reason for 
Failure 
Symptoms and Examples 
Overestimation This is perhaps the most common reason for failure, and one which, 
if uncorrected, can lead to the continuation of error for a long 
time. Examples include the long Cold War period in which the U.S. 
consistently overestimated the "missile gap" between the U.S. and 
Soviet Union. Critics of the Iraq invasion say this was the main kind 
of error that happened in the estimation of Saddam Hussein's 
warfare capability. 
Underestimation This occurs when intelligence or political leadership seems unwilling 
to be receptive to warnings, or completely misreads the enemy's 
intentions. A classic example is Stalin in 1941, who didn't want to 
hear about the possibility of Hitler invading Russia, even though the 
British and Americans tried to tip him off. 
Subordination of 
Intelligence to 
Policy 
This happens when judgments are made to produce results that 
superiors want to hear instead of what the evidence indicates. It is 
the most widely discussed and analyzed type of intelligence failure, 
although some discussions talk about a related error, bias. 
Lack of 
communication 
The lack of a centralized office often creates this problem, but it 
more typically results from when you have different officials from 
different agencies who have different rules on who and how they 
communicate, or few analysts who work on-the-fly for different 
agencies and don't have full-time intelligence responsibilities. 
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Unavailability of 
Information 
Regulations and bureaucratic jealousies are sometimes the cause of 
this, but the most common problem involves restrictions on the 
circulation of sensitive information. When there is virtually no 
intelligence at all, this is called something else, ignorance.  
Received 
Opinion 
This is also called "conventional wisdom" and consists of assertions 
and opinions that are generally regarded in a favourable light, but 
have never been sufficiently investigated. 
Mirror-Imaging This is technically defined as "the judging of unfamiliar situations on 
the basis of familiar ones," but most often involves assessing a 
threat by analogy to what you (your government or a similar 
government) would do in a similar position. 
Over-confidence  This occurs when one side is so confident of its ability that it projects 
its reasoning onto the other side and believes that since it would not 
do something itself, neither will the other side. The classic case is 
the Yom Kippur war of October 1973. 
Complacency This happens when you know the enemy might do something, 
though you are not sure what or when, and yet you do nothing 
anyway. The classic example is the British who did nothing in the 
weeks leading up to the Falkland War of 1982. 
Failure to 
connect the dots 
This occurs when the connections between bits of intelligence are 
not put together to make a coherent whole. It is most easily 
observed in hindsight.  
Table 3 O’Connor’s Ten Reasons for Intelligence Failures 
 
O’Connor’s category of “subordination of Intelligence to policy” seems to be 
identical to the vulnerability usually classed as politicisation. Interestingly, 
Treverton (2008:93-94) defines five categories of politicisation, which if we 
accept that O’Connor and Treverton are writing about the same issue, would 
make five taxonomical sub-categories of politicisation. The vulnerability of 
politicisation of Intelligence is discussed in chapter 6.  
Intelligence gaps, by contrast, can be created as a result of human, system or 
process failures. They can also simply be absences of information due to the 
inability of the agencies to collect against a particular target or group, or to 
break into a particular source of information. A target could change its 
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methods of passing information, rendering conventional methods unworkable. 
Such was the case in the immediate post-invasion period in Iraq in 2003 and 
for several years afterwards, when insurgent groups moved to the use of 
human couriers on motorbikes and bicycles, in an attempt to defeat the 
surveillance methods used by some of the allied agencies.28 One of the 
reasons for creating an Intelligence collection plan, and the breaking down of 
these requirements into primary and secondary requirements, is to help with 
establishing what gaps in collection capabilities exist. Another reason for the 
plan is to then work out how to close those gaps, to enable the fullest 
collection coverage possible, within the limits of available resources, mapped 
against priorities. 
 
3.2 Defining Terrorism 
 “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.29 
“Terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely 
a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or 
of individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the 
methods used are unlawful, or the target protected, or both” 
(Higgins, 1997:28).30 
“We have cause to regret that a legal concept of terrorism 
was ever inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise; it is 
                                            
28
 Information provided by several Intelligence officers with experience of working in Iraq during that period. 
29
 Anonymous. 
30
 Judge Rosalyn Higgins was the first female judge to be elected to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  
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ambiguous; and, above all, it serves no operative legal 
purpose” (Baxter, 1974:380).31 
 
The long-standing failure to compose a globally acceptable definition of 
terrorism, even by the United Nations, highlights the intensely political, deeply 
divisive and insoluble nature of the concept of terrorism. Few other words are 
so loaded with such strongly opposing viewpoints and yet repeated attempts 
to encapsulate terrorism in an all-inclusive, internationally agreed upon, 
practical and legally acceptable definition all appear to have failed. At one 
extreme end of the spectrum, some definitions have been spectacularly 
incomplete. Following the Al Qa’eda attacks upon the U.S. on 11 September 
2001, the UK Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, 
famously remarked that: “what looks, smells and kills like terrorism is 
terrorism” (Collins, 2002:167–168).32 It is difficult to imagine Greenstock’s 
definition being accepted in a UK court of law. Likewise a famous U.S. legal 
statement on a definition of pornography is often paraphrased into a simplistic 
yet equally inaccurate definition on terrorism: “when one sees terrorism, one 
recognises it”.33 
The degree to which the concept of terrorism suffers from politicisation was 
highlighted by Weiss when he compared the backgrounds and subsequent 
international elevation of four prominent figures in world politics. The four 
individuals mentioned by Weiss provide interesting case studies. They were 
all actively involved in terrorist offences, yet all went on to become significant 
                                            
31
 Prof. R. Baxter is a former Editor-in-Chief of the American Journal of International Law, a Member of the U.S. 
Permanent Court of Arbitration and a former consultant to the U.S. Dept. of Defense, Dept. of State and the Naval 
War College. 
32
 Greenstock’s full quote was “Increasingly, questions are being raised about the problem of the definition of a 
terrorist. Let us be wise and focused about this: terrorism is terrorism. What looks, smells and kills like terrorism is 
terrorism”.  
33
 The original “non-definition” was given by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Potter Stewart who was presiding over 
the case of Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964).  The case centred on a movie theatre which was alleged to have shown a hard-
core pornographic film. Stewart’s written notes on the case stated that hard-core pornography was difficult to define, 
but, he added, “...I know it when I see it…and the motion picture involved in this case is not that".   
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political leaders, two of them winning the Nobel peace prize. Weiss (2011) 
stated:  
 
“What do we make of terrorism when we consider what 
Nelson Mandela, Menachem Begin, Gerry Adams, and Yasir 
Arafat have in common? They were all regarded as terrorists 
at one time. Then two of them got the Nobel Peace Prize and 
all were eventually regarded as great leaders of their people. 
So terrorism is a difficult concept to get hold of”. 
 
Menachim Begin was a former member of the Jewish underground group 
Irgun, and was personally responsible for conducting several terrorist 
operations aimed at forcing a British withdrawal from the British Mandate of 
Palestine, prior to the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948. One of Begin’s 
operations, a terrorist bombing in 1946 of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, 
resulted in the deaths of 91 civilians (Kushner, 2002:181). Elected as Prime 
Minister of Israel in 1977, Begin signed the Camp David peace treaty with 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1979 (Stein, 1999:228-229). Both Begin 
and Sadat were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1978 (Nobel Prize, 
n.d.). 
As leader of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (usually translated as “Spear of the 
Nation” or known as “MK”), Nelson Mandela planned and directed sabotage 
operations against the apartheid government of South Africa, for which he 
was jailed for life in 1964. Released from prison in 1990, he was eventually 
elected as President of South Africa in 1994. He was awarded the Nobel Prize 
for Peace in 1993, in conjunction with Prime Minister FW de Klerk (Mandela, 
2004:63–68). 
Gerry Adams was a member of Sinn Fein since at least 1970, and was 
interned in 1971 under the Special Powers Act 1922. Released in 1972 to 
participate in secret talks with the British government, he is alleged to have 
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played a direct and central role in planning the bombing campaign in Belfast 
in July 1972, which became known as Bloody Friday.34 Twenty-two explosive 
devices were detonated in Belfast, in just over an hour, resulting in nine dead 
and 130 injured (Lalor, 2003:7–8).35 Adams was re-arrested in 1973 and was 
subject to internment at Long Kesh internment facility. Following two escape 
attempts, he was subsequently convicted and jailed. In 1983, he became the 
President of Sinn Fein and was elected as Member of Parliament. Taking part 
in secret talks with both the Irish Taoiseach and the British Northern Ireland 
Office, he was deeply involved in the negotiations which led to the 1994 IRA 
ceasefire and later the 1998 “Good Friday Agreement” (UK Government, 
1998). He was present at the inauguration of U.S. President Barack Obama 
as a personal guest of U.S. Congressman Richard Neal. In 2011 he was 
elected as member of the Irish Parliament. He was also a Westminster 
Member of Parliament (although abstentionist) from 1983-1992 and 1997-
2011.  
Yasir Arafat founded the FATAH movement (The Palestinian National 
Liberation Movement) in 1959 and was actively involved in the fight for 
Palestinian statehood for most of his life, personally leading several 
paramilitary incursions of FATAH commandos into Israeli territory (Aburish, 
1999:33–67). Throughout his life, he was dogged by allegations of direct and 
personal involvement in a number of major terrorist incidents. These included 
the hijacking of five airliners and the subsequent destruction of three of them 
in Jordan, the operations of the FATAH sub-group “Black September”, which 
kidnapped and killed 11 Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games in Munich 
in 1972 and the murder of U.S. diplomats in Khartoum (Karam, 2006).36  Later 
                                            
34
 In 2010, a convicted IRA bomber, Doloures Price, said that she had told researchers from Boston University that 
Gerry Adams was her Officer Commanding, when she was a member of the IRA’s Belfast Brigade.  
35
 Adams denies the allegations of IRA membership as libellous, although he has never fought a libel action against it 
(cf. Taylor (1997:140), English (2003:110), Moloney (2002:140) and Urban (1993:26)). 
36
 One of the Palestinians involved, Daoud, gave several interviews after the opening of Steven Spielberg's film 
"Munich", which reignited the issue of the Munich massacre. Daoud remained unrepentant on his role in the Munich 
attacks. During a televised interview on the German TV channel "Spiegel TV", he stated "I regret nothing. You can 
only dream that I would apologize. (Karam, 2006)" In an Associated Press interview, he justified the Munich 
operation, considering that its success legitimised it, saying "Before Munich, we were simply terrorists. After Munich, 
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in life, Arafat entered into secret talks with the government of Israel, 
concerning Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These 
negotiations resulted in the 1993 Oslo Accord (or the “Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements”), which paved the way 
for the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), a Palestinian 
Police Force and the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from 
areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Mattar, 2005). In 1994, Arafat 
became the Prime Minister and the President of the PNA, as well as the 
Commander of the Palestine Liberation Army and the Speaker of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council. In the same year, Arafat was jointly awarded 
the Nobel peace prize together with the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 
and the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres (Nobel Prize, n.d.). 
Schmid (2004:375–395) identifies four primary reasons why terrorism is 
difficult to define: 
 
“1. Terrorism is “a contested concept” and political, legal, 
social science and popular notions of it are often diverging; 
2. The definition question is linked to (de-)legitimisation and 
criminalisation; 
3. There are many types of “terrorism”, with different forms 
and manifestations; 
4. The term has undergone changes in meaning in the more 
than 200 years of its existence”. 
 
The first point is significant, that terrorism is one of the most fiercely contested 
words. The terrorist label is polemical and it has now become almost 
                                            
at least people started asking who are these terrorists? What do they want? Before Munich, nobody had the slightest 
idea about Palestine. (Mostyn, 2010)”  
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weaponised, carrying strong and vivid connotations and implying criminality, 
lawlessness and public condemnation. More importantly, perhaps, it also 
implies that the protagonist using the label has some kind of moral right, or at 
least holds the moral high ground. A comment by Jenkins (1980:2) captured 
this neatly when he wrote that the use of the word terrorism: “implies a moral 
judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its 
opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral 
viewpoint”. The last part of Jenkins’ statement points to an important factor in 
the debate: that applying the label against one’s opponent can help to change 
the wider perception of the public. This can result in increased support against 
those labelled terrorists and more sympathy for those using the label. In this 
case, much can depend on the marketing and publicity power generated in 
support of the labelling protagonist.  
The second point centres on (de-)legitimisation. If one can successfully de-
legitimise one’s opponent, it makes it considerably more difficult for the 
opponent to make their political points in a public forum. It also decreases the 
likelihood that any meaningful negotiations can take place between the two 
sides. By successfully criminalising one’s opponent, it can make it more 
difficult for them to operate effectively, and it allows for more robust judicial 
proceedings against them in the event that they are arrested. This has been a 
powerful tool used repeatedly in the Palestine-Israel conflict, where both sides 
have consistently accused each other of conducting terrorist acts and of 
committing war crimes. Palestinian suicide bombings against Israeli targets 
have been declared as terrorist actions by the Israeli government. Israeli 
military reprisals in the form of airstrikes resulting in civilian casualties, or the 
demolition of houses lived in by suspected terrorists, are likewise labelled as 
acts of state terror by Palestinian leaders. De-legitimisation can also lead to 
dehumanisation, another powerful weapon which can be deployed in support 
of one side or the other. When one side dehumanises the opposing side, it 
can be much easier to take robust action or to justify what would otherwise 
appear to be a disproportionate response.  
   
90 
 
Schmid’s third point brings up the pluralist nature of terrorism and the 
resultant debate on terrorism not being a concept, tangible or easily 
identifiable, but a web of interconnected typologies of terrorism. This issue of 
terrorism typologies has been the subject of considerable academic debate 
(Kaplan, 2003; Schmid, 2004b; Schmid, 2004a; Hoffman, 1986), yet it also 
has implications for a country’s legislation and its counter-terrorism policies 
and responses. The fourth point raises the debate on how terrorism is defined 
now, and how it has been defined in the past. 
Schmid (2004a:197–221) also proposed five conceptual frameworks which 
could be used as lenses through which terrorism could be viewed: crime; 
politics; warfare; propaganda/communication; religion/fundamentalism. These 
frameworks were not designed to be taken as a definitive or exhaustive list, 
but more of a sample of potential frameworks. Such frameworks could assist 
in examining how individuals enter into terrorism (radicalisation and/or 
recruitment), progress to conducting terrorist actions (operational 
involvement) and how and whether they leave terrorism behind 
(disengagement). Schmid and Jongman (2005:40) took this dissection of 
terrorism still further by defining ten distinct typologies seemingly in an effort 
to produce an etiology of terrorism, should such a thing be considered to 
exist. Schmid (Schmid, 2004b:198) considers the two distinctions of mala 
prohibita and mala per se, before coming down on the side of mala per se, 
stating:  
 
“Some offences are so serious that they are considered 
morally wrong in all civilised societies. In particular, this 
applies to murder—the premeditated, unprovoked killing of a 
human being. When it comes to terrorist crimes, a narrow 
definition of terrorism that would focus on mala per se crimes 
appears desirable, since there is widespread international 
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consensus about the latter as constituting a gross violation of 
accepted rules”.37  
 
Writing specifically on the problems encountered in defining religious terrorism 
as opposed to terrorism in general, Schbley (2003) recognises the conundrum 
that an apolitical definition of terrorism is the most desirous, and would also 
be the most effective type of definition, yet accepts that such a definition 
would also be the most problematic in defining. She ambitiously proposes 
(Schbley, 2003:106) that the academic community must provide “legislators, 
policymakers, soldiers, and intelligence and law enforcement officers with 
defining tools, legal précis, and concepts that will redress this costly and 
painful misunderstanding”. It is unrealistic to expect that this would provide a 
workable solution for the UK government, in respect of its counter-terrorism 
policy, but it would be a distinct step in the right direction for the UK 
government to host a conference, and a post-conference working group, on 
defining terrorism. This would ideally enjoy the participation of serving and 
retired Intelligence practitioners, and academics from the forefront of terrorism 
and legal studies.  
All of this academic discourse leads to a vexing question: is it possible to 
successfully and accurately define terrorism? Some academics disagree 
(Schmid & Jongman, 2005:2-3), arguing that “the study of terrorism can 
manage with a minimum of theory”. Others (Ganor, 2002:287) see the 
defining of terrorism as a central and crucial foundation for that study, arguing 
that “an objective definition of terrorism is not only possible: it is also 
indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism”. This leads to an 
interesting erotema: if we cannot define terrorism, can we realistically expect 
to craft a meaningful, international response to combat it? At the same time, 
                                            
37
 Mala in se (what Schmid calls mala per se) comes from the Latin which means “wrong in itself” and is used to 
denote behaviour which a civilised society considers inherently wrong. Commonly quoted examples include murder 
and rape. Mala prohibita is behaviour which is prohibited by law, as opposed to being considered as fundamentally 
wrong. This is similar to the Roman legal principles of iussum quia iustum (that which is commanded because it is 
just) and iustum quia iussum (that which is just because it is commanded). See Deffains and Fluet (2014) for a fuller 
description. 
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an additional question must be asked: is it reasonable to expect to achieve a 
single, all-encompassing definition of terrorism, fit for all circumstances, 
covering all possible situations? There is an argument which suggests that the 
mechanisms for successfully prosecuting perpetrators of terrorist offences are 
diminished by the continuing absence of such a global definition. This 
argument follows the legal principle known as nullum crimen, nulla poena sine 
praevia lege poenali, which states that no crime can be committed, and thus 
no corresponding punishment can be administered, without there already 
existing at the time of the offence, a penal law which was violated. This is 
employed to prevent ex post facto laws being introduced. Article 7 of the 
Human Rights Act (Parliament, 1998) prohibits criminal laws being introduced 
retrospectively.38 The absence of a clear definition of terrorism can impact 
upon extraditions and other international co-operation agreements. The 
inability to clearly define terrorism carries with it the issue that different 
countries have different thresholds for what constitutes a criminal act. This is 
an area in which the UN could make a considerable contribution, by bringing 
together the legal and professional expertise necessary to discuss and 
eventually create an international definition of terrorism. Such a definition 
would not, admittedly, provide an immediate solution to the problem of 
defining the act, but it would at least provide an internationally crafted 
framework upon which the individual countries could use as a foundation for 
their own, national definitions. Analysis of selected terrorism definitions 
From as early as the 1930s it can be seen that the problem of defining 
terrorism was a difficult one. In its 1937 Convention, the League of Nations 
(1937:sec.1) defined terrorism in Article 1.1 as: “…criminal acts directed 
against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the 
minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public”.39 At 
                                            
38
 Schedule 1, Article 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Parliament 1998b) states that “no one shall be held guilty of 
any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed” 
39
   This statute was never formally enacted by the League and thus never entered into force. 
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the time, it was an ambitious attempt at encapsulating the offence of 
terrorism. The Convention went further in Article 2, which subsequently 
attempted to clarify exactly what could constitute a terrorist action. If an action 
was already covered by the above definition in Article 1.1, and if the action 
was directed at another State, then the 1937 Convention (League of Nations, 
1937:sec.2.1–2.5) considered the following to constitute terrorist acts: 
 
“1. Any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or 
loss of liberty to: 
    a) Heads of State, persons exercising the prerogatives of 
the head of the State, their hereditary or designated 
successors; 
    b) The wives or husbands or the above-mentioned persons; 
    c) Persons charged with public functions or holding public 
positions when the act is directed against them in their public 
capacity. 
2. Wilful destruction of, or damage to, public property or 
property devoted to a public purpose belonging to or subject 
to the authority of another High Contracting Party. 
3. Any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members 
of the public. 
4. Any attempt to commit an offence falling within the 
foregoing provisions of the present article. 
5. The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of 
arms, ammunition, explosives or harmful substances with the 
view to the commission in any country whatsoever of an 
offence falling within the present article”. 
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It is prescient that even today the United Nations remains unable to agree on 
a formal definition of terrorism, despite the fact that there are several UN 
resolutions condemning terrorism.40 This absence of acceptable definition is 
not for lack of trying, however. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
has been formally deliberating a “Proposed Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism” since at least 2000. The UN’s most comprehensive 
attempt at a definition of terrorism is arguably that from 2002 (2002:sec.2.1) 
and reads thus:  
 
    "1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of 
this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and 
intentionally, causes: 
        (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
        (b) Serious damage to public or private property, 
including a place of public use, a State or government facility, 
a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the 
environment; or 
        (c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems 
referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely 
to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the 
conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, 
or to compel a Government or an international organization to 
do or abstain from doing any act." 
 
The problem causing the log-jam on formal ratification is not the definition 
itself. The main issue is bifurcated and the two sides are closely related, yet 
mutually opposing: should the UN definition apply to a State’s armed forces, 
                                            
40
 See Annex C for a list of relevant UN Instruments. 
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and should it also be applied to liberation or self-determination movements? 
The often diametrically opposed relationship between these two groups 
constitutes the kernel of the problem. It raises questions which have to date 
been indeterminable by the international community. Examples of these 
include: 
 
1. What are the defining characteristics of a terrorist 
group or organisation?  
2. What are the defining characteristics of a liberation or 
self-determination movement? 
3. Should activities of nations’ Armed Forces be included 
or excluded? 
4. Should there be a separate definition of “state 
terrorism”? 
 
On 08 October 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
unanimously passed Resolution 1566 (UNSC, 2004) which condemned 
terrorist acts defined as: 
 
"criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the 
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of 
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, 
intimidate a population or compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as 
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating 
to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by 
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considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other similar nature." 
 
The definition adds nothing to strengthen previous definitions and makes no 
attempt to address the perennial issue of the inclusion or otherwise of self-
determination groups, liberation movements or the acts carried out by a 
State’s armed forces. Less than one year later, the United Kingdom drafted 
Resolution 1624, aimed at combating international terrorism by enhancing 
international passenger security. The Resolution was unanimously adopted by 
the UNSC on 14 September 2005, yet despite many references to fighting 
terrorism and the member states’ obligations in doing so, it did not add any 
new additions to the definition of terrorism (UNSC, 2005). Thus the UK failed 
to take advantage of an opportunity to influence the definition of terrorism and 
to shape the international debate on this. The United Nations now has 
nineteen international conventions on terrorism, yet an internationally agreed 
UN definition on terrorism continues to be elusive.41 
In addition to the United Nations, the European Union has also devoted 
considerable energy to carving out its own definition of terrorism. Article 1 of 
the EU’s “Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002)” (European 
Council, 2002:sec.1.1) directs EU member States to: 
 
“take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional 
acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defined as 
offences under national law, which, given their nature or 
context, may seriously damage a country or an international 
organisation where committed with the aim of: 
— Seriously intimidating a population, or 
                                            
41
 The nineteen UN specialised international conventions on terrorism to date consist of 14 major universal legal 
instruments and five amendments to prevent terrorist acts. A summary of these is provided at Annex C. 
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— unduly compelling a Government or international 
organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or 
— seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental 
political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a 
country or an international organisation, shall be deemed to 
be terrorist offences: 
(a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death; 
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; 
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;  
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public 
facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including 
an information system, a fixed platform located on the 
continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to 
endanger human life or result in major economic loss; 
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods 
transport; 
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or 
use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development 
of, biological and chemical weapons; 
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods 
or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life; 
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or 
any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is 
to endanger human life; 
(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h). 
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The EU definition has a number of interesting additions. The inclusion of 
clauses such as “seriously intimidating a population” together with “unduly 
compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain 
from performing any act” bring the definition more up to date by recognising 
the intimidation of a state, or its people, by another state. While the EU 
definition is only binding for EU member states, clauses (d) and (h) have 
particular significance for the international community, in particular regarding 
conflicts which have a terrorist component. One such example was the 2006 
war in Lebanon, which began as a retaliatory conflict between the Israeli 
Defence Forces on one side and Hizbollah on the other, and turned into a full-
scale war resulting in thousands of dead and the displacement of just under a 
quarter of Lebanon’s population (UNHRC, 2006). During this conflict, Israeli 
military aircraft conducted raids against Beirut Rafic Hariri International 
Airport, destroying all three runways and forcing the diversion of international 
flights to Cyprus. Other installations targeted included power plants and water 
infrastructure (BBC, 2006). Under the EU definition, such attacks would be 
classified as terrorist actions even though they were conducted by the Armed 
Forces of a state. It is exactly this conundrum which poses the most difficult 
issue for the UN in trying to create a definition of terrorism which is 
meaningful, robust and inclusive, yet is globally acceptable among member 
states (Bures, 2011:pt.3). 
The EU Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law (TTSRL) body 
studied the available academic discourse on defining terrorism and published 
a paper in which they identified “six key qualities (definitional elements) that a 
sound definition of terrorism must contain” (2008:2). The paper considered 
that for a definition of terrorism to be sound, the following criteria have to be 
met: 
 
1. It should render the intentional character of the 
committed acts. 
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2. It should be clear on the purpose of the act. 
3. It should qualify the act itself. 
4. It should specify the target…. 
5. …. as well as the perpetrators. 
6. It should define the scope of the act, including the 
exceptions” (TTRSL, 2008:2–3).  
 
In addition to its list of definitional elements, the report also noted that that 
there was one central principle it had identified which all academic definitions 
of terrorism contained. Calling this the “nodal point”, the report identified it as 
the principle of double victimization (TTRSL, 2008:2). This holds that the 
actual target of a terrorist attack is not the “real target”, instead it is a 
secondary target, “connected or not with the victims” which is the real target. 
Furthermore, this principle states that this is the case regardless of whether or 
not the secondary target is in any way connected with the actual target, as it is 
the secondary target which the attack seeks to influence.  
This is an important point and it captures the concept that a terrorist attack 
rarely seeks to “only” cause terror or casualties. Instead, the terror is intended 
to act as an indirect lever of influence upon a secondary group, usually one 
which either holds power or which is close to the power-broking circle. The 
report is blunt in describing the lack of commitment from some EU member 
states in adopting the EU definition of terrorism. The UK is singled out for 
criticism, along with a handful of other member states. As the report pointedly 
states: 
 
“Unfortunately, the implementation in the member states has 
passed with mixed results.....Above all, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom have not incorporated the 
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second part of the EU definition – the specific list of criminal 
acts that should be considered terrorism when motivated in 
the particular manner.....The inconsistent implementation 
hinders the full exploitation of the common EU definition of 
terrorism. It opens up room for law suits on extradition, 
complicates cooperation between the member states, and 
thus casts doubts on the whole EU counter-terrorism 
cooperation” (TTRSL, 2008:3). 
 
The EU report makes one final salient point:  “Efficient counter-terrorism 
policy will inevitably rest on many factors, but above all, the countries must 
agree on what terrorism is” (TTRSL, 2008:3). 
Tiefenbrun takes a similar approach to the EU’s TTSRL, but arrives at 
different conclusions. She identifies five structural elements to which all 
definitions of terrorism can be reduced (Tiefenbrun, 2003:367). These primary 
elements she identified thus: 
 
“1. The perpetration of violence by whatever means; 
2. The targeting of innocent civilians; 
3. With the intent to cause violence or with wanton disregard 
for its consequences; 
4. For the purpose of causing fear, coercing or intimidating an 
enemy; 
5. In order to achieve some political, military, ethnic, 
ideological, or religious goal”. 
 
Tiefenbrun subsequently unpacks these elements, examining the deeper 
issues coming from her search for a semiotic definition of terrorism and she 
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asks a number of questions. What constitutes terrorism? Who can and cannot 
be considered as an innocent civilian? What can legitimately be considered as 
an unintentional killing in wartime? While the TTSRL list has an emphasis on 
legal aspects, Tiefenbrun’s paper is more philosophically focused. This 
resonates clearly with a central topic of this section, namely how can we fight 
something which we cannot seem to accurately define? The current UK 
definition of terrorism, as provided by the Terrorism Act 2000 (Parliament, 
2000:sec.1) states: 
 
“(1). “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—. 
(a) the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government, 
or an international governmental organisation, or to intimidate 
the public or a section of the public, and 
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a 
political, religious, racial or ideological cause. 
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—. 
(a) involves serious violence against a person, 
(b) involves serious damage to property, 
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person 
committing the action, 
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public 
or a section of the public, or 
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to 
disrupt an electronic system”.42 
                                            
42
 This definition is the current one, which was slightly updated by the Terrorism Act 2006 (Parliament, 2006b)  and 
the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008   
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Having stated that the EU’s TTSRL list of six essential points is a valid 
concept, it would be apposite to map the UK’s definition of terrorism, as 
contained in the Terrorism Act 2000, against the TTSRL criteria. First, it 
should “render the intentional character of the act”. Section 1(a) of the 
Terrorism Act includes an “act which either does, or threatens to, influence the 
government, or intimidate the public” (2000, sec.1a). This seems to meet the 
threshold for the first criteria, but other parts of the definition also meet it 
adequately. Section 1(c) carries a fairly comprehensive selection of some of 
the more usually considered elements of motivations for terrorist acts, namely 
“advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause” (Parliament, 
2000:sec.1c). Both of these sections carry implicit intention within them, and 
fulfil the requirement for mens rea. 
The second point from the TTSRL paper states that a definition must be “clear 
on the purpose of the act” (2008:2). Sections 1(a) and 1(b) of TA 2000 
(2000:sec.1a, 1b), described previously, seem to cover this point, and even if 
one considers the purposes in 1(c) as an inconclusive list (2000:sec.1c), it 
does nevertheless signpost the most common and most serious purposes of 
terrorist actions. The third TTSRL point states that a definition must “cover the 
act itself” (2008:2),  and on this point the definition from TA 2000 is lacking. 
While section 2 of the Act includes rather broad offences such as “involving 
serious violence against a person” and “involving serious damage to 
property”, there is no detailed list of specific actions included (2000:sec.2). 
Earlier in this chapter, an overview was provided of Article 1 of the EU’s 
Framework Decision (2002). This provides a list of specific actions and it 
extends to acts such as kidnapping, hostage taking, seizure of aircraft, 
release of dangerous substances, and more. Yet the requirement to include 
an exhaustive list is itself the subject of debate in the academic community, as 
evidenced in works by Roy (2002), Green (2001), Holmes (2001), Saul 
(2006:2), Zunes (1988), Burns(2001) and Jackson (2009).  
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The fourth point requires that a definition “specifies the target of the terrorist 
act”. Various subsections cover this requirement: Section 1(b) stipulates that 
the use, or threat, is designed to influence the government, an international 
government organisation, the public, or a section of it, while section 2(e) 
includes the more recent phenomenon of electronic attack. The fifth point 
requires that the perpetrators should be specified in addition to the target, and 
this requirement is not fulfilled by the Terrorism Act 2000 definition. Finally, 
the last requirement is that the definition should “define the scope of the act, 
including the exceptions”. The UK definition places the offence within the 
boundaries described in Terrorism Act 2000, but it cannot be said to define 
the scope of the act, nor the exceptions to it. Burke (2004:22), in a study of Al 
Qa’eda, surmised how loaded with meaning and counter-meaning a definition 
can become:  
 
“despite the shifting and contested meaning of "terrorism" over 
time, the peculiar semantic power of the term, beyond its literal 
signification, is its capacity to stigmatize, delegitimize, denigrate, 
and dehumanize those at whom it is directed, including political 
opponents. The term is ideologically and politically loaded; 
pejorative; implies moral, social, and value judgment; and is 
"slippery and much-abused." In the absence of a definition of 
terrorism, the struggle over the representation of a violent act is a 
struggle over its legitimacy. The more confused a concept, the 
more it lends itself to opportunistic appropriation”. 
 
3.3 Problems with terrorism definitions 
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“After September 2001, problems of definition became acute, since the 
Council adopted general legislative measures against terrorism—with 
serious legal consequences—without defining it. The Council has 
encouraged States to unilaterally define terrorism in national law, 
permitting wide and divergent definitions” (Saul, 2008b:2). 
 
“the question of a definition of terrorism has haunted the debate among 
States for decades” (Schmid (1992) cited in Burns, 2001:1–2). 
 
The absence of an internationally accepted definition can arguably solicit 
abuse of the term by both sides in a conflict. In the uprising in Libya, the 
former leader Colonel Muamar Gaddafi continually denounced Libyan 
protestors as foreign terrorists, calling on his supporters to fight them as such. 
Until the situation in Syria deteriorated into entrenched fighting, and was 
followed by the rise of the Islamic State (aka. ISIS, aka. ISIL), the Libyan 
conflict, of all the uprisings during the Arab Spring, was the one which more 
closely evolved into a classical armed struggle. The protagonists were the 
various anti-Gaddafi rebel groupings (mostly under the umbrella National 
Transitional Council (NTC)) on one side and the Libyan Armed Forces on the 
opposing side. The carrying out of NATO airstrikes in support of the rebels 
had a significant impact on making the conflict a more even-handed one, but it 
also resulted in the questioning of the legitimacy of that NATO support 
(Abass, 2011). The NATO military intervention was dragged into the wider 
debate on terrorism and on state-sponsored actions which may or may not be 
classified as such. Güngör (2013:2) goes so far as to state that NATO 
involvement in Libya exceeded its legitimate authority as it brought about 
“regime change”, something prohibited by international law.  
This military application of NATO force was primarily conducted through the 
medium of targeted airstrikes against the Libyan Armed Forces. Viewed 
through the lens of the EU’s Article 1 mentioned previously, two of the 
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identified “terrorist offences” bear closer scrutiny. First, “unduly compelling a 
Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from 
performing any act” (European Council, 2002:sec.1.1). An implicit aim of the 
NATO air support to the TNC forces was to limit the ability of the Libyan 
Armed Forces to fight an effective campaign against the rebel forces of the 
TNC. The second offence recognised by the EU Framework’s Article 1 as a 
“terrorist offence” is listed as “seriously destabilising or destroying the 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country 
or an international organisation”. Güngör (2013) and Abass (2011) make the 
argument that this is what the application of NATO military air power in the 
Libyan conflict has resulted in. Thus the argument of whether to include or 
exclude acts committed by the Armed Forces of a State (or States), in an 
effective and acceptable definition of terrorism, was brought to the fore in the 
Libyan conflict, despite the fact that the use of force was authorised by the 
UNSC (UNSC, 2011:para.4).43 
Without the effective criminalisation of terrorism, it becomes more difficult to 
combat it on an international level. This criminalisation is regularly purported 
to strengthen the policies related to dealing with terrorism. These include, but 
are not limited to: punishment or other retributive designs; incarceration of the 
offender(s) to prevent further acts being committed; rehabilitation of the 
offender(s) 44; the deterrent effect which nations generally wish to project, in 
order to minimise the probability of an attack taking place.45  
Cultural context is extremely important in the area of criminalisation. A report 
by the Australian Law Reform Commission, for example, notes that 
criminalisation can reinforce deterrence of and retribution for a crime, as it 
                                            
43
 UNSCR 1973 had five explicit aims: Protection of civilians; No Fly Zone; Enforcement of the arms embargo; Ban 
on flights; Asset freeze.  
44
 This is a contentious topic, particularly in light of recent programmes to rehabilitate Al Qa’eda terrorists in some 
countries. For specific research on rehabilitation experiences in Indonesia, see “Deradicalisation and Indonesian 
Prisons” (ICG, 2007). Other relevant research in this area is by Christmann (2012) and Disley  (Disley et al., 2012). 
45
 Honderich (1984) provides a deeper discussion of this topic.  
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encourages the revulsion of the community while simultaneously adding to the 
resultant “social censure and shame” (2002:65).  
In a community which has a strong level of support for the person carrying out 
a terrorist attack, the dynamic switches. At the height of the internecine 
violence between Shia-Sunni communities in Baghdad during 2004-2007, 
even though Iraqis not involved in terrorism were losing members of their 
family and their wider community to suicide bomb attacks conducted by the 
opposing sect, many expressed strong support for members of their own sect 
conducting similar attacks upon their opponents in reprisal. In these cases, 
there was virtually no social stigma or community repulsion, even for 
extremely violent and deadly terrorist attacks, as each side felt under mortal 
attack from the other. It was common at that time to hear both sides express 
the belief that they were fighting a war of survival and were threatened with 
extermination.46 Unless the overwhelming majority of the community feel the 
sense of revulsion and disgust mentioned by the Australian report, then a 
significant aspect of the criminalisation policy fails. 
Saul (2008d; 2008b; 2008a) has written extensively on the complex nature of 
the legal issues associated with our inability to define terrorism effectively, 
and the resulting implications this has for the criminalising of terrorism. He 
highlights the emotive aspect of terrorism and the tendency of criminal law to 
avoid the motive, resulting in an inevitable discord. His description (Saul, 
2007:sec.5) of the problem, though lengthy, is an excellent summary of the 
issues inherent in attempting to define terrorism within law. : 
 
“… “Terrorism” currently lacks the precision, objectivity and 
certainty demanded by legal discourse. Criminal law strives to 
avoid emotive terms to prevent prejudice to an accused, and 
shuns ambiguous or subjective terms as incompatible with the 
                                            
46
 Based on discussions between the author and a large number of Iraqi Intelligence officers and other government 
officials of both Shia and Sunni persuasion, while the author was working in Baghdad during this period. 
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principle of non-retroactivity. If the law is to admit the term, 
advance definition is essential on grounds of fairness, and it is 
not sufficient to leave definition to the unilateral interpretations of 
States. Legal definition could plausibly retrieve terrorism from 
the ideological quagmire, by severing an agreed legal meaning 
from the remainder of the elastic, political concept. Ultimately it 
must do so without criminalizing legitimate violent resistance to 
oppressive regimes – and becoming complicit in that 
oppression”.  
 
Saul identifies one problem clearly: the need to de-couple a legal meaning of 
terrorism from the politicised concept of it. Solving this problem, however, is 
much more difficult than identifying it. The academic community alone cannot 
fulfil the remit to construct a suitable, workable and acceptable definition of 
terrorism for the government, nor would they be the most appropriate body to 
carry out this task. A round-table audience, however, consisting of relevant 
experts from the Police, the judiciary, the Department of Public Prosecutions, 
the Intelligence services and the academic community who research and write 
on terrorism, would provide a forum for a very useful exchange of viewpoints, 
and would raise the debate on defining terrorism to a new level within this 
community. It is only through deeper discussion that we can more closely 
approach a practical, effective, inclusive and relevant definition of terrorism for 
the UK.  
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter the two crucial terms of the thesis question, Intelligence and 
terrorism, have been taxonomically unpacked to highlight the difficulties 
inherent in defining these two terms. Even before any definitions were 
examined, a more fundamental issue was raised: that there is a difference of 
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opinion among those writing on Intelligence and terrorism matters, as to 
whether the rationale for defining these terms is a sound premise. This study 
highlighted some of the definitions which have been constructed and 
employed since as early as 1949. The various constituent parts of these were 
considered, and a summary of each was provided. Some of the various 
continua were also described, as some writers have referred to them in their 
academic work on defining Intelligence. It is no surprise that the scope and 
scale of these definitions has changed considerably since 1947. At that time 
the main threat to the national security of the UK and the USA was viewed as 
twofold. Externally, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies constituted 
the primary threat, which was military in nature. The second dimension was 
an internal one, consisting of domestically conducted espionage, subversion 
and sabotage. In the Cold War period, countering these two threats absorbed 
the bulk of the Intelligence efforts of the UK and the USA.  
The threats which the UK faces now include domestic terrorism carried out by 
its own citizens and residents, as well as other less deadly but economically 
damaging ones. An example of this would be the various anti-globalisation 
protests which have necessitated enormous deployments of Police officers 
and which have resulted in damage to commercial and residential areas and 
disruption to major city centres. As society and the global community have 
changed, the threat of terrorism is now one of the most important challenges 
for the UK government. The Intelligence work required to counter this threat 
must be efficient, in terms of resource deployment, and effective, in terms of 
preventing attacks. 
The second half of this chapter continued with the taxonomical examination, 
this time looking at specific definitions of terrorism. The examination opened 
with a quote from Greenstock, and this was compared to a definition of 
pornography from a U.S. Supreme Court Judge, as both definitions were 
similarly vague and assumptive in nature. Next, in order to demonstrate some 
of the difficulties in defining terrorism, a brief summary was provided on four 
globally renowned individuals: Nelson Mandela, Menachem Begin, Gerry 
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Adams and Yasir Arafat. All four became international leaders in their own 
right, two of them were recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, and yet all four 
had also been previously regarded as terrorists.  
These biopics reinforced the fact that the concept of terrorism is very difficult 
to consider without some form of politicisation also being inherently present. 
The topic of the politicisation of Intelligence has been writ large in the media 
of the UK and the USA in particular, following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Both Hulnick (2006:968) and Ott (2003:69-94) agree on the continuing need 
for analysts and Intelligence officials to speak truth unto power. Hulnick 
considers it the perennial challenge of the industry, while Ott laments what he 
sees as a gradual decline in the presence of oversight within the Intelligence 
sphere.  
The work of authors such as Schmid and Schbley were introduced to explain 
the contemporary thinking from the academic community writing on terrorism 
studies. Schmid provided us with four reasons why terrorism is a difficult 
concept to define, while Schbley presses her readers to accept that defining 
terrorism is of paramount importance. The lack of any UN-wide, accepted 
definition of terrorism was discussed at length as this issue features in much 
of the critical literature surrounding the topic. Research from Tiefenbrun and 
others has contributed much to the debate, especially in attempting to identify 
the key components which a terrorist action should contain, in order to be so 
labelled. This brings us back to the initial question raised in the introduction, 
viz. can we fight something which we cannot truly define? As Stern (2000:12–
13) notes, the way in which governments respond to terrorism is directly 
influenced by the way in which governments perceive and define terrorism.  
Defining the two concepts of Intelligence and terrorism is clearly a task beset 
by difficulties on all sides, but what of the implications of such difficulties? The 
activities of the UK Intelligence agencies are now governed by the legislation 
which also placed them on a statutory footing (The Security Services Act 1989 
and the Intelligence Services Act 1994) as well as by other legislative 
instruments (e.g. the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, among 
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others). The nature of Intelligence collection is heavily weighted towards 
secrecy and covertness, which is necessarily more difficult to legislate than 
prosecuting individuals for terrorism offences. In order to collect Intelligence to 
assist in safeguarding the domestic security of the UK, legislation governing 
the UK Intelligence agencies authorises them to conduct activities which 
would otherwise be unlawful, such as the intercept of personal 
communications. This important distinction is often overlooked by media 
reporting on Intelligence cases and accusations are levelled at the agencies 
(and by extension, against the government of the day), that their activities are 
unlawful. The various legislative instruments authorise them to conduct 
activities otherwise unlawful, such as the intercept of communications, subject 
to stringent checks and balances (e.g. warrants, either judicial or Ministerial), 
specific guidelines (e.g. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
Guidance), and other legislation (e.g. the Human Rights Act 1998, et al) 
(Parliament 1998b; Home Office 2013; Parliament 1994; Parliament 1989; 
Parliament 2000b). The importance of defining terrorism, however, has an 
arguably greater impact as the ability to clearly state the parameters of a 
terrorism-related offence under law is essential to enable the State to 
successfully prosecute a person or persons actively involved in supporting 
terrorism. An inability to clearly define Intelligence has a greater impact on the 
agencies carrying out the work than on public safety, whereas the inability to 
clearly define terrorism could result in the inability to successfully prosecute 
an evidentially sound case in a court of law. 
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Chapter 4 CONTEST: The UK Counter-Terrorism Policy 
Before examining the Intelligence cycle in UK counter-terrorism and 
assessing its effectiveness, the UK’s counter-terrorism policy first needs to be 
understood, as the collection, analysis and use of Intelligence takes place 
within this context. This chapter examines this policy, explaining the 
environment within which the UK’s intelligence work takes place. The UK’s 
strategy for combating terrorism is known as the CONTEST strategy. First 
introduced in 2006, the current version was approved in 2011 (Home Office, 
2011) and a subsequent update to the policy is next due in 2016. The aim of 
CONTEST is “to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from 
international terrorism” (Johnson, 2010:4) and it is divided into four distinct 
work-streams or strands. These strands are named PREVENT, PURSUE, 
PROTECT and PREPARE. The PURSUE and PREVENT strands are focused 
on reducing the terrorist threat, while the PROTECT and PREPARE strands 
aim to reduce the vulnerability of the UK to terrorist attacks. Working in 
conjunction, the four strands reduce the threats and the vulnerability which as 
a result reduces the overall risk of a successful terrorist attack against the UK.   
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3 The CONTEST Strategy 
 
The CONTEST strategy dovetails with the three primary pillars of the Control 
Strategy in the UK National Intelligence Model: Prevention, Intelligence and 
Enforcement. Prevention is encompassed by the PREVENT strand through 
the development and delivery of a co-ordinated, cross-government response 
for preventing violent extremism. Three of the strands, PROTECT, PREPARE 
and PREVENT all contribute to the production of risk assessments and 
security advice for the Police, government departments and key partners from 
the public sector. These include financial institutions and those estates 
designated as elements of the Critical National Infrastructure. The pillar of 
Intelligence is covered by all four of the CONTEST streams, as the 
Intelligence cycle functions in each of these.  
The mechanics of the Intelligence cycle in the PREVENT strand are very 
similar but the primary focus here is on stopping individuals or groups 
becoming sufficiently radicalised to begin attack planning. Direction in this 
case is more likely to come from warnings by agencies and key partners, such 
as the CHANNEL programme, the Prison service, community Police officers, 
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youth groups and other organisations at a more grass-roots level within 
society. Collection may be carried out in a much more overt manner, such as 
face to face meetings with youth leaders, housing officers, concerned friends, 
family or neighbours, even a personal meeting with the target of the 
investigation. Collation will take place at the same time, and will help to enrich 
the overall picture of the case, adding data from a range of potential partners 
such as housing, social services, police, prisons, MAPPA, CDRP, etc. 
Analysis and evaluation are more likely to be collegial in PREVENT cases 
with a high degree of multi-agency collaboration, less focused on stopping an 
attack than on preventing a person or persons from crossing a line into a 
dangerous stage of radicalisation. As PREVENT targets the twin threats of 
terrorism as well as violent extremism, it has a necessarily wider focus than 
the PURSUE strand.  
Once Intelligence has been produced, all four CONTEST streams are 
involved with the Intelligence-sharing among the relevant agencies and 
trusted key partners. The enforcement pillar encompasses both the 
PREVENT and PURSUE strands through the disruption of terrorist individuals 
and networks as well as violent extremist groups and individuals, using 
arrests where applicable and appropriate. This also generates a deterrent 
effect through the publicly visible disruption of such networks and groups. 
Enforcement is also covered by the combination of PREPARE and PURSUE. 
These continually add to the development of Counter Terrorism capacity, 
while at the same time extending the capability to respond to terrorist 
incidents and to move as rapidly as possible to the post-attack recovery 
phase. The relationship between the CONTEST streams and the UK policing 
pillars can be looked at from a different angle, mapping the CONTEST 
strands against the components of the NIM’s Control Strategy, as seen below: 
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4 The relationship between CONTEST and the policing pillars 
4.1 PURSUE 
The PURSUE strand of CONTEST aims to stop terrorists from conducting 
attacks, and this work includes disrupting cells actively engaged in attack 
planning. There are 6 main priorities under PURSUE:  
  
“increasing covert detection and investigation capability and 
capacity; improving the effectiveness of the UK prosecution 
process; developing more effective non-prosecution actions; 
improving capability to disrupt terrorist activities overseas; 
strengthening the coherence between our counter-terrorism 
work and counter-insurgency and capacity building overseas; 
and enhancing inter- agency coordination” (Johnson, 2010:2).  
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PURSUE relies very heavily on intelligence for it to be effective and there is a 
close relationship between PREVENT and PURSUE. In an ideal world, this 
would result in a virtuous circle. The PREVENT strand would reduce the 
numbers of those involved in terrorism, while the PURSUE strand would 
disrupt, dismantle and where applicable, convict those involved in terrorism. 
This would result in a further reduction in physical plotters, and an increase in 
public awareness of the deterrent effect of such operations. The importance of 
this work is reinforced by statistics from the annual Intelligence and Security 
Committee annual reports. In the period 2012-13, the Security Service 
devoted 68% of its resources to international counter-terrorism, a figure which 
the report says was broadly similar to the preceding two years (Rifkind, 
2013:12). Likewise, SIS devoted 35% of its resources to the same challenge 
and GCHQ made a similar contribution of resource allocation (Rifkind, 
2013:14).  
The PURSUE strand employs the entire Intelligence cycle to meet its aims. 
Direction could come from the Security Service, the JIC, from Special Branch 
or other departments or agencies acting on information received. Collection is 
carried out in accordance with the direction received, to provide the raw 
material required to start building up a picture. This is simultaneously 
enhanced by the collation of existing information already held in a variety of 
data repositories. Analysis is conducted within the relevant agencies such as 
the Security Service and GHCQ, and it is evaluated in-house and at multi-
agency level. The more serious the case, the more involved this evaluation 
process becomes. The dissemination of interim and polished Intelligence 
reporting will aim to provide actionable Intelligence to the executive bodies 
tasked with intervention, to prevent a terrorist action from taking place. This 
could be done by Special Branch and/or other Police assets such as specialist 
firearms and forensics teams, or it could require action by SIS overseas. As 
PURSUE is aimed at stopping an attack from happening, there is a much 
tighter tactical focus in this area. The authorities, especially the Police and the 
Security Service, constantly have to balance two opposing requirements. On 
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the one hand, there is the desire to collect as much Intelligence as possible, 
to derive an evidentially solid case for a successful prosecution. On the other 
hand, there is the need to protect the safety of the general public.  
4.1.1 Covert Detection & Investigation 
The first PURSUE priority is increasing the capability and capacity of covert 
detection and investigation. The regulation, use and governance of covert 
surveillance in the UK are covered by RIPA. Covert surveillance comprises 
two main categories: directed surveillance and intrusive surveillance. Part 2 of 
RIPA governs the way in which authorised public sector organisations classed 
as RIPA Authorities (e.g. councils, police, and some government departments 
and agencies) carry out directed surveillance. This is tightly defined in RIPA 
(Parliament, 2000a:sec.26 (2)):  
 
“Surveillance is directed for the purposes of this Part if it is 
covert but not intrusive and is undertaken (a) for the purposes 
of a specific investigation or a specific operation; (b) in such 
manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private 
information about a person (whether or not specifically 
identified for the purposes of the investigation or operation); 
and (c) otherwise than by way of immediate response to 
events or circumstances the nature of which is such that it 
would not be reasonably practicable for an authorisation 
under this Part to be sought for the carrying out of the 
surveillance.” 
 
Intrusive surveillance is thus named as it permits a much higher degree of 
intrusion by the State into the right to privacy of an individual or individuals. 
Intrusive surveillance includes techniques such as the covert deployment of 
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cameras in residential dwellings, and the covert deployment of listening 
devices into privately owned vehicles. Intrusive surveillance is defined in RIPA 
(Parliament, 2000a:sec.26 (3)) thus: 
 
“surveillance is intrusive for the purposes of this Part if, and 
only if, it is covert surveillance that — 
(a) is carried out in relation to anything taking place on any 
residential premises or in any private vehicle; and 
(b) involves the presence of an individual on the premises or 
in the vehicle or is carried out by means of a surveillance 
device”. 
 
As covered in chapter 4.2, the proposed use of directed and intrusive 
surveillance must take into consideration the factors of the mnemonic “PLAN”, 
i.e. that it is proportionate, legitimate, authorised and necessary (Johnson, 
2010:para.2.04).47 The regulatory mechanisms for the application of 
authorisation to conduct covert surveillance are contained in the Codes of 
Practice for RIPA (Home Office, 2010). The use of directed and intrusive 
surveillance is an increasingly emotive topic in the UK media, more so since 
the release of highly classified material into the public domain by the 
revelations of Edward Snowden (BBC, 2013). A frequent topic of discussion in 
the global media is the balance between the intrusion of the State into the 
private lives of citizens, as part of the State’s attempts to secure and protect 
society, versus the individual and collective freedoms which citizens expect to 
enjoy. The most important of these are enshrined in the Articles of the Charter 
                                            
47
 A consultation was launched in April 2009 to ensure that techniques are used only when they are strictly necessary 
and proportionate to the offence under investigation. Following this consultation, the Government took seven 
statutory instruments through Parliament. These set out exactly who in each public authority may authorise certain 
covert techniques and for what purpose. They give clear guidance on when authorisation under RIPA is – and when 
it is not – required, and provide enhanced controls for local authority use of RIPA. 
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of the United Nations (1945). A former Director General of the Security 
Service commented on this distinction during a Reith lecture, stating  
 
“I am often asked to speak at conferences and in debates on the theme 
of security versus liberty. I always refuse because I do not see these as 
opposites. They are different but there is no liberty without security. I 
wish to argue for liberty, not be falsely characterised as its opponent” 
(Manningham-Buller, 2011:3).  
 
It would be useful to briefly mention the most recent statistics related to 
authorised property interference, and to directed and intrusive surveillance 
requests by law enforcement agencies in the UK, and to view these figures 
graphically, in the context of the previous decade.  
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In the Annual Report of the Chief Surveillance Commissioner for 2103-2014 
(the most current at the time of writing), authorised requests by Law 
Enforcement agencies in the UK to conduct directed surveillance increased 
marginally to 9,664 applications in the period 2013-14, compared to 9,515 for 
2012-13, following a continually downward trend from more than 25,000 
applications in 2003.  (Rose, 2014:para.4.8).  
 
5 Directed surveillance authorisations for law enforcement agencies over past 
ten years (Rose, 2014:11)  
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Authorised requests by Law Enforcement agencies to conduct intrusive 
surveillance showed a slight increase for the period 2013-14, to 392, 
compared to 362 for 2012-13 and 408 for 2011-12 (Rose, 2014:para.4.6).  
6 Intrusive surveillance authorisations over past ten years (Rose, 2014:10) 
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Authorisations for property interference were granted on 2,689 occasions for 
the period 2013-14, also an increase compared to 2,440 for 2012-13.(Rose, 
2014:para.4.5). 
 
  
In the report for 2011-2012, the Surveillance Commissioner commented that 
the use of a tracking device in a vehicle is often “more proportionate, more 
accurate and safer than using scarce surveillance personnel” (Rose, 
2012:para.4.3). Many individuals engaged in terrorist activity are now much 
more familiar with the tactics, capabilities and technical tools used by law 
enforcement and Intelligence agencies than they were a decade ago. Recent 
terrorist plots have shown a higher degree of this knowledge than previously. 
Terrorist groups, organised crime groups and narcotics traffickers have also 
engaged in the transfer of knowledge in this area, making the work of the 
agencies more difficult. They are now much more “surveillance aware” than 
previously.48 
                                            
48
 See Chapter 4.3.4, cf. Operation RYHME. 
7 Property interference authorisations over past ten years (Rose, 2014:10) 
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In his 2011-12 annual report (Rose, 2012:11) the Chief Surveillance 
Commissioner made an observation which has implications for covert 
Intelligence work in counter-terrorism. He wrote that the course of his 
department’s inspections had shown a distinct reluctance by local authorities 
to authorise covert operational elements such as surveillance, which he 
attributed to their unwillingness to be expose themselves to potentially 
adverse media coverage. He saw three possible explanations for this. The 
first was that local authorities could be conducting fewer investigations, with 
the associated impact that this could be contrary to the public interest. The 
second was that these local authorities may be employing traditional, overt 
methods which also carry an intrinsic risk of infringing upon an individual’s 
right to privacy (European Court of Human Rights, 2010:10). The third was 
the most concerning, that local authorities were carrying out the activities 
without the necessary authorisation, and therefore without the legal protection 
of an authorised operation conducted under the auspices of RIPA (Rose, 
2012:11). 
A key difference between the law enforcement community and the non-law 
enforcement agencies such as the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) 
is the level of knowledge and experience in covert surveillance and the 
relevant but extremely necessary legislation which governs its use. The senior 
leadership of the UK’s Police forces are now more aware of the requirements 
enshrined in RIPA and other Acts, which govern the requests for, and 
deployments of, human surveillance teams, technical surveillance, CCTV and 
CHIS. The process of applying for a warrant to conduct such activities is 
strictly laid out and a request is submitted through a recognised and clearly 
defined chain of command which expects to see satisfactory justification for 
the granting of a warrant to conduct covert surveillance. Agencies other than 
Intelligence or law enforcement do not generally have this level of knowledge, 
awareness or experience. It can be argued, however, that covert surveillance 
is not their core business.  
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Yet any organisation or body which is authorised by RIPA to conduct such 
covert activities, (defined as “relevant public authorities” (Parliament, 
2000b:sched.2)), has been vested with these powers because it is considered 
that they may have a legitimate need to use such covert methods.49 Indeed, in 
the period 2011-12, 66.86% of requests for authorisation to conduct directed 
surveillance came from the DWP (Rose, 2012:11). As the Surveillance 
Commissioner highlights, there are a number of factors which engender 
reluctance by many of these relevant public authorities to request 
authorisation for the deployment of covert surveillance. This is one area in 
which inter-agency collaboration can help. Cross-pollonisation of officers 
between agencies such as GHCQ, SIS, Security Service, Special Branch and 
others can increase the skill sets in areas such as covert legislation, warranty 
and case management.50 RIPA is not a “silver bullet” for covert Intelligence, 
however, and on its own it cannot be expected to cover any and all possible 
eventualities for covert collection.51 While RIPA is the primary legislation 
governing covert surveillance, other instruments of legislation also impact on 
the process. The Freedom of Information Act (FIA) (Parliament, 2000a) and 
the Data Protection Act (DPA) (Parliament, 1998a) both have a direct 
relevance upon covert surveillance for relevant public authorities. The Human 
Rights Act (HRA) (Parliament, 1998b) also mandates the obligations of an 
agency employing covert surveillance, to ensure the protection of individuals 
who willingly pass information to that agency. The UK law enforcement 
agencies are also governed by the Criminal Procedures and Investigations 
                                            
49
 See Annex H for a list of relevant public authorities 
50
 The author has worked alongside embedded officers from a variety of agencies and has also been embedded in 
foreign agencies. While such cross-pollonisation can help in raising skill levels, it is also highly dependent upon the 
personalities involved. 
51
 The question of whether RIPA is sufficient for the task of collecting covert Intelligence is one which cannot be 
answered in this paper, as it is a subject worthy of its own thesis, such is the depth and the breadth of the field 
covered. An excellent introduction to some of the issues surrounding RIPA are contained in a collection of essays 
edited by Billingsley (2009). Particularly relevant are Harfield’s chapter (2009) on “The Regulation of CHIS”, 
Buckley’s chapter (2009) on “Managing Information from the Public”. Gillespie’s writing on “Juvenile Informers” 
(2009) take an interesting diversion for those interested in a more in-depth examination of RIPA’s suitability for 
purpose in highly specific areas. Gillespie posits, for example, that a juvenile informant who is used covertly to 
conduct a test purchase of narcotics is currently covered by RIPA, yet he believes that such use cases would never 
have been envisaged by the authors and creators of the RIPA legislation. Indeed, Gillespie considers that this is an 
area best directed to the Home Office RIPA Review Group. 
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Act (CPIA) (Parliament, 1996) which mandates when information received in 
confidence by those agencies must be disclosed to the defence.  
This combination of legislative instruments can result in the decision being 
taken by a relevant public authority that the requesting of authorisation for 
covert surveillance is either too risky (in terms of negative publicity and 
liability) or too complex (in navigating the legislation) to embark on. The path 
of least effort, and therefore least perceived risk, is to simply avoid requesting 
authorisation. For the law enforcement and Intelligence agencies, the option 
to take the path of least effort is rarely, if ever, available. In addition, the topic 
of surveillance is now very much in the national agenda of the UK media, 
particularly in light of the unauthorised releases of classified information by 
Edward Snowden.   
These revelation have had negative impacts upon the Intelligence 
community’s efforts to track and disrupt terrorists (Moore & Whitehead, 2014) 
and have also had an international impact in the political sphere. For example, 
a major breakdown occurred in the political relationship between Germany 
and the USA following allegations of a sustained intelligence collection effort 
by the USA against German governmental targets, including Germany’s  
Chancellor Merkell (Pond, 2013; Martin, 2014). This relationship breakdown 
culminated in the expulsion of the CIA Head of Station, an act usually 
reserved for only the most serious diplomatic incidents involving Intelligence 
matters (BBC, 2014).  
Covert detection and investigation contributes primarily to the collection part 
of the cycle, but it cannot start without direction, whether it is initial or ongoing. 
The stringent legal requirements involved in being granted a warrant for 
directed or intrusive surveillance ensure that individual or collective human 
rights are not adversely affected with just cause, and with sufficient supporting 
evidence to convince a Judge or a Minister of State. The cycle supports this 
legislative foundation, requiring direction to be given and allowing from the 
necessary supporting evidence to be produced during the application for a 
warrant. This ensures that without the necessary warrant in place, collection 
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cannot begin, or in the event of an ongoing case, cannot continue unless an 
existing warrant is approved for extension or re-issue. 
4.1.2 Effective Prosecution 
The second PURSUE priority is to improve the effectiveness of the UK 
prosecution process. The primary aim of any Intelligence cycle is to produce 
actionable intelligence and in counter-terrorism this can take various forms. 
Intelligence is collected on a terrorist target in order to build up a picture of the 
individuals involved, the location of materials, the roles and hierarchical 
functions of those involved, their motivations and capabilities, the details of 
any attack planning and critically, what stage that planning has reached. As in 
the PREVENT strand there is a balance to be maintained between continuing 
to collect Intelligence to complete the overall picture, and to ensuring that 
public safety is maintained. This is particularly important to ensure that control 
of weapons, explosives or individuals is not lost by law enforcement or 
Intelligence officers. Disrupting a terrorist cell too early can mean that 
prosecutions are unsuccessful due to a lack of prima facie evidence. Allowing 
a terrorist cell to continue to operate, in order to conduct further Intelligence 
gathering, carries a risk that the cell will evade surveillance and successfully 
carry out an attack. 
Some of the improvements in effectiveness of legislation derive from the 
introduction of laws such as the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (CTA) 
(Parliament, 2008). This Act introduced a number of strengthened provisions 
which PURSUE benefits from. Schedule 2  provides extended sentencing for 
offenders convicted of offences which, although non-terrorist in nature, are 
nonetheless deemed to have a terrorist connection, an example being the 
possession of explosives (Parliament, 2008:69). Certain restrictions on foreign 
travel can be applied in Schedule 5 to those convicted of terrorist offences, if 
necessary preventing offenders convicted under the CTA from travelling 
abroad (Parliament, 2008:76-81). Domestically, new requirements now 
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ensure that those convicted of terrorist offences are monitored on their 
release from prison. In an effort to target the funding of terrorism, the Treasury 
Department is now empowered to order institutions in the financial sector to 
take direct action against suspect transactions, where a suspicion of money 
laundering or terrorist financing exists. UK legislation, such as the Terrorist 
Asset-Freezing Act 2010 (Parliament, 2010) is intended to strengthen the 
interdiction of terrorist financing and those engaged in it. It restores the asset-
freezing capabilities previously authorised by the Terrorism (United Nations 
Measures) Order (Parliament, 2006) and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United 
Nations Measures) Order (Parliament, 2006a) which were previously 
authorised under the United Nations Act 1946 (Parliament, 1946). These two 
Acts were subsequently deemed unlawful and ultra vires by the UK Court of 
Appeal in the case of R v Ahmed (Supreme Court, 2010:, para.177).52 The 
Court concluded that the 1946 United Nations Act had not been intended to 
provide authorisation for the conduct of “coercive measures” which would, in 
the Court’s opinion, unjustly interfere with human rights, without the requisite 
degree of Parliamentary oversight. TA 2006 established offences which 
support both PURSUE and PREVENT, such as the offence of encouraging 
terrorism (2006a:sec.1) or disseminating publications that seek to encourage 
terrorism (2006a:sec.2). These offences of incitement to terrorism have 
become known as “glorification” offences.  
The role of intercept in counter-terrorism work is a central one and this is 
clearly recognised at the highest levels of UK government policy-making. The 
Privy Council in their review on the role of intercept as evidence (Chilcot et al., 
2008:10), highlighted the importance of intercept in counter-terrorism cases 
worked on by SIS, GCHQ and the Security Service. The report concluded that 
there was considerable support for the admission of intercept as evidence but 
it stated that a satisfactory legal model could not be agreed upon by the key 
stakeholders (Chilcot et al., 2008:pp.48–51). Gordon Brown summarised the 
                                            
52
 Ultra vires is a legal maxim, the meaning of the Latin phrase being traditionally translated as “beyond the powers”. 
Its antonym is intra vires, usually translated as “within the powers”. If something is ultra vires it is usually considered 
to be invalid from a legal standpoint.  For a detailed explanation of this legal principle, see Dobson (2013). 
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dilemma in Prime Minister’s Question Time, noting that the report supported 
the use of intercept as evidence in principal, but also had concerns about the 
potentially negative impact which disclosure of such material could result in 
(Anon, 2008:col.959).  
It is exactly these conditions which prove most problematic and continue the 
divide between select Parliamentarians on one side, and the Intelligence 
community on the other. This debate is an example of the dichotomy facing a 
democratic government – ensuring that citizens’ rights (to privacy, freedom of 
speech, freedom of expression, etc.) are safeguarded and remain protected 
from institutional abuse, while at the same time making every effort to ensure 
that national security and public safety are maintained. It is a delicate balance 
and can only be maintained if the requisite components of legislation, 
oversight, transparency and trust are present, and are employed satisfactorily.  
The subject of lawful intercept is an extremely sensitive one in the UK but as 
the Home Secretary confirmed in 2014, the UK’s counter-terrorism work relies 
heavily on the capability of intercept (2014b). This fact is now widely known 
and technical details regarding intercept techniques are now available on the 
internet (May, 2014a; BBC, 2003).53 May (2014) also told Parliament that 
communications data has been used as evidence in “95 per cent of all serious 
organised crime cases handled by the Crown Prosecution Service”, and that 
intercept has been a significant part of every counter-terrorism operation 
undertaken by the Security Service in the past 10 years.  
The Home Office continues to take the stance that it is the Government’s 
desire to find a method or system for the use of intercept as evidence in UK 
courts. In the 2013 CONTEST Annual Report (May, 2013:15), the Home 
Secretary stated that the government would continue to seek a workable 
solution which would enable intercept to be used evidentially in UK courts, but 
                                            
53
 The BBC report describes the mobile telephone evidence presented by the Prosecution, in the case of the Soham 
murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in 2002. This case shows how forensic evidence derived from the 
signal data and call records of a mobile telephone are used in law enforcement. Summers (2012) describes the 
technical aspects of the analysis of the mobile phone handset in relation to the various cell towers.    
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would not reduce the value of the intercepted information as Intelligence or 
reveal too much about the capabilities of the Intelligence services. Given the 
difficulties surrounding this issue, it is unlikely that such a legally viable model 
will be introduced in the near future. 
Effective prosecution can only take place once the cycle has been completed 
for at least one iteration. Intelligence alone is not enough to secure a 
successful prosecution; it requires solid evidence to support the prosecution in 
a court of law. The “sterile corridor” helps to ensure that Intelligence is used 
correctly and does not inadvertently encroach on the investigation itself, which 
could lead to evidence being dismissed, or having to be withdrawn, or being 
proven as unsound. All the parts of the cycle work to generate evidence, and 
finished product reports together with technical evidence, as depicted in many 
court cases with the support of graphical charts such as that in Annex E, are 
used to lay out the arguments of the prosecution’s case. The cycle supports 
effective prosecutions by ensuring that the necessary analysis and evaluation 
have taken place before any disseminated reports are released. 
4.1.3 Non-prosecution Actions 
The third priority is the development of more effective non-prosecution 
actions, an essential component of the wider PURSUE strategy. Not all cases 
of suspected terrorist activity can be prosecuted, for a variety of reasons.  In 
cases involving nationals of other countries who pose a risk to the national 
security of the UK, the stated aim of the UK Government is to deport such 
people (May, 2013:14). In cases where groups or organisations are deemed 
to be “concerned in terrorism”, the Government’s ultimate response lies in the 
proscription of such organisations (Parliament, 2006a:sec.21). Such 
proscription makes the organisation illegal in the UK, and also prohibits the 
organisation from operating in the UK. In addition, several ancillary restrictions 
assist in cutting off the group’s ability to function, such as the inherent 
consequential offences of actual or professed membership of a proscribed 
   
129 
 
group, which carries a custodial sentence of ten years (Parliament, 
2006a:sec.3). 
The term “operating space” can used to describe the nebulous concept of a 
terrorist group’s ability to form, to associate, to communicate, to plan, to 
gather equipment and to conduct operations (Burke, 2014). In short, it is the 
degree of operational freedom which the group enjoys. Within this operating 
space, terrorist groups conduct their own Intelligence cycle, collecting 
Intelligence, evaluating and analysing it, before eventually using it for attack 
planning (Burke, 2014). The denial of this operating space becomes a key aim 
in counter-terrorist planning and operations. Intelligence plays a primary 
function in building up a rich picture of a terrorist group and how it functions as 
a network, within its own operating space.   
Not all terrorist groups are subjected to prosecution. It is not in the State’s 
interest to allow an identified group to proceed as far as possible with attack 
planning, and for the State to intervene at the last moment, in order to 
maximise the evidence collected. As discussed previously, this carries a high 
risk that the attack will actually take place, so the duty to maintain public 
safety is paramount. Second, not all groups are equal in capability and intent. 
Some groups are little more than two or three disillusioned individuals who 
may have formed a bond and discuss topics such as armed struggle and 
conducting attacks, but who may not actually progress beyond this stage. If 
and when they come to the attention of the authorities, such individuals may 
be more appropriately dealt with by initiatives such as the CHANNEL 
programme, which works to help steer such individuals away from extremist 
viewpoints (ACPO, 2009).  
The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (2011) (Parliament, 
2011) abolished the previous system of control orders, replacing it with 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) against an individual 
about whom there exists a reasonable belief that the individual is, or has 
been, involved in terrorism (Parliament, 2011). Control orders were introduced 
with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Parliament, 2005) and have been 
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the subject of a long-running debate in the UK, about the appropriateness of 
these measures. Former Home Secretary David Blunkett described the use of 
electronic tagging as being like a “prison without bars” (BBC, 2004). A key 
objection has been the ability for the State to subject an individual to a control 
order, while withholding the details from the affected individual, of why they 
are being subject to the control order. Critics have voiced concern about the 
State’s ability to ignore the central tenets enshrined in habeus corpus 
(Parliament, 1679).54 
The targeting of terrorist financing remains a key weapon in counter-terrorism, 
as severing a group’s access to operational funds can have a 
disproportionately successful effect upon the group’s ability to plan and 
conduct actual operations.55 In addition to the UK’s own legislation on the 
combating of terrorist financing, the UK is also bound by some United Nations 
legislation, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1904 (UNSC, 
2009), primarily aimed at disrupting Al Qaeda financing. The UK’s Charity 
Commission has produced its own counter-terrorism strategy document, in 
which it defines its overarching aim as: “to identify, disrupt and prevent 
terrorist and other serious abuse of the charitable sector” (2012:8). After 2007, 
the Commission was more proactive in its efforts, engaging more with the 
Metropolitan Police and Counter-Terrorism Command, and creating a greater 
focus on Intelligence analysis. The first version of the Commission’s counter-
terrorism strategy (2008) came about as a result of these efforts, plus a wider 
engagement with the public, canvassing opinion from civil society and other 
interested bodies on which strategic direction the Commission should take 
(Jones, 2008).  
                                            
54
 The legal maxim of habeas corpus translates from the Latin as “you may have the body”. In its full form, the maxim 
states “habeas corpus (ad subjiciendum)”, meaning “you may have the body (subject to examination)”, i.e. a person 
could only be held in detention if their detention could be proven to be lawful. The Habeus Corpus Act was passed by 
Parliament in 1679, although the legal principle is believed to have been part of Common Law prior to the publication 
of the Magna Carta, which was published in 1215. Article 39 of the Magna Carta stated that “No freeman shall be 
taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon 
him except upon the lawful judgement of his peers or the law of the land”. 
55
 Interviews between the author and U.S. members of a specialist team working to interdict terrorist financing, Kabul, 
Afghanistan, 2006-2009. 
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The strategy was revised in 2012 (Charity Commission, 2012) to align it more 
closely with the findings of Lord Carlile’s review (2011) of the PREVENT 
strategy for the government. In 2014, a draft Bill (Cabinet Office, 2014a) was 
produced, entitled “Draft Protection of Charities Bill”. This legislation, if 
enacted, will give the Commission wider powers to take more stringent action. 
These powers include the ability to close down a charity under investigation, 
in order to maintain the public’s confidence (Cabinet Office, 2014a:sec.6). 
They also include preventing individuals from resigning before they are 
disqualified, then returning to another charity at a future date (Cabinet Office, 
2014a:sec.8–9). The Charity Commission’s 2012 strategy (2012:8) still 
contains the same four-strand approach of awareness, oversight, co-
operation, intervention, the model of which is reproduced below: 
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8 Charity Commission Counter-Terrorism Strategy: The Four-
Strand Approach (2012:8) 
 
In some circumstances, non-prosecution actions can be a deliberate choice 
for the Police, while in other circumstances, they may be the only course of 
action open. Despite the work of the Police and the Intelligence agencies, 
there are occasions when the outputs of the cycle are only Intelligence, and 
not evidence. When there is a credible risk to public safety, the Police may 
have to arrest a terrorist suspect, knowing that at the point of arrest, there 
may be little or no admissible evidence to support a prosecution.56 This is not 
a breakdown or a weakness of the cycle as a model, it is simply a reality that 
despite the best efforts of Police and Intelligence agencies, there will always 
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be cases where there is a paucity of evidence collected. Some targets are 
very “surveillance aware” and are meticulous in ensuring that their behaviour, 
their communications and their actions cannot be used as evidence against 
them. The Intelligence cycle conforms to the same principle of databases: 
“garbage in, garbage out”, that is to say, the outputs of the model are highly 
dependent upon the inputs into it, as well as on the capabilities of the people 
involved in the cycle’s processes. The cycle supports non-prosecution 
actions, as it can be very clear that further Intelligence is unlikely, or that 
despite the Intelligence collected, there is not enough evidence to move to 
arrest and prosecution. Finally, Intelligence gaps still occur, despite all 
available resources being devoted to a high-value target.57 
4.1.4 Disruption of Terrorist Activities Overseas 
The fourth PURSUE priority is improving the government’s capabilities to 
disrupt the activities of terrorists abroad. Countering the threat of overseas 
terrorism, in addition to being an aim in itself, also contributes to the national 
security of the UK. Important intelligence is often derived from the disruption 
of overseas terrorist groups, especially when members of the group are 
detained or electronic media is captured. This has, however, raised another 
issue with which the UK government has had to contend, viz. the protocols to 
be followed when British officials observe or take part in the questioning of 
suspects detained overseas. Detailed debates took place in the House of 
Commons, regarding British Intelligence officers and their alleged participation 
in, or observation of, the torture of terrorist suspects detained overseas (Davis 
& Lewis, 2009). As a result the UK government produced a guidance 
document in July 2010, detailing the code of conduct to be followed by 
Intelligence or law enforcement officers involved in overseas questioning 
(Cabinet Office, 2010). This was legally challenged In July 2011 by the 
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Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in legal action (2012; 2011) 
against the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence and two others, 
arguing that the governmental guidance:” …leaves officers in the field with the 
mistaken and unintended expectation that they will be protected from personal 
criminal liability in situations where they may, unwittingly, be liable for 
crimes”.58  
A key instrument in the UK’s capability to disrupt terrorist actions overseas is 
the use of Special Forces (SF). The UK government confirmed in May 2012 
that up to 200 SF soldiers would remain in Afghanistan beyond the 2014 
withdrawal (Wintour, 2012). Since 2003, the UK SF have been heavily 
involved in counter-terrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
deployment in Iraq after the 2003 invasion required a complete SF Squadron 
to be based in the country for a 6-month deployment. The Squadrons were 
rotated every 6 months for a period of several years, resulting in one of the 
most sustained UK deployments of SF since World War 2. The use of the SF 
in Iraq and Afghanistan has allowed the British government to engage in 
significant force projection, taking the counter-terrorism battle to the very 
centre of the operating space of some groups, especially that of the Afghan 
Taleban and the Iraqi insurgency. In addition to the physical disruption 
resulting from a counter-terrorism operation overseas, such a capability also 
generates a psychologically disruptive effect among cell members, as they 
often feel unsafe, even within their traditional home areas (Source_08, 2011). 
A key factor in disrupting terrorism overseas is the Foreign Service liaison 
work undertaken by British Intelligence officers with their foreign counterparts. 
Naturally, this is stronger in some countries than others. The Intelligence 
cooperation between the UK and the USA, for example, is the real heart of 
what has become known as “the special relationship”. The extent of trust in 
this relationship allows a full and frank sharing of raw and finished product 
that enables a very effective division of labour between the two partner 
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countries. Other bilateral relationships have also resulted in significant 
disruptions, such as the information provided by Saudi Intelligence which 
enabled the UK authorities to eventually discover the so-called “printer bomb” 
on a commercial cargo plane when it landed in the UK.59  
Cultural factors play a large part in the benefits gained from international 
liaison work, especially where there are considerable cultural differences in 
the host country. Regions such as the Middle East and Southeast Asia can be 
difficult environments in which to collect Intelligence, without understanding 
the myriad factors which underpin the cultural framework and the 
interpersonal relationships which are so vitally important in these locations.  
Foreign liaison is not without its difficulties, however. Not all countries follow 
the same rules on protecting Intelligence sources, so a deeper risk 
assessment needs to be conducted when sharing Intelligence with certain 
countries, in order to ensure that sensitive information is not passed on to 
individuals or agencies not cleared for such information. Even worse is the 
potential for high-grade, processed Intelligence to be passed on to the 
terrorist targets themselves, either deliberately or inadvertently. One of the 
most frequently discussed countries in this regard is Pakistan, and the links 
between the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and the Taliban / Al 
Qa’eda. Legal issues also exist in sharing Intelligence with partner countries 
that may be subject to additional, legal requirements outside of their own 
national legislation. One such example is that of US Intelligence reports being 
passed on to an EU partner nation which then faces a legal challenge to 
disclose such information. 
The Intelligence cycle results in reported product which is used as a basis for 
disruption operations against terrorist groups or individual actors. In many 
ways, this disruption is the archetypical picture of the cycle in action. Once an 
individual is named as a target for investigation, this direction results in a 
collection effort which, together with other collated information, is analysed 
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and evaluated, resulting in the requirement to collect additional Intelligence. 
The subsequent direction then refines the original direction, bringing a 
narrower aperture of focus on the target. As the picture builds, a target back 
begins to develop and when this has been sufficiently refined and contains 
enough accurate information to be acted on, the disruption plan can be 
formulated and implemented. This is arguably the zenith of the Intelligence 
cycle in action. 
4.1.5 Capacity Building 
The fifth priority is to strengthen the coherence between the UK’s counter-
terrorism work and the capacity-building and counter-insurgency work which 
is conducted overseas (Johnson, 2010:11). The use of UK intelligence officers 
overseas is not the only way in which the PURSUE strategy aims to disrupt 
overseas terrorist activity. The UK devotes considerable effort and financial 
commitment to capacity-building programmes which aim to raise the 
capabilities, effectiveness and standards of other countries which the UK 
considers as partners in the fight against international terrorism (May, 
2013:19).  
These capacity-building programmes have soft and hard aspects. The soft 
side can include the provision of specialist training courses on the whole 
spectrum of the Intelligence cycle, assisting those countries in raising their 
own standards of Intelligence collection and use. This helps the recipient 
country to professionalise their systems and processes to higher, more 
sophisticated and more effective standards of Intelligence collection and 
exploitation. Raising the standard of counter-terrorism capabilities of other 
countries such as Pakistan and Yemen contributes directly to increasing the 
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level of public safety in that country and also helps to reduce the potential 
threat of international terrorism reaching the UK’s shores.60  
The harder side of the equation concentrates on direct action which is carried 
out when the Intelligence cycle has generated actionable Intelligence and 
disruptive action is required. This is another area which can fall to the UK SF, 
who provide training and mentoring in counter-terrorism operational 
procedures to other nations. For example, in 2010 the UK government sent a 
contingent of SF to train the Yemeni Armed Forces, following the abortive 
attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to detonate a device on board a U.S. 
passenger airliner as it prepared to land in Detroit (Rayment & Blomfield, 
2010). 
In addition to capacity-building programmes, the UK government also 
provides direct funding to countries which are considered to be key partners in 
combating international terrorism. In the financial year 2009-10, the budget for 
overseas counter-terrorism was £36.9 million (Bryant, 2010). The recipient of 
the largest segment of this funding was Pakistan, followed by Afghanistan, 
Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel in descending order (Home Office, 2011:11).61  
Assessing the effectiveness and impact of capacity-building programmes is 
one of the most difficult areas of Foreign Service work.62 In terms of mapping 
this against the Intelligence cycle, this is almost impossible to do. What is 
more usual is to look at the quality of the product and the skill of the staff, 
comparing the before and after results. Such comparisons are, however, more 
subjective than objective, but the key aims are to assess whether the officers 
trained have absorbed the training sufficiently to be able to deliver a higher-
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 The financial year 2009-10 was the last year in which government spending on overseas counter-terrorism was 
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grade product afterwards. Much of this training focuses on the analysis and 
reporting aspects of the cycle. The direction and evaluation parts are often 
either overlooked or given less priority, which is an area in which 
improvements can and should be made. 
4.1.6 Inter-Agency Co-ordination 
The sixth and final priority is the enhancement of inter-agency co-ordination. 
Much has been written about the rivalry between the UK Intelligence 
agencies, particularly that between SIS and the Security Service. It has been 
a long-running topic for authors, especially the depth of the rivalry which was 
perceived to exist during the Cold War (Harrison, 2012; Corera, 2012; 
Macintyre, 2014). In the past two decades co-operation between the 
Intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies of the UK has seen great 
improvement.  By 2007 for example, the Director of the Security Service 
confirmed that his agency had established eight regional centres in the UK, 
working in tight integration with Police officers, Special Branch and with other 
regional authorities (Evans, 2007) and by  2011 this had been increased to 
nine. The Intelligence and Security Committee (Rifkind, 2013:13) noted in 
2013 that such inter-agency collaboration had undergone “a huge change for 
the better, sweeping away the tired old turf wars of ten or twenty years ago”. 
The UK’s Intelligence agencies, together with the Police and the Armed 
Forces, now co-operate to “an unprecedented degree” in the counter-
terrorism arena, to protect both the UK and its interests overseas (Source_08, 
2011). Since the Al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, and the 
resulting allied military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, this co-operation 
has increasingly included Defence Intelligence (DI), due to the close proximity 
in which the UK SF and other elements of the Armed Forces operate in this 
space. A Foreign Secretary illustrated this increased contribution from DI 
when he described his involvement in the NATO air campaign in Libya, 
stating: 
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“We really saw as ministers through the last year, through the 
Libya conflict, the value of Defence Intelligence. We started 
each day listening to the Chief of Defence Intelligence and 
then the JIC staff and we couldn’t make our political decisions 
about Libya without really understanding the defence picture. 
So I think perhaps we have had direct experience, more than 
would be the case of ministers in recent years, of the value of 
Defence Intelligence” (Rifkind, 2012:17 citing Foreign 
Secretary Hague). 
 
The degree of crossover nowadays, between overseas and domestic counter-
terrorism to protect UK interests has increased since the 2001 Al Qaeda 
attacks on the USA. Domestic terrorist plots would traditionally have fallen to 
the Security Service to deal with, while a group plotting to attack British 
targets abroad, for example, would come under the remit of SIS. The rise of 
the global, interconnected Islamist extremist network has resulted in a blurring 
of boundaries, both for the terrorist groups and for those who work to defeat 
them. Taking post-2003 Iraq as an example, one scenario is a group of Iraqi 
nationals, based inside Iraq but with connections to other individuals within 
the UK, plotting an attack inside the UK, requiring one or more of the Iraq-
based group to travel to the UK. Another scenario is a group of UK nationals 
planning to travel to Syria to join a jihadist group such as ISIS. The 
demarcation of previous decades is no longer as clear-cut as it once was. The 
Intelligence cycle can be employed by an individual or across multiple 
agencies and in this latter example, SIS, GCHQ and the Security Service 
would conduct their own iterations of the cycle, providing their own, single-
agency direction, resulting in collection, with multi-agency collation, evaluation 
and analysis, with each agency exchanging semi-finished reports before an 
all-source, polished report might be issued. The work of JTAC has done much 
to push forward this inter-agency working, with each agency providing officers 
   
140 
 
and agency-specific IT terminals to enable a truly joint working environment 
with commentary from all of the key agencies on terrorist-specific. While the 
JTAC environment is probably more accurately described as multi-agency 
working, it has an added, spin-off benefit. Staff seconded to JTAC work in a 
unique environment where Intelligence sharing and partnerships are the norm 
instead of the exception. When they return to their parent agencies, these 
experienced officers are much more willing and able to work collaboratively 
with their colleagues in other agencies and other government departments. 
Together with cross-fertilisation tours and exchange officer postings, JTAC 
adds another mechanism to encourage the spread of joined-up working 
across the Intelligence community.  
When two or more agencies are collaborating on a target, the various 
elements of the cycle may be carried out by more than one agency. In terms 
of collection, this may be limited to one agency by necessity, given the nature 
of the target. Collation, analysis and evaluation are more typical areas in 
which multi-agency work is more usual. When it comes time to produce a 
report, this may be done by one agency as the lead, or it may be a 
collaborative work. Both are common, depending on the nature of the task.  
4.1.1 SUMMARY 
The PURSUE strand of CONTEST is probably the most easily identified with 
the operation of the Intelligence cycle. This section has described the six key 
areas of the work involved, and it has been clearly demonstrated how the 
Intelligence cycle underpins the whole of PURSUE. Without a functional and 
simple model, these areas would require more resources for planning and for 
the operational activities carried out within the cycle. All three of the UK’s 
Intelligence agencies, together with the Police, are familiar with the 6-stage 
Intelligence cycle and this results in a real “force multiplier” effect. Individual 
officers as well as teams are able to work on a part of the cycle, share the 
progress, hand over work to others, and pick up the work at a later stage of 
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the cycle if required, without any loss of momentum. Regular liaison, including 
multi-agency meetings, help to ensure that all parties are regularly updated 
and that any new developments are shared among the relevant analysts. The 
Intelligence cycle works very effectively in the PREVENT strand and it is the 
mission which drives the process.  
  
4.2 PREVENT  
The PREVENT stream concentrates on the root causes of radicalisation, to 
stop individuals becoming violent extremists or terrorists. Radicalisation has 
been defined by a specialist Home Office department as: “the process by 
which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some 
cases, then join terrorist groups” (BSU, 2008). Under this strand, various 
outreach programs aim to counter the radical, extremist and/or violent 
ideologies which assist in recruiting individuals to groups which espouse 
these belief systems (Home Office, 2011:58–77). The PREVENT stream 
acknowledges that the proactive disruption of terrorist groups can never be 
solely sufficient to neutralise the terrorist threat, recognising instead that a 
collective partnership of central and local Government, law enforcement and 
the wider community is essential. In June 2011, the PREVENT strand 
underwent a comprehensive review by the UK government (Carlile, 2011). 
Following this review, PREVENT now comprises three central policy planks. 
4.2.1 The Ideological Challenge of Terrorism 
The first component of PREVENT is responding to the ideological challenge 
of terrorism and to the threat from the people promoting it (May, 2011:1). 
Under this, the current UK government (a Conservative & Liberal Democrat 
coalition) takes a visibly tougher stance than the previous (Labour) 
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government, stating that this government will not work with groups or 
organisations who do not accept “values of universal human rights, equality 
before the law, democracy and full participation in our society” (May, 2011:1–
2). This plank of the PREVENT policy also tightened up on providing funding 
to groups working within this sphere, making it clear that funding would be 
withdrawn unless clear evidence was available that the work of a group was 
effective and that it provided value for money (Travis, 2011). 
The current strategy aims to interdict the ability of extremist and terrorist 
groups to spread their ideological message, thus limiting their potential ability 
to successfully radicalise people, especially those individuals more vulnerable 
to radicalisation. The ideological challenge identified by the Government also 
raises the issue of community engagement, which spreads across both the 
first and third priorities of the revised PREVENT strand (ACPO TAM, 2008). In 
countering radicalisation and extremism, communities are often more effective 
at identifying vulnerable individuals and attempts at radicalisation, or any 
increasing trends of such behaviour with the community (Source_08, 2011). 
The Association of Chief Police Officers considers the involvement of local 
authorities and other partners to be “critical…in preventing violent extremism. 
They are in a good position to talk to their local communities, hear their 
concerns and help them to reject extremism” (ACPO, 2015). This resonates 
clearly with the ACPO stance that PREVENT is not only an initiative of the 
Police, as ACPO believes that the communities best able to reject extremism 
are those with “strong and empowered communities” (ACPO, 2015).  
Fighting an ideological challenge using the Intelligence cycle is more opaque 
than the work which takes place in the PREVENT strand, and targeting an 
individual or a group is a more clearly defined task than targeting a belief 
system. An additional factor is that much of this work takes place in the 
political sphere and is therefore carried out not by Police or Intelligence 
officers, but by civil servants who are unlikely to have been trained in the use 
of the Intelligence cycle. There are inputs into this work-stream which will 
have derived from the Intelligence cycle’s outputs, such as the scale and 
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content of a jihadist website which promotes extremism and exhorts people to 
take part in terrorist activities. In addition, reporting derived from the 
Intelligence cycle is used in cross-government initiatives, such as the report 
by the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism 
(Cabinet Office 2013). Other classified reports will derive from direction, 
resulting in collection, analysis and evaluation, and will be produced as a 
disseminated product, but may not go through subsequent iterations of the 
cycle. This does not, however, lessen the contribution of the model in any 
way. 
4.2.2 Prevent the Recruitment of Individuals 
The second priority of PREVENT is preventing people from being attracted to 
terrorism, and making sure that anyone at risk is provided with the 
“appropriate advice and support” (May, 2011:15). The latest PREVENT 
strategy makes an important assertion, that radicalisation is usually “a 
process, not an event”. This is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, a 
process generally has a longer timeline than an event, and a process should 
provide more opportunities for interdiction than an individual event. Second, 
this identification of radicalisation as a process has allowed the Home Office 
to compare it with some elements of the processes used in serious crime, 
together with the associated crime prevention methods, tactics and tools 
which have been developed to combat it. Whilst acknowledging some 
similarities, however, the new strategy clearly emphasises that the PREVENT 
strand is not a Policing strategy, nor should it become one (ACPO, 2015). 
The 2011 revision to the PREVENT strategy acknowledges that there has 
been public concern over the perception that PREVENT-related programmes 
are being used as a vehicle to conduct intrusive and/or unwarranted 
surveillance against citizens (May, 2011:56). It has also been the subject of 
academic criticism (imprimis Rogers, 2008:38–61). Another concern was that 
the strategy could allow programmes to be used in a disproportionate manner 
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(May, 2011:31), an issue which had been extensively reported on in the 
mainstream media, primarily in regard to a paper published by the Institute for 
Race Relations (Kundnani, 2009). While noting this concern, the report 
stresses that PREVENT-related programmes are not and will not be used as 
a means to covertly collect intelligence. The report adds that such 
programmes will be subject to appropriate oversight mechanisms and data 
protection regulations (May, 2011:8).  
The recommended principles for the sharing of PREVENT-related information 
are stipulated in a Home Office policy document, which clearly establishes the 
guidelines for such sharing as necessity and proportionality, consent and the 
power to share (Gupta, 2010:17-20). Consent should be obtained wherever 
possible, although the guidance recognises that this will clearly not be 
possible in some cases, and provides mechanisms for instances in this case. 
The power to share information between departments is legislated mainly by 
two statutory Acts, the DPA (Parliament, 1998a) and the HRA (Parliament, 
1998b).63 Necessity and proportionality consider that information should only 
be shared where it is both necessary and proportionate to the outcome 
desired by the covert action being planned. Both necessity and proportionality 
are two key requirements in the legislation of covert policing in the UK, as part 
of the mnemonic “PLAN”. This covers four areas which must be considered 
before undertaking a covert operation:  
 
1. “Proportionality – is it proportionate to obtain the 
intelligence desired using the planned covert methods? 
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 In addition, the power to share information is also covered by the common law duty of confidentiality which places 
an obligation upon a solicitor, for example, to respect the confidentiality of the affairs and statements of their client. A 
concise explanation of this premise, together with a legal test is as follows: “Confidential information is any 
information to which the common law ‘duty of confidence’ applies. A duty of confidence is created when ‘private’ 
information has been passed on in such a way that the person receiving the information was aware, or should have 
been aware, that the information was being imparted on the basis of confidentiality. (The legal test is whether a 
‘reasonable’ person would think the recipient ought to have known that the information was confidential)” (London 
Law School, 2013:1).  
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2.  Legitimacy – is the purpose of obtaining the desired 
intelligence a legitimate on, such as national security 
interest, prevention of crime and disorder, or public 
safety? 
3. Authority - what is the lawful basis and the legal 
authority for undertaking the covert action, and what 
warrantry is required? 
4. Necessity – why is the desired activity necessary, and 
could the intelligence be obtained through other, less 
intrusive methods?” (Harfield & Harfield, 2012:102).   
 
Laws (Parliament, 2000b:sec.30) and statutory instruments (Parliament, 
2000d) stipulate, for example, that in order to deploy a Covert Human 
Intelligence Source (CHIS), authorisation must be necessary and 
proportionate (Parliament, 2000b:sec.29(2)). These prerequisites, originally 
deriving from the ECtHR, ensure that a citizen’s rights, especially the right to 
privacy (as stipulated under Article 8 of the ECHR (2010:art.8)) are not lightly 
sacrificed by the Intelligence agencies or the Law Enforcement community. 
They further ensure that sufficient justification is provided before any covert 
action is authorised. In particular, the principle of necessity negates the 
instigation of covert action such as conducting intrusive surveillance or the 
deployment of a CHIS, simply because it would provide an easier method of 
collecting intelligence than less intrusive methods. It would be impossible from 
a Policing point of view to successfully, effectively and efficiently identify all 
the cases of extremism and terrorism ongoing in the UK by operational 
Policing tactics and methods, as there are simply not enough resources.  
Another highlight of the 2011 PREVENT policy is a more rigorous scrutiny of 
the funding provided to the various programmes which work in this area of 
supporting those identified as being vulnerable to radicalisation or extremism. 
Acknowledging that such programmes wield considerable influence, the 
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PREVENT strategy stipulates that such organisations must also be "credible 
and able to reach and talk to people at risk”, a criticism which has been voiced 
about previous efforts (Carlile, 2011:sec.6.53–6.70).  
The new strategy also emphasises an international dimension to this work, 
aiming to operate collaboratively with other foreign governments in the areas 
of research, and to build on the knowledge and understanding of other 
countries, to better understand radicalisation. While such international co-
operation takes place across many areas related to counter-terrorism, it is 
rarely publicised due to the sensitivities involved in international collaboration. 
Some countries do not want such participation made public, and this is 
particularly the case in the regions of the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. 
Despite this, a number of de-radicalisation programmes have been discussed 
openly, including programmes in Saudi Arabia (Ezzarqui, 2010), Yemen 
(Porges, 2010; Berger, 2014) and Indonesia (ICG, 2007). Opinion is divided 
as to their effectiveness and long-term success rates (Source_08, 2011).  
The Intelligence cycle can be applied to a recruitment prevention target in a 
similar way to an active terrorist target. Although the threat posed may be 
lower, the same stages can be followed in collecting and reporting, to enable 
the authorities to decide which course of action to take. This could range from 
no action and only a monitoring brief, to referral to the CHANNEL programme, 
e.g. in the case of a vulnerable adult or a young teenager, through to 
intervention by the Police if deemed necessary. The Intelligence cycle 
supports recruitment prevention equally well as it does with the PURSUE 
strand.  
4.2.3 Addressing Radicalisation 
PREVENT’s third priority is to “work with those sectors and institutions in 
which risks of radicalisation exist” (May, 2011:8). Five particular areas of 
focus are identified by the June 2011 strategy: faith, health, educational 
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institutions, charities and the criminal justice system and the internet has been 
added as a separate, standalone category (May, 2011:8). The 2011 policy 
makes the aspirational statement that there should be no “ungoverned spaces 
in which extremism is allowed to flourish without firm challenge and, where 
appropriate, by legal intervention” (May, 2011:9). 
 As the Internet is being used more and more by terrorist groups, and by 
those engaged in radicalisation, it follows that the use of the Internet as a 
radicalisation vehicle will be a key area for the PREVENT strategy. Indeed, Al 
Qaeda has been described as the first guerrilla movement in history which 
made the move from the physical to the virtual space (Coll & Glasser, 2005). 
Given the size and depth of the internet, however, the battle to deny the 
internet to radicalising elements is more of an ambition than an achievable 
policy goal. PREVENT acknowledges that counter-radicalisation programmes 
need to be proportionate to the actual risk of radicalisation, as resources are 
limited in this area. 
The PREVENT strategy is owned and coordinated by the Office for Security 
and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office. The OSCT reports 
directly to the UK Home Secretary in the capacity of Lead Minister, and also 
to the Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT, 2011). 
Despite the PREVENT strategy being owned at Ministerial level, the 2011 
policy pushes the implementation of it down to the lowest practical level 
through a wide range of partnerships such as crime reduction groups, local 
authorities, faith and youth groups, housing offices and others (May, 
2011:sec.8.69, 9.7, 11.13). 
The UK government has made efforts to raise awareness about the indicators 
of radicalisation and extremism, highlighting the risks posed to young people 
in further and higher education institutions, while the problem of radicalisation, 
particularly within UK prisons, has been an increasing area of concern in UK 
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counter-terrorism (BSU, 2008).64 A report by the Quilliam Foundation on 
radicalisation in British prisons identified four individuals who had been 
radicalised while in prison, and were later convicted and imprisoned for 
terrorism-related offences (Brandon, 2009:14). The threat of radicalisation 
being conducted within UK prisons is a serious one which requires more 
extensive research to better understand the nature of this threat.65 Neumann, 
for example, has doubts about certain individuals, such as Jose Padilla, 
having been radicalised while in prison, as opposed to after their release 
(2010:29). Two case studies highlight the dangers which successful 
radicalisation can pose. 
Richard Reid, the so-called “shoe bomber”, converted to Islam while serving a 
sentence in Feltham Young Offenders Institution & Remand Centre for 
various petty crimes. Following his release from prison, he began to attend 
Brixton mosque and changed his name to Abdel Rahim. According to the 
Imam there, Reid was influenced to change mosques by people who had 
established themselves some years ago on the periphery of the mosque’s 
influence. Baker described their beliefs and teachings as much more militant 
(BBC, 2001). Imam Baker believed that these individuals deliberately targeted 
weaker, more impressionable individuals and that Reid fitted this profile.  
Reid moved on to attend Finsbury Park mosque in London, which at the time 
was under the leadership of Abu Hamza al Masri, the radical, extremist 
preacher. Masri was later convicted in the UK of a series of offences, 
including six counts of soliciting to murder and one offence under the 
Terrorism Act 2000. He was subsequently extradited to the USA in October 
2012 and convicted of a range of terrorist-related offences including hostage 
taking and conspiracy to provide and conceal material support and resources 
to terrorists. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in the USA (U.S. District 
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 Part of the report states: "We have noticed that terrorist groups are remarkably tolerant of individuals with serious 
criminal histories. This is the case even when those individuals continue to be involved in very serious non-terrorist 
crimes, including drug trafficking, assault and even rape” (BSU, 2008).  
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 The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) business plan provides an insight into its resources, aims 
and working methods Also see work by Neumann (2010). 
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Court, 2004). There is strong conjecture, but no hard evidence, that Reid 
personally met Zacarias Moussaoui, currently serving life imprisonment 
without parole in the US, having been convicted of his involvement in the 11 
September 2001 attacks by Al Qa’eda against the USA (U.S. District Court, 
2006). Imam Baker also agrees with the theory that Reid met Moussaoui 
(Brandon, 2009:14).  
Shortly after he ceased visiting Brixton mosque, Reid travelled to Afghanistan 
and Pakistan in 1999, and spent most of the year 2000 in Pakistan. It was 
during this visit that he is believed to have attended the Khalden terrorist 
training camp outside Kabul. Ahmed Ressam, who attended Khalden training 
camp and was subsequently imprisoned for his part in plotting to detonate 
explosives at Los Angeles Airport (the “LAX Millennium Plot”), identified Reid 
as having attended the camp at the same time as him. Another convicted AL 
Qaeda terrorist, Yacine Akhnouche, also identified Reid as having attended 
Khalden camp (Elliott, 2002). On 22 December 2001, Reid attempted to 
detonate an explosive device hidden in his shoes, while on board an 
American Airlines plane flying from Paris to Miami. He was overpowered by 
passengers after the device failed to detonate. Reid was subsequently 
sentenced by a U.S. Court to three life sentences with no possibility of parole 
(U.S. District Court, 2002).  
Muktar Sa’id Ibrahim was the ringleader in the failed 21 July 2005 attacks 
against the London transport network, and was also one of the attempted 
suicide bombers in the plot. He was convicted of conspiracy to murder for his 
part in the attempted bombings and was jailed for life with a minimum tariff of 
40 years (CPS, 2007). Ibrahim is believed to have been radicalised during his 
time in a British prison (BBC, 2005). Convicted of indecent assault at the age 
of 15, he was later involved in two robberies and like Reid was eventually 
detained for five years in Feltham Young Offenders Institution & Remand 
Centre, for a gang-related attack he was involved in. Also like Reid, he began 
to attend Finsbury Park mosque, listening to sermons preached by Abu 
Hamza al Masri.  
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It is still not fully known if Ibrahim actually met with Mohammed Siddique Khan 
(leader of the 07 July bombings in London) while he was in Pakistan during a 
visit in December 2004, but counter-terrorism officers believe that the two 
men either met in person, or that they were both trained by the same person 
or people. Ibrahim travelled to Pakistan on 11 December 2004, together with 
two other males named Shakeel Ismail and Razwan Majid. All three men were 
carrying camping equipment, cold weather clothing and copies of pages from 
a medical manual, on dealing with ballistic injuries.  
Officials at Heathrow airport detained the men and questioned them, as their 
equipment was similar to that noted being carried by other British males who 
had travelled abroad to take part in jihad. They were released after 
questioning and allowed to depart the UK, as they had not committed any 
offence. Two of the 07 July bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan and 
Shehzad Tanweer, departed the UK for Pakistan a couple of weeks before 
Ibrahim, on 19 November 2004. Tanweer and Khan returned to UK on 08 
February 2005 while Ibrahim returned alone, in March 2005. Between 11 
December 2004 and 08 February 2005, two of the suicide bombers who later 
blew themselves up in the 07 July attacks were in Pakistan at the same time 
as the leader of the failed 21 July attacks (Casciani, 2007).  
In addition to their simultaneous location in Pakistan for nearly 4 weeks, the 
similarity of the explosive devices was an even stronger link. All the devices 
used in the successful 07 July attacks and the failed 21 July attacks were 
based on hydrogen peroxide. Although hydrogen peroxide has been used by 
many terrorist groups for the past two decades, the actual composition of the 
devices used in both the 07 July and the 21 July attacks was unlike anything 
previously seen, according to the government forensics experts who 
examined the devices (Casciani, 2007). Although forensically similar, the main 
difference was in the organic compound used in the explosive material. The 
devices used on 07 July, all of which detonated, had black pepper as the 
organic ingredient. The devices used on 21 July, all of which failed to fully 
detonate, employed chapatti flour as their organic compound. Government 
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experts stated that the types of devices used in these attacks has not been 
found in any professional literature, and believed that this kind of device used 
was too unstable to handle (Casciani, 2007). When a reconstruction of one of 
the bombs was manufactured by government technicians for testing 
purposes, it had to be carried out with the use of robotics in a quarry due to 
the high risks involved in creating such an unstable device (BBC, 2007a). The 
degree of similarity of the devices makes it almost certain that they were 
either constructed by the same bomb-maker, or that the same bomb-maker 
instructed two or more individuals who subsequently manufactured the 
devices.66  
There is another possibility, which is that the explosives used in the devices 
for the 21 July attacks were manufactured at the same time, and in the same 
batch, as the explosives used in the devices which successfully detonated in 
the 07 July attacks. If the explosives had degraded due to sublimation in the 
period between being manufactured and the attempts to detonate it on 21 
July, it could have caused the technical failure of the explosives.67 The scale 
of the investigation was immense. More than 12,500 statements were taken 
by the Police in relation to the 07 July attacks; 26,000 pieces of evidence 
were catalogued, 5,000 of which required forensic examination; 142 
computers were seized as evidence, and the amount of CCTV footage which 
required examination exceeded 6,000 hours (Parliament, 2006a:para.74). 
The case studies described above are valuable in helping to understand the 
path which a radicalised person can take, and how that path can ultimately 
lead to the person participating in a terrorist attack. Radicalisation is not 
something which only works for terrorist groups, it is also used across the 
extremist spectrum from single-issue causes (such as animal rights or anti-
abortion activists) to political groups, including both left-wing and right-wing 
                                            
66
 Comments made to the author by a former government official familiar with the case, who wishes to remain 
anonymous. 
67
 Sublimation occurs when a solid converts into a gas without first passing through the liquid stage. It can affect 
homemade explosives, rendering them highly unstable or rendering them inert. 
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extremists. The academic study of radicalisation is key to arriving at a clearer 
understanding of how terrorist groups groom and recruit individuals and some 
work is already being done in this area (Baker-Beall, 2015).  Developing a 
clearer appreciation of the factors and processes of radicalisation will 
contribute to a fuller picture on how to prevent it taking place, which lies at the 
core of the PREVENT strand. 
 
The UK government funds programmes which work to counter the threat of 
radicalisation, such as the Islam Citizenship Education Project (ICEP), and 
the CHANNEL project. The approach of ICEP is to provide an Islamic-centred 
framework which teaches the values and concepts of citizenship, through a 
series of 44 lessons, all of which have been discussed with the assistance of 
the Muslim community in the UK (ICEP 2012). The CHANNEL programme 
was singled out in the June 2011 report as an initiative which has enjoyed 
successful results (Carlile, 2011:9). CHANNEL is a multi-agency project 
funded by the OSCT and works as a multi-agency initiative designed to 
identify and support vulnerable people at risk of radicalisation (Peters, 
2012:3). The CHANNEL programme is composed of three stages of process. 
A diagrammatic model showing the CHANNEL process is shown below 
(Peters, 2012:15):  
   
153 
 
 
9 The CHANNEL process (Peters, 2012:15) 
 
The first stage is the identification of a person or persons vulnerable to 
radicalisation. This will usually raise the concern that an individual is exhibiting 
behaviour which leads to believe that s/he is either susceptible to 
radicalisation, or is closely identifying with radical or extremist ideology. The 
next step is to conduct a joint risk assessment of the case and to identify the 
factors/issues of concern which need addressing. Finally there is referral and 
support, during which a bespoke programme of support measures and 
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intervention will be developed and implemented, with regular reviews of 
progress. This will provide the necessary assistance to an at-risk person, in 
order to counter the radicalising influences they are being subjected to. 
Options which the CHANNEL guidance may suggest as suitable include 
counselling, faith guidance, civic engagement, support networks and finally 
the more mainstream services, such as health, housing, education, social 
services and employment.  
A wide range of partners work together in the CHANNEL area, some are 
statutory partners mandated to be involved, while others become involved as 
required. Statutory partners include social services, the education sector, 
children’s services, youth services and the various offender management 
services, such as the Probation Service. Non-statutory partners come from a 
wider social and governmental landscape and can include the Police service, 
UK Border Force, Housing, Her Majesty’s Prison Service, Youth Offending 
Services and local authority elements such as the role of “PREVENT Lead”. 
Joining the local and central government bodies are a range of other 
institutions such as charities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
welfare groups. Community policing is a key tool in preventing the 
radicalisation of young and/or vulnerable individuals, and the willing provision 
of information by the local community is an underpinning part of such policing.  
In the pilot year of 2006 there were just 5 referrals to CHANNEL but by the 
reporting year of 2013-14, this had increased to 1,281 (ACPO, 2014). The 
youngest referral to CHANNEL was of primary school age (Ilston, 2014). The 
following graph shows the number of referrals to the CHANNEL programme 
from its inception in 2006 to 2014 (the year 2008-20009 is missing as ACPO 
do not provide any data for this period).  
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10 Graph showing number of individuals referred to CHANNEL 
from 2006-2014 
 
Deploying the Intelligence cycle in support of tackling radicalisation is 
definitely feasible but the operational environment is wide-ranging, 
encompassing schools, faith groups, religious communities and prisons to 
name just a few. The difficulties in operating in an environment such as a 
prison are considerably more challenging than in operating in the wider 
community so although the model can be employed within this work-stream, 
the operational environment will have an impact on the effectiveness of the 
model’s deployment, as the environment will produce constraints unique to 
each. That said, the cycle can still be employed on a target who is at risk of 
radicalisation, to establish a pattern of life, a circle of associates, meetings 
with persons of interest, etc., in just the same way as in other work-strands. 
Conducting the same cycle within the confines of a prison, however, would 
still follow the same stages but implementing it would be a task of a different 
magnitude. 
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4.3 PROTECT 
4.3.1 Critical National Infrastructure 
The PROTECT stream aims to decrease the UK’s vulnerability to terrorist 
attacks, especially the vulnerability of the UK CNI, the transportation 
infrastructure, the national borders and those areas designated as crowded 
places, such as football stadiums. Much of the PROTECT stream takes place 
in conjunction with the work of the Security Service, especially the protection 
of the UK CNI. The CNI is defined as: “those facilities, systems, sites and 
networks necessary for the functioning of the country and the delivery of the 
essential services upon which daily life in the UK depends” (CPNI, 2014). 
IN the UK, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is 
the government body responsible for conducting the site surveys of 
designated critical facilities. It also provides advice and education to the public 
and private sectors on the risks to the CNI, and the measures which can be 
taken to mitigate these risks. The CNI programme encompasses nine distinct 
sectors constituting emergency services, communications, finance, the food 
supply chain, energy, the health sector, government, the national 
transportation network and the water infrastructure (CPNI, 2014).  
In the last few years, an extensive programme of work has been conducted to 
increase the physical security of certain elements of the UK CNI, some of 
which are very visible. These security upgrades include measures such as 
heavy-duty, anti-ram barriers installed around the Houses of Parliament, 
which greatly increase the stand-off distance between a potential vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) and the target. This stand-off 
distance is the primary defence against attack by an Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED). The over-pressure in a shock wave resulting from a high-order 
explosion decreases rapidly over two factors - time and distance. The more 
the distance can be increased between the target and the explosion, the 
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greater the chance that a building will survive against an explosive attack, and 
the greater the chance that casualties and damage will be minimised.  
The threat of explosive attack against buildings generates complex problems 
for both designers of new-build installations, and for officials responsible for 
counter-terrorism and critical incident planning. They must contend with 
multiple threats which include building collapse, flying debris, dust, pollution 
clouds resulting from destruction of, or damage to, the building infrastructure, 
secondary hazards caused by damage to utilities and services, such as 
electrical hazards, flooding, contamination and the ignition of ruptured gas 
supplies (Gedeon, 2003:pp.4.1–4.19). As the Intelligence agencies have 
increased their knowledge about how various IEDs are manufactured, this has 
led to a greater understanding of the potential and actual explosive effects 
resultant from these devices. This in turn has led to planners, designers and 
architects being able to design more security measures into a planned 
building or a piece of infrastructure. Transportation is an area where the 
Intelligence cycle has made solid contributions and where it works in a 
continuous iteration of gathering more inputs to be analysed in order to 
produce a more refined output. As our understanding of terrorist-based 
explosive devices increases, the ability to build in mitigation measures 
improves commensurately.  
4.3.2 Transportation, Border Security and Crowded Places 
Successful large-scale attacks against the public transportation sector have 
taken place in European cities including London and Madrid, while in the 
USA, sporting events have also been targeted for attack (FBI, 2010). The 
unsuccessful attempt in December 2009 by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to 
detonate explosives on board a passenger aircraft while on final approach to 
land at Detroit airport showed that mass transport remains a priority target for 
terrorist groups (Office of the Attorney General, 2015). In addition to directly 
targeting transportation systems, Al Qaeda groups have also employed a 
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considerable degree of lateral thinking in their attempts to inflict large-scale 
casualties using transportation networks.  
Less than a year after Abdulmutallab’s failed attack, two IEDs were 
discovered on board cargo planes bound for the US. The information 
concerning the existence of the devices, both posted in Yemen, came from 
Saudi Intelligence. One device was discovered on an aircraft which landed in 
the UK at East Midlands Airport, while the other was discovered on board an 
aircraft which landed in Dubai (Hague, 2013). These two devices were 
expertly concealed as printer cartridges and had even been constructed in 
such a way that the cartridges would look internally authentic if subjected to 
X-ray examination (INTERPOL, 2010). The actual printer containing the 
explosive device at East Midlands was so expertly constructed that the Police 
and Home Office specialists looking for the device actually disassembled the 
printer, put it back together again and declared it clear of explosives. 
Following a second investigation of the printer some 5 hours later, the device 
was discovered. It transpired that the device had been inadvertently de-
activated by the Police during the first inspection when the Printer cartridge 
was removed (BBC, 2010; INTERPOL, 2010).  
Strong Intelligence co-operation between the Intelligence agencies of the UK, 
UAE and Saudi Arabia helped to ensure that the plot was uncovered, and that 
the devices were able to be made safe and forensically examined. In the 
same way that knowledge of IEDs is used to help enhance building design 
security, so the knowledge gained from the printer bomb plot was also used to 
strengthen procedures for examining parcels and mail coming from Yemen to 
the UK. It also resulted in a tightening up of security protocols for the cargo 
industry (Pistole, 2013).  
A more ambitious plot targeting the UK transport sector was the “liquid bomb 
plot” of 2006. The operation to interdict this complex plot was called Operation 
OVERT and it culminated with the arrests of 24 people in August 2006, on 
suspicion of planning to blow up transatlantic passenger aircraft in mid-flight. 
The plot was centred on the use of the explosive substances TATP and 
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HMTD.68 It required up to 18 suicide bombers boarding up to 10 transatlantic 
aircraft flying from the UK to cities in the U.S. and Canada, carrying with them 
the necessary equipment and chemical substances necessary to construct 
IEDs in mid-flight (CPS, 2010). The interdiction of this plot was the 
culmination of a massive, Intelligence-led operation involving multiple 
agencies and requiring a very complex framework of co-ordination. The scale 
of the investigation was similar to that conducted in the 21 July London bomb 
plot. The Metropolitan Police confirmed the following quantities of evidence 
seized as part of the investigation: “26,000 exhibits collected; 102 property 
searches; 80 computers and other devices seized; 226 (computers) seized 
from inside internet cafes; 15,000 CDs; 500 Floppy disks; 14,000 Gigabytes of 
data” (Casciani, 2009). The ringleader, Abdul Ahmed Ali, was convicted of 
conspiracy to murder, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 
minimum tariff of 40 years. The plot was described by the Security Service as: 
“one of the largest UK-based terrorist plots” ever (CPS, 2010). 
The transport sector, mass-attendance events, the utility infrastructure and 
the offices of financial institutions are just some of the soft targets which are 
attractive to terrorist attack planning, and it is these types of target which the 
PROTECT strand has to encompass. Working together, the Security Service 
and the Police lead this strand, but local partnerships are also essential for 
this strand to be successful. Risk assessments cannot be done in isolation 
from the customers who also constitute terrorist targets. While the Counter-
Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) from the Police are the primary officials 
who drive this process, they need a two-way engagement with the public and 
private sectors (Metropolitan Police Service, 2014). Risk assessments 
conducted by CTSAs, CPNI staff and others leads to risk management 
                                            
68
 Triacetonetriperoxide (TATP) is an extremely powerful but unstable explosive. Until relatively recently, TATP was 
extremely difficult to detect but the requisite technology is now greatly improved compared to the capabilities it 
offered in 2006, when the London bombings occurred. TATP provides an advantage to terrorist groups over other 
types of improvised explosives, as it can be manufactured from relatively small amounts of materials which can be 
purchased without arousing suspicion. The most significant "marker" ingredient is hydrogen peroxide which raises 
suspicions if bought in sufficient quantity.  Some groups have mitigated this problem by purchasing small amounts 
across a dispersed geography, to lessen any potential suspicion. The explosive power of TATP is assessed to be 
around 70-85% of the power of the commercial explosive TNT, traditionally used in commercial blasting in the UK. In 
this particular plot, it is most likely that hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD) would have been used to trigger 
the initial detonation which would then cause the TATP to explode.  
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recommendations. These include advice on vulnerability reduction and, 
business continuity structures and processes to enable organisations to 
remain functional in the post-attack phase. As an example of this, the 
Intelligence gained as a result of Abdulmutallib’s failed Christmas Day airliner 
plot has led to major changes in airport security procedures in the UK and 
elsewhere, including the dedicated scanning of footwear (Heathrow Airport, 
2006). The ratio of passengers being hand-screened was increased from one 
in four to one in two, a move widely unpopular with the aviation industry but 
one which the government felt necessary, given the Intelligence derived from 
the liquid bomb plot, the Christmas Day plot and others (BBC, 2006a). 
Many of the site surveys undertaken by the CPNI for specific installations or 
categories of facilities are conducted on a rolling basis, the frequency of which 
is not publicly disclosed. The terrorist threat is not static by nature, but is 
dynamic and continues to morph and to be refined. Terrorist groups exchange 
tactics, ideas and information with other terrorist groups, and also with 
organised crime syndicates and narcotics networks. In the same way that the 
UK Intelligence Agencies define their Intelligence requirements and collect 
against them, so terrorist groups also collect their own Intelligence, for 
strategic, long-term purposes, for operational requirements and for tactical 
use in planned attacks (Burke, 2011:pp.16–20; Burke, 2014).  
One of the most intelligence-led areas of the whole CONTEST strategy is the 
operation to secure the UK borders. The provision of Advance Passenger 
Information (API) and Passenger Name Records (PNR) data generates a 
massive quantity of raw information which can prove extremely useful to 
agencies implementing the Intelligence cycle in their efforts to secure the 
borders (Hardy, 2014). Until 2013, the UK Border Agency (UKBA) had 
primacy in securing the country’s borders and the Agency worked with the 
Security Service, the Police and the travel industry (UKBA, 2011). In 2012, a 
highly critical report was released by the Commons Home Affairs Committee 
which published very strong criticism of the UKBA’s senior leadership in 
particular: 
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“We are astonished that the Agency provided this Committee, 
and its predecessors, with information that turned out to be 
patently wrong on so many occasions over the last six years. 
If it was not attempting to mislead the Committee then it must 
be a sign that senior officials had no idea as to what was 
actually going on in their organisation. We find it very hard to 
believe that no one within the Agency had any idea that 
checks were not being carried out as they should have been 
and we expect the Agency to share the findings of its 
disciplinary investigation with us as soon as it is completed” 
(Home Affairs Committee, 2012:39). 
 
 
After the report was published, the Home Secretary announced the abolition 
of the UKBA. The core work of the agency was returned to the Home Office, 
under the UK Visas and Immigration department, while a new agency, the UK 
Border Force (UKBF), adopted the immigration enforcement responsibilities of 
the defunct UKBA. One legacy from the UKBA was the opening in 2010 of the 
National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC), which also contains the Rules-
Based Targeting Team. The aim of the NBTC is to act as a central focus for 
analysing information related to both goods and passengers (Hardy, 2014). It 
also receives data from the UK e-Borders system. A variety of analytical 
techniques are used to sift the data provided by these systems and these are 
combined with watch-lists and no-fly lists primarily from the UK, the EU and 
the U.S. to proactively enhance the security of UK borders. The e-Borders 
initiative is designed to “deliver timely data, information, intelligence and risk 
assessments to relevant government agencies on all passengers seeking to 
enter or leave the UK”(Home Office, 2005:3). 
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The threat of terrorist attack against crowded places has increased in 
importance in the last decade. Cutting-edge technology is currently being tried 
and tested to assist in securing crowded places, with a government initiative 
called INSTINCT leading the way. INSTINCT stands for Innovative Science 
and Technology in Counter-Terrorism and is a cross-governmental initiative 
aimed at identifying and developing new and/or emerging technologies which 
can assist in the fight against terrorism (OSCT, 2011b). In 2010, a technology 
demonstrator for INSTINCT was employed by the Home Office under the 
auspices of the Office for Security Counter Terrorism to highlight the issues 
surrounding the vulnerability and securing of crowded places and mass-
attendance events. It has reportedly been responsible for establishing new 
standards in the collaborative efforts between the private sector and 
government, in the area of counter-terrorism. The diagram below shows the 
concept of INSTINCT, as conceived by the Home Office (OSCT, 2011b).  
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11 The INSTINCT concept 
 
Attacks on crowded places are a favoured terrorist target as they inflict mass 
casualties, generate instant media coverage and perhaps more importantly for 
the attackers, ensure that the terrorist agenda endures in mainstream media 
reporting. Crowded places have featured as targets in several high-profile, 
UK-based terrorist plots in recent years. The following case studies cover two 
of the more ambitious plots in recent years, to launch terrorist attacks against 
crowded places and to create mass casualties. The disruption of both 
operations were fully Intelligence-led and required the utilisation of enormous 
resources from the Intelligence agencies and the Police, to interdict the cells 
and to secure the convictions of those involved (Source_08 2011). These 
case studies also demonstrate the scale, complexity and potential lethality of 
two of these plots, and highlight the importance of the Intelligence cycle in 
disrupting plots such as these. As an indication, Operation CREVICE required 
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79,000 man-hours solely dedicated to surveillance, technical monitoring and 
transcription by the Intelligence agencies (Security Service, n.d:para.13). The 
Head of Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC) described it as a landmark case, 
in terms of the resources deployed (Clarke, 2007). 
The collaboration between the Saudi and British Intelligence agencies was a 
prime factor in the successful disruption of the “printer bomb” attack. In this 
case, it was a foreign Intelligence agency which produced the vital information 
and without bilateral and multilateral agreements in place, disruptions such as 
this would be far less probable. The dismantling of the UK Border Force 
illustrates the fact that even government agencies do not always follow best 
practice and that without effective leadership and management, processes will 
not be followed correctly and organisational structures will grow lax. While the 
NBTC was a step in the right direction, it was too little, too late.  
4.3.3  Operation CREVICE – 2004 
In March 2004, the Metropolitan Police conducted a series of raids in the UK 
under the auspices of an ongoing operation, OP CREVICE, which aimed to 
disrupt an Al Qa’eda-linked terrorist cell in the UK. The cell was plotting to 
detonate explosives manufactured with ammonium nitrate fertiliser (Hallett, 
2011), a technique previously favoured by the Irish Republican Army. The cell 
was led by Omar Khyam, who at the start of the operation was believed to be 
involved in providing solely logistical support and facilitation to the Al Qa’eda 
network, and was not considered to be actively involved in attack planning. 
Four of the core members of the group were from Pakistani backgrounds and 
had initially come together over their mutual disillusionment with what they 
saw as the lack of progress in the Kashmir campaign. All four visited Pakistan 
and gave their assistance to various Pakistani-led jihadist groups operating in 
the Kashmir area, as well as to some groups planning operations in 
Afghanistan. Frustrated at not being able to actively participate in operations 
there, they decided to target the UK instead. At least Khayam and Ahmed had 
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frequent meetings with members of Al Muhajiroun (the radical Islamic 
organisation subsequently proscribed under UK law in 2010) (Straw, 2010:1–
2). 
As early as February 2003, some of the group had begun to discuss the 
possibility of attacking targets within the UK. Khyam organised a dedicated 
training camp for the group, which was carried out in secret inside Pakistan in 
July 2003. The group learned basic skills such as small arms training, and 
they also received some instruction in explosives (Summers & Casciani, 
2007). The culmination of their training was the test detonation of an IED 
containing around 1.5 kilograms of ammonium nitrate fertiliser, an ingredient 
frequently used to construct IEDs (U.S. Attorney, 2010). Having successfully 
demonstrated the capability of the explosive, the group returned to the UK. 
Garcia purchased a large quantity of ammonium nitrate fertiliser and placed it 
in a storage facility in West London, in November 2003 (Metropolitan Police 
Service, 2007). The quantity of fertiliser purchased was 600 Kilograms, which 
was around a quarter of the amount used by Timothy McVeigh when he 
carried out the bomb attack in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people (FBI, 1995).   
In February 2004, the Security Service gained new information that indicated 
Khyam and his cell were now actively planning a terrorist attack and he and 
the core members of the group were placed under more intensive 
surveillance. On 02 February, Khyam was observed in the company of 
Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, who carried out the 
suicide attacks in London in July of the following year. The Police then  
received a tip-off that a suspiciously large quantity of fertiliser was being 
stored in London (CPS, 2007b). Following a visit to the storage facility, the 
fertiliser was identified as the ammonium nitrate variety. It was covertly 
switched for a similar but inert substance, and the storage facility was placed 
under surveillance. On 20 February 2004, Mohammed Khawaja arrived in the 
UK from Canada, where he met with Khyam to show him pictures of 
detonators constructed by Khawaja, and to discuss the manufacture of 
detonators in the UK for the group. This meeting was covertly monitored by 
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the Security Service. The following day Khyam again met with Mohammed 
Siddique Khan and the two had a detailed conversation inside Khyam’s car. 
This meeting was also covertly monitored, but at the time the Security Service 
were not aware that this was Khan who was present at the meeting. The two 
discussed a range of topics including attending terrorist training camps in 
Pakistan, equipment to take for participation in these camps, and details of a 
fraud scheme which Khyam offered to set up for Khan, to provide funds (BBC, 
2007b). 
The next day, Khyam discussed potential mass-casualty targets for their UK 
attack. One of these was the Ministry of Sound nightclub in London. Another 
was the Bluewater shopping complex, one of the largest in Europe. A third 
target discussed was the utility sector, where Khyam raised the possibility of 
getting sympathetic staff within the gas, electric and water companies to 
provide inside, technical information which would assist with their attack 
planning. Just over one week later, Khyam was trying to locate a number of 
CDs which contained technical data about the UK’s high-pressure gas pipe 
network and the related hazardous plant details. The CDs had been stolen 
and provided to Khyam by a sympathiser working as a gas engineer (BBC, 
2007b).  
On 19 March, Khyam was recorded discussing a number of possible attack 
scenarios including a car bomb, a bomb attack against a Police station, and 
an attack against the Bluewater shopping complex (BBC, 2007b). At this 
stage, the Police had also been informed by the storage facility that the 
customer responsible for the fertiliser had notified the company that the 
storage would no longer be required from the end of March (CPS, 
2005:sec.21.14 (iii)). This advancement of the attack planning, together with 
the new information from the storage facility, meant that the Police and the 
Security Service had no choice but to move in and arrest the cell, due to the 
need to ensure public safety (CPS, 2005).  
On 29 March, Khawaja was detained in Ottawa by the Canadian RCMP and 
hours later, six individuals associated with the cell, including Khyam, were 
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arrested in the UK. One more suspect was detained in Pakistan several days 
later, and eventually returned to the UK (CPS, 2005). Khawaja was sentenced 
to ten and a half years imprisonment in Canada, subsequently increased to 
life imprisonment on appeal (Zeldin, 2012). Five of the six members of the 
British cell were convicted in the UK of terrorist offences and sentenced to life 
imprisonment (CPS, 2007b). 
The description of the Operation CREVICE case, however, provides an 
excellent example of how the Intelligence cycle can be used to successfully 
disrupt an advanced terrorist plan to conduct mass casualties. The covert 
surveillance operation, for example, would have generated a regular stream of 
Intelligence which would have gradually built up the picture of activities 
conducted by the group, and would also have resulted in the collection of 
evidence to be used in the prosecution, once the arrests were made. 
 
4.3.4  Operation RHYME - 2006 
Dhiren Barot was a convert to Islam who constructed extremely detailed and 
sophisticated attack plans for senior Al Qa’eda figures. Having left London to 
fight as a jihadist in Kashmir around 1995, he wrote a book in 1999 entitled 
“The Army of Medinah in Kashmir” using the pseudonym Esa al Hindi. The 
book detailed his experiences in this conflict, although most of it portrayed his 
frustration at what he considered to be an ineffective and almost farcical war. 
Barot wrote that “terror works, and that is why the believers are commanded 
to enforce it by Allah” (Hindi, 1999:107–108).69 The book was commissioned 
by Moazzem Begg, owner of the Islamic bookshop Maktabah al Ansar, in 
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 Barot’s book, published under his pen-name Esa al Hindi, was previously downloaded for other terrorism-related 
research, at http://www.streetdawah.com/books/Kashmir.pdf sometime in 2009. 
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Birmingham, who was subsequently arrested in Pakistan and detained in U.S. 
custody in Guantanamo Bay.70  
Barot compiled a list of what he considered to be the best targets to attack for 
the creation of mass casualties and the instilling of fear and panic among the 
population of the UK. One plot centred on the use of stretch limousines filled 
with propane gas canisters and explosives, which would be parked in 
underground car parks. The vehicle bombs would then be detonated with the 
aim of collapsing several major buildings and killing as many people as 
possible (Barot, n.d.). Another of Barot’s plots was to detonate a large bomb 
underneath London’s River Thames to cause a massive flooding of the 
London Underground network, again with the aim of causing as many 
casualties as possible (Barot, n.d.:36). Another of his plans included the 
hijacking of a petrol tanker to be used as a mobile bomb. This would be 
crashed into a large public building, with the aim of collapsing the building 
onto others (Metropolitan Police Service, 2006).71 Barot also researched the 
potential use of a “dirty bomb” (Barot, n.d.). In addition to targets in the UK, he 
conducted detailed attack planning on targets within the US. These included 
financial institutions such as the New York Stock Exchange and various 
financial headquarters including those of Citigroup bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (U.S. District Court, 2007).  
He was placed under surveillance by UK authorities on 15 June 2004 and 
displayed a very high degree of surveillance awareness. A senior counter-
terrorism officer described Barot as “probably the most difficult individual to 
keep under surveillance that we have had in recent times” (The Guardian, 
2006). To facilitate his planning work and to assist with the necessary 
                                            
70
 Begg’s Birmingham bookshop was raided by Police in 2000, under the authorisation of an anti-terrorism warrant. 
Begg’s detention in Guantanamo Bay came after he was arrested in Pakistan on suspicion of terrorism offences. He 
was released without charge, following the intervention of the UK authorities and he subsequently sued the UK 
government for their alleged complicity in the case, which was settled out of court. 
71
 A detailed summary of the attack plans, including reproductions of some of the trial material, such as recordings of 
the suspects, copies of their notebooks, sketches etc. were provided on a Metropolitan Police webpage, at 
http://www.met.police.uk/pressbureau/rhyme/index.htm  accessed in February 2010, subsequently removed. A 
summary of the case was later posted at http://content.met.police.uk/News/Terrorist-jailed-for-life-for-conspiracy-to-
murder-in-the-UK-and-US/1260267887712/1257246745756 accessed on 05 August 2014. 
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logistics, Barot constructed a small cell of at least six people. In addition to 
their logistical assistance, Barot also utilised their particular skill-sets to 
enhance his attack planning (BBC, 2007d). Mohammed Naveed Bhatti, an 
engineering  graduate, assisted by researching the effects of explosives, while 
Zia Ul Haq, an architect, used his knowledge to work out the best way to 
engineer the collapse of a building (BBC, 2007b). Crown prosecutors detailed 
how Barot had already evaded his surveillance team and his whereabouts 
were unknown to the authorities, when his attack plans were discovered on a 
laptop seized by Pakistani Police during a counter-terrorism raid in Gujarat in 
2004 (Sturcke, 2006). Writing of his plan to use gas bottles as improvised 
explosives in limousines, Barot envisaged the explosion piercing a London 
Underground tunnel under the river Thames: "imagine the chaos that would 
be caused if a powerful explosion were to rip through here and actually 
rupture the river itself. This would cause pandemonium, what with the 
explosions, flooding, drowning, etc. that would occur/result" (Barot, n.d:36). 
Despite the fact that there was virtually no admissible evidence with which to 
secure a conviction, the Police were forced to take the decision that Barot 
would have to be arrested as soon as he was identified again, due to the 
significant risk to public safety which his plans posed. A counter-terrorism 
officer noted that ”It was always possible that Barot could have been alerted 
to what happened in Pakistan, and since we did not know how far advanced 
his attack plans actually were, the decision was made to arrest him as soon 
as he was next seen” (The Guardian, 2006). 
He was successfully identified by surveillance officers on 01 August and two 
days later he was arrested. His co-conspirators were also arrested in the UK 
in simultaneous Police raids (BBC, 2006a). Barot and others were also 
indicted in the U.S. on several counts of terrorism-related charges. These 
included plotting to attack targets within the US, and in Barot’s case, being a 
lead instructor at a jihadist training camp in Afghanistan around 1998 (U.S. 
District Court, 2007). Due to the custody laws in the UK, Barot could only be 
held for a maximum of 14 days, at which time he would either have to be 
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charged, or released. The work required by the authorities to produce 
sufficient evidence to charge and convict Barot and his team was the most 
complex investigation which Scotland Yard had carried out to date (The 
Guardian, 2006). Almost 300 computers were seized and forensically 
examined, along with more than 1,800 items of removable media, all of which 
required forensic examination in addition to the computers. Over 4,000 
individual garages and lock-ups were visited by Police in the course of the 
subsequent investigation, and more than 600 sets of physical keys had to be 
examined in conjunction with the garages and lock-ups (Metropolitan Police 
Service, 2006b). Despite these challenges, sufficient evidence was produced 
within the 14-day period that, when Barot was confronted with the charges 
against him, he pleaded guilty (CPS, 2006:1). He was sentenced in a UK 
court to 40 years imprisonment for conspiracy to murder, but this was 
subsequently reduced to 30 years on appeal. Six of Barot’s cell also received 
lengthy custodial sentences, ranging from 15 to 26 years, for conspiracy to 
murder (CPS, 2007b). 
The decision to move in and arrest Barot highlights a point made previously, 
that there are occasions when the Police have no option but to arrest, even 
though they may lack sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution. The 
Intelligence cycle had been in action for some time when the advanced nature 
of Barot’s plans was revealed. As in the case of Operation CREVICE, the 
material collected would have increased the detailed understanding of the 
Intelligence agencies, regarding the nature of the threat and the movements 
of the key individuals. These updates would have been analysed and 
evaluated, and interim reporting issued, to provide an all-informed, “single 
version of the truth” for each of the partner agencies. Following on from 
dissemination, the collection plan would either continue or would be refined, to 
provide increasingly effective and targeted collection of raw material. The 
cases of Operation CREVICE, RHYME, PRALINE and others provide solid 
evidence that the Intelligence cycle works effectively, in theory, and in 
practice, to support counter-terrorism work in the UK. Like all models requiring 
   
171 
 
the use of people, the cycle can, and does, suffer from human factors, but 
when used correctly, the model allows a terrorist target to be collected against 
in a systematic and effective way, resulting in a gradual construction of a 
more complete Intelligence picture. 
4.4 PREPARE 
The PREPARE strand of the CONTEST strategy concentrates on resiliency, 
mitigation and business continuity, while an attack is ongoing, and afterwards 
in the post-attack recovery phase. Once an attack is underway, the 
PREPARE strand aims to help the authorities to end the attack as safely and 
quickly as possible. A key requirement for this strand to function effectively is 
interoperability, especially among the groups of emergency services who are 
most likely to be in attendance at the scene. They must be able to 
communicate among themselves, have the ability to send situation reports up 
the chain of command and receive additional direction coming downwards. 
The ability of the Police to respond to a terrorist attack with the appropriate 
level of armed response is another key factor within the Prepare strand 
(Home Office, 2011:92–103). Earlier in this chapter, a summary of the UK’s 
CNI was provided as part of the PROTECT strand. The UK’s CNI estate 
includes many high-profile terrorist targets, some of which have wider public 
safety implications in the event of a terrorist attack against them. Examples of 
such facilities include nuclear power sites, utilities such as the water supply 
and the ability for the National Grid to deliver electricity as needed (CPNI, 
2014).  
4.4.1 The CBRN Threat 
The government’s ability to develop and maintain resilience includes 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) protective measures. 
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It is not only the physical sites of related installations which pose the potential 
for a terrorist attack. The actual attack itself could involve the use of weapons 
such as chemical or biological agents, radiological material or at the extreme 
end of the threat spectrum, a nuclear device. The threat of a CBRN attack is 
considered one of the four highest priority risks in the UK’s National Security 
Strategy (Cameron 2010, pp.11,27–28). 
Chemical weapons have been used before in terrorist attacks. The nerve gas 
attacks in Japan in 1994 and 1995 demonstrated how such an attack could 
rapidly overwhelm the abilities of the emergency services to respond to it. In 
the 1995 attack against the Tokyo subway system, 12 people were killed by 
the gas but more than 5,000 people required medical treatment, which the 
available medical staff and facilities simply could not cope with (Seto, 2001:1–
4). The threat from radiological attack was also highlighted in the same year 
as the Tokyo gas attack. In 1995 and 1996, the Chechen Islamist rebel leader 
Shamil Basayev publicly threatened to use radiological dispersal devices 
(RDD) packed with explosives to target Russian facilities. Basayev’s group 
showed containers of radioactive materials to journalists. The containers were 
assessed to contain either Cobalt-60, Cesium-137 or Strontium-90, the most 
likely candidate being Cesium-137 (Burke, 2006:39–41). Basayev’s group 
also contacted Russian media in November 1995, describing the location in 
which they had hidden a canister of radiological material, buried in 
Izmailovskiy Park in Moscow. The TV station sent a film crew to locate the 
canister, after which they contacted the authorities and the material was 
removed. The canister contained around 33 pounds of Cesium-137, a material 
which is a by-product of nuclear fission. This incident was aimed at displaying 
that Basayev’s group was serious in both their capability and their intent 
(Bale, 2004).72 Al Qaeda has previously expressed its intention to construct 
an RDD. A declassified CIA report (2003:1-2) stated that: 
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 In Intelligence terms, capability and intent are separate characteristics. A useful definition of each is that provided 
by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), which defines capability as “the ability to execute a specific course of 
action” and intent as “an aim or design to execute a specified course of action” (Gortney, 2014).  
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“Al Qaeda is interested in radiological dispersal 
devices (RDDs) or “dirty bombs”. Construction of 
an RDD is well within its capabilities as radiological 
materials are relatively easy to acquire from 
industrial or medical sources”. 
 
Biological weapons have a long history of use, and were used at least as 
early as 2,500 years ago (Mayor, 2009:3–5). In 2001, less than two weeks 
after the Al Qa’eda attacks of 11 September, several letters containing 
anthrax spores were sent to U.S. politicians and media organisations. Five 
people died from anthrax poisoning contracted from the letters and a further 
22 required medical treatment (Heinrich, 2003:1–3). The threat of a nuclear 
device being constructed and detonated by a terrorist group is clearly within 
the high impact but low likelihood quadrant of the risk spectrum, but it is a 
threat taken very seriously by the UK authorities, and is classed as a “Tier 
Two” risk (Cameron, 2010:27). The collection of Intelligence against the 
CBRN threat from Al Qa’eda and other groups remains a very high priority for 
the UK’s intelligence agencies. The dangers of nuclear proliferation have 
been aptly demonstrated by the activities of the Pakistani scientists A.Q. 
Khan, who created an illicit supply chain for the clandestine programmes of 
Libya and other countries to design nuclear weapons (Butler, 2004:17–21;26–
27). A former director of the FBI summarised the threat as follows:  
 
“The economics of supply and demand dictate that 
someone, somewhere, will provide nuclear 
material to the highest bidder, and that material will 
end up in the hands of terrorists. Al Qaeda has 
demonstrated a clear intent to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction. In 1993, Osama bin Laden 
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attempted to buy uranium from a source in the 
Sudan. He has stated that it is Al Qaeda’s duty to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction. And he has 
made repeated recruiting pitches for experts in 
chemistry, physics, and explosives to join his 
terrorist movement” (Mueller, 2007). 
 
Thankfully the threat of a CBRN device remains a theoretical but possible 
threat for the UK authorities, but there is a clear intent by groups such as AQ 
to acquire this technology. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the 
Intelligence cycle in dealing with this threat, as the CBRN threat is a more 
highly classified topic than other terrorist threats such as the use of suicide 
bombers.73 The fact that this is classed as a Tier 2 risk means that 
considerable Intelligence efforts will be targeted against this risk, and that any 
indication of an increase in likelihood of this threats being manifest would 
result in a major uplift of Intelligence effort, given the potential risk of mass 
casualties and environmental destruction. 
4.4.2 Interoperability 
A number of scenarios have also considerably influenced the PREPARE 
strand of the 2011 CONTEST strategy. Two of these were domestic incidents 
in the UK, and one was an overseas incident. The first was not a terrorist 
incident but a fire at King’s Cross Underground station in London in 1985, 
which killed 31 people. The fire was accidentally started by a carelessly 
discarded match on a wooden escalator and it spread rapidly, killing 31 
people. The inability of the emergency services to communicate among 
                                            
73
 The Butler Report (2004) is probably the most informative document in this niche area, particularly the sections 
describing the A.Q. Khan network, and the WMD programmes of Iran, North Korea, Libya and Iraq, along with 
Usama bin Laden’s efforts to acquire such technology for his organisation. 
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themselves and with other command elements was highlighted as a key factor 
in dealing with the incident. In the final report of the government’s inquiry into 
the incident, the inquiry’s Chairman, Desmond Fennell OBE QC (1989:137) 
noted in particular that: 
 
“Staff at stations on London Underground have not been 
provided with radio equipment because current portable 
radios will only operate below ground if there is a continuous 
aerial system throughout the station. The only means of 
communication for staff at King's Cross on 18 November 1987 
was the telephone or word of mouth. Members of the British 
Transport Police and the London Fire Brigade at the scene 
had their own personal radios, but they did not work between 
the surface and underground. Officers below ground within 
the station could not communicate by radio either unless 
within line of sight”. 74 
 
The concept of interoperability has always been firmly embraced by the UK’s 
Armed Forces, and most operations nowadays are conducted in a fully tri-
service framework. For this reason, training for joint operations is a staple of 
all UK military exercises and the ability for all elements to communicate 
among themselves is of paramount importance. The emergency services in 
the UK have not traditionally had the luxury of such dedicated training. They 
deal with real-time incidents on a daily basis, unlike the Armed Forces who 
are primarily training for war on a regular basis. Since 2001 the Armed Forces 
                                            
74
 One of the most serious factors which impeded the rescue, evacuation and fire-fighting operation underground was 
the lack of a suitable communication system, enabling the emergency services to communicate with each other 
below ground, even if they were not in direct line of sight. Perhaps more importantly, this also prevented the fire-
fighters and Police officers below ground to communicate with the command elements above ground, except by fixed 
landline telephone. 
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of the UK have been involved in almost continuous, large-scale, joint 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the most important foundations of 
the UK’s joint military training is the establishment and maintaining of 
communications. Without the ability to give and receive orders and situation 
reports, the Armed Forces cannot function effectively. The emergency 
services have traditionally lagged behind their military counterparts in this 
regard. A practitioner with experience in both the UK Police and the UK 
Armed Forces explained why this capability gap exists: 
 
“In the military, we trained every day for a war that might 
never come. As a Police Officer, I was faced with real 
incidents every single day I walked the beat. I never knew 
what was coming next, from helping a lost tourist with 
directions, to attending a murder scene. That’s the difference 
between the two jobs – one of them, you spend every day 
training for something you rarely have to do, and the other 
you do a fairly short training course, and then you’re in the 
thick of it from then on” (Source_14, 2011). 
 
The PREPARE strand in the 2011 edition of the CONTEST strategy 
recognises this need and it paves the way for a four-year plan to enhance the 
government’s response capabilities in four areas: building capabilities to 
respond to and recover from terrorist incidents and other emergencies; to 
improve general preparedness for highest-impact risks; to improve the ability 
of emergency services to collaborate when dealing with the aftermath of a 
terrorist attack; to the enhance communications capabilities and information-
sharing capacity, when dealing with a terrorist attacks (Home Office, 2011:93–
94). 
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The second incident was the terrorist attacks against the London transport 
network in July 2005, and it was exactly the kind of incident that the 
PREPARE strand aims to deal with more effectively. It was a complex attack, 
using multiple assailants to hit different, geographically dispersed targets. The 
first three attacks were near-simultaneous, all causing multiple fatalities plus 
additional casualties. In a similar way to the communications issues 
encountered by the emergency services during the King’s Cross fire the year 
before, there were communications issues which hampered the initial 
deployment of emergency services, and which compounded the problems 
they faced. These suicide attacks resulted in 52 fatalities and several hundred 
injured (Hallett, 2011:1).  
In the first few minutes after the initial explosions took place, the overall 
picture was confusing for the authorities, which is to be expected in any 
similar incident. The Coroner’s report highlighted the immediate need for 
answers to two questions: what had occurred, and where. It then explained 
the three main factors that caused difficulties in providing answers to these 
two questions. The first issue was that three of the explosions occurred inside 
the London Underground tunnels, so the explosions in such a confined space 
resulted in few eyewitnesses. The second issue was the lack of 
communications available. The third was that the available communications 
systems were overwhelmed by calls in the immediate aftermath of the 
explosions (Hallett, 2011:27–28).   
Once again, communications had proved to be a weak link in the post-incident 
capabilities of the emergency services to respond accordingly. As the purpose 
of PREPARE is “to mitigate the impact of a terrorist incident where it cannot 
be stopped”, it is understandable why this strand places such emphasis on 
the communications aspect of the response portfolio (May, 2011:94). The 
degree of collaboration and cooperation between agencies is also a central 
factor in ensuring that the PREPARE strand is as effective as possible. In this 
regard, the ISC were very clear in their perception of the role which inter-
agency collaboration has to play. They voiced their desire to see this 
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collaboration strengthen and improve, in the recommendations of their report 
which was placed in the context of international terrorism being countered 
(Murphy, 2006:44). This desire to see even stronger collaboration is 
addressed by the PREVENT strand (Home Office 2011, pp.100–101). 
It is not only the following of procedures which is important in the immediate 
post-attack phase. For mitigation to be effective, it is vital that all those 
involved understand the procedures, that they are familiar with them, and that 
they are carried out properly. The testing and exercising of such SOPs is a 
component part of PREPARE. In real terms this translates into a range of 
exercises - from tactical training on the ground for the emergency services 
and associated departments to practice their responses to a terrorist incident, 
through to Cabinet Ministers being tested with table-top planning and 
simulation exercises.  
Terrorist incidents such as the 2005 London bombings require the 
involvement of a large number of stakeholders and a significant number of 
actual staff deployed on the ground. The regular training of such staff, from a 
Police Constable to a Cabinet Minister, is essential in order to translate plans, 
SOPs and contingencies into actual behaviours that are carried out when an 
attack takes place. In addition to dealing with the actual incident, the Police 
(and by extension, the government of the day) also have to consider the 
impact of an incident upon the public’s confidence. The Metropolitan Police 
Service’s definition of a critical incident is “any incident where the 
effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on 
the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community” (NPIA, 
2011:6). A simplified diagram of the critical incident model used by the UK 
Police is provided below (College of Policing, 2013). 
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12  Three phases of Critical Incident Management (College of 
Policing, 2013) 
The preparation phase includes several requirements. Staff must have had 
the appropriate training to deal with a critical incident and there must be 
sufficient resources available to manage the incident. Managing a critical 
incident includes the correct and early identification of an incident as being 
critical. It also requires that appropriately senior officers are informed of the 
incident as early as possible, to enable the command chain to respond with 
the appropriate level of authority, and to manage the incident effectively. The 
third phase is a very important one in terms of the relationship between the 
Police and the community. Restoring public confidence was a major 
requirement for the Police in the wake of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, 
and was identified as such by Lord Macpherson in his findings 
(1999:sec.45:12; 46:35; 58). Restoring public confidence involves regular 
Police engagement with the community and confidence-building measures. It 
may require victim support or victim care measures to be taken. The 
interaction with the media is also of key importance as this has a direct impact 
upon the public’s perception of a case or incident. When trust between the 
Police and the community breaks down, it can require a public inquiry such as 
the Macpherson enquiry to rebuild it (NPIA, 2011:69).  
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At the tactical and operational levels, drills and simulation exercises are 
crucial to mitigate the impact of an attack. At the strategic level, one of the 
most important aspects of the mitigation plan is the prior identification of 
responsibilities and roles for the various aspects of the Prepare strand. Within 
the UK’s National Security Strategy, the UK Resilience Capabilities 
Programme has mapped out these responsibilities across 22 distinct work 
streams in a horizontal and vertical matrix, called the National Resilience 
Planning Assumptions (NRPA).  
The NRPA provides roles and responsibilities for events such as a CBRN 
incident, in which the Home Office are assigned primacy, and a mass-
evacuation event, in which the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat (CCS) would take the lead (May, 2013:31). The prior identification 
of ministries and departments who would take the lead is a major step forward 
in reducing the duration of the initial paralysis which almost always occurs 
immediately after the start of a terrorist attack. The matrix of these workflows 
of the UK Resilience Capabilities is shown below (Home Office, 2011:95): 
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13  Workstreams of the UK Resilience Capabilities Programme 
 
The third incident which played a major role in the thinking behind the 
PREPARE strand was the series of multiple terrorist attacks launched in 
Mumbai in 2008. A group of ten Lashkar-e Tayyiba  (LeT) terrorists departed 
from Karachi on 22 November 2008 in a small boat, and around 30 minutes 
later, they were cross-decked to a larger vessel, the Al Husseini belonging to 
the LeT. An Indian fishing vessel, the MV Kuber, was captured by other LeT 
members and its crew was killed. The Captain was spared and the group 
boarded his vessel on 23 November. They forced the Indian captain to sail to 
Mumbai, arriving four miles from the coast at 1600 hours on 26 November. 
The captain of the vessel was then killed and the group boarded an inflatable 
dinghy to travel the remaining four miles to Mumbai, arriving in the vicinity of 
Badhwar Park.  
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The group split up into five attack teams and took taxis to their allocated 
targets: The CST Railway Station; the Leopold Café and Bar; the Taj Mahal 
hotel; the Oberoi-Trident hotel; Nariman House, a Jewish centre. A total of 
twelve separate attacks were launched and the attack span lasted for almost 
four days (Khetan et al., 2009:116–167). During the attacks, 163 people were 
killed and 308 were injured. The only surviving attacker, Ajmal Kasab, was 
subsequently convicted of 86 separate offences, sentenced to death by the 
Indian Supreme Court and executed on 21 November 2012 (Maryland 
Coordination and Analysis Center, 2012:1). 
The scale and complexity of the attack indicated a very high degree of 
planning, training and probably rehearsals by the attackers. The attackers 
were equipped with handheld GPS satellite navigation units, GSM mobile 
phones and THURAYA satellite phones, which allowed them to employ robust 
command, control and communications, especially with their controllers while 
the attacks were in progress (Kronstadt, 2008:2). Some of their 
communications were encrypted using commercial, off-the-shelf encryption 
systems (Home Office, 2011:34). Previous attacks in India by LeT had been 
of a much lower order of complexity, mainly involving single IED attacks or 
isolated operations. The Mumbai attacks of 26 November provided a lethal 
illustration of the difficulties faced by the authorities when a complex attack is 
launched against multiple targets in different geographical areas.  
The importance to the authorities of command, control and communications 
increases as a terrorist attack unfolds, as these factors are critical in enabling 
the authorities to develop an accurate picture of the incident. In the same way 
that Police Intelligence staff analyse a criminal’s “routes to crime”, so the 
travel and transport itineraries of the Mumbai attackers were analysed, to add 
to the picture of how the attack unfolded. By capturing an Indian vessel and 
using its Indian captain, the attackers evaded detection on their route into 
Mumbai. The terrorists accurately maintained a ship’s log while on board the 
captured vessel, which helped the Indian authorities to plot the 
speed/time/distance vectors of the attackers. They even kept detailed logs of 
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which terrorists were on deck watch, and at which times (Ministry of External 
Affairs, 2008:36).  
In military terms, this ability to create a consolidated situational awareness is 
described as the “Recognised Picture of the Battlespace” (RPB). The 
inclusion of the word “recognised” was made in order to highlight that all 
stakeholders understand the need to work from the same picture, or 
Intelligence assessment. Initially this concept came from the Royal Navy, 
wanting to ensure that all RN vessels at sea had the same situational 
awareness of maritime traffic in their vicinity. This picture was produced and 
updated at a naval HQ in UK and was broadcast to all RN vessels on a 
secure communications link, to provide each vessel with the Recognised 
Maritime Picture (RMP) (Burke, 2006:77–78). This concept was adopted by 
the Royal Air Force to provide all aircraft and ground stations in the UK and 
overseas with a Recognised Air Picture (RAP).  
As soon as the authorities are aware that an attack is underway, various 
procedures are initiated, such as a command room being stood up. Relevant 
stakeholders are immediately notified of the incident so they can begin to 
prepare response assets such as ambulances, fire engines, crowd control 
cordons and traffic management systems, which prevent traffic gridlock but 
also allow emergency services to access the incident areas. The Mumbai 
attacks lasted for four days. The dispersed nature of the attacks, coupled with 
incidents such as the fire which broke out at the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower 
Hotel, further strained the efforts of the Indian authorities to develop an 
accurate and timely overview of the situation across the city and to deliver a 
co-ordinated response to bring the attacks and the fire to an end (Khetan et 
al., 2009). 
The 2011 PREPARE chapter identified several lessons learned from the 
Mumbai attacks, which had potential implications for the UK government’s 
ability to respond to a similar series of attacks. While London had to deal with 
multiple, near-simultaneous terrorist attacks against the bus and Underground 
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travel infrastructure in 2005, there was one major difference. As the London 
attacks were solely suicide attacks, it meant that each of the four explosions 
were finished operations, in terms of them being self-contained incidents. In 
Mumbai, the attackers aimed to kill as many people as possible while they 
were still alive. The taking of hostages was the primary reason that the 
attacks lasted for four days and this resulted in extended publicity for the 
terrorists’ cause. The CONTEST strategy aptly described these as 
“marauding attacks” and added that there have been significant changes to 
the equipment, tactics and resources of the UK Police, and also to the “multi-
agency response that such incidents would require” (Home Office, 2011:14).  
Several of the government’s observations in CONTEST related to the use of 
firearms by the Police. The appropriateness of weapons and tactics deployed 
by the authorities against attacking terrorists is an important factor in how 
successful the government response is. One aspect is the calibre of the 
Police weapons, although the deployment and application of more powerful 
weapons do not necessarily bring a concomitant positive result. Weapons and 
calibres of ammunition must be carefully selected for the appropriateness of 
the task in which they are deployed.  
An example of this is the deployment of armed Police officers at UK airports. 
Within any major UK airport terminal, it is common to see armed officers 
carrying Heckler and Koch MP5 sub-machineguns. This weapon fires a 9mm 
round, which has a considerably lower muzzle velocity and shorter range than 
the 5.56mm ammunition fired by traditional assault rifles found in NATO 
member states. In the crowded confines of an airport terminal, a low-velocity 
9mm round is a safer option for the Police to use than a larger and/or high-
velocity round.75 By contrast an Armed Response Vehicle (ARV) of London’s 
                                            
75
 If a 9mm round is fired and misses the target, it will not travel as great a distance as a 5.56mm round. It will also 
have less velocity, and is less likely to ricochet if it hits a hard object. The 9mm round is also less likely to enter and 
fully exit a human body and continue on its path, potentially injuring additional people. For even more sensitive 
environments, such as the pressurised cabin of a passenger aircraft, 9mm ammunition can be adapted still further, 
for example the ammunition used by sky marshals. This kind of ammunition is less powerful, and can use frangible 
projectiles, which expand and flatten as they leave the barrel, allowing the bullet to still disable or kill an attacker, 
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Metropolitan Police may carry two assault rifles (Heckler and Koch G36) of 
5.56mm calibre. It is unlikely that sufficient Police firepower (in terms of 
numbers of firearms and the appropriate calibres) could be deployed by ARVs 
alone, in the event of a Mumbai-style, multi-site, complex attack.  
The 2011 CONTEST policy thus identified that armed Police officers would 
need access to more powerful and more appropriate weapons to deal with 
such an incident. It also identified the need to provide a faster response from 
the Armed Forces, at the request of the Police, to assist with the containment 
and neutralising of a complex attack (Home Office, 2011:97).76 Another gap 
identified by the strategy was the firearms capacity of cities other than 
London. This regional capacity is being upgraded, as are the procedures for a 
city or Police force to request armed support from neighbouring regions 
(Home Office, 2011:97). An additional benefit of the UK hosting the 2012 
Olympic Games was the enhanced training for firearms officers which was 
delivered early, as part of the CONTEST 2011 strategy (Home Office, 
2011:6;97). 
Assessing the effectiveness of the Intelligence cycle in the sphere of 
interoperability is made more difficult by the wide area of scope which this 
work strand covers. At one end of this scope are the London terrorist attacks 
of 07 July 2005, while at the other end is the accidental fire at Kings Cross 
station. The upgrading of the UK Police firearms capability was a direct result 
of the Intelligence gained about the planning and tactics used in the Mumbai 
attacks and in this case, the model was definitely of value as the provision of 
detailed reporting was used to effect a change in UK security policy. The 
Intelligence operation following the 07 July attacks, Operation THESEUS, was 
                                            
while minimising the chance of the round accidentally puncturing the pressurised cabin wall, potentially leading to an 
explosive decompression. 
76
 A previous example of such support from the Armed Forces was the intervention by the Special Air Service 
Regiment during the siege of the Iranian Embassy in London in 1980, in which the Police requested military support. 
In such a situation, the Police formally hand over control of the incident to the Armed Forces. The decision to assault 
the building was taken shortly after one of the hostages was executed by the terrorists, and the body dumped outside 
the Embassy steps. During the SAS assault, one hostage was killed and the remaining 19 were successfully 
rescued. Five of the six terrorists were killed during the rescue operation. For a full account of the siege and the 
assault, see Pearson, W., 2011. “The Iranian Embassy Siege: The True Story”, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson). 
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primarily a reactive operation, although it obviously built upon existing 
Intelligence, including that collected as part of Operation CREVICE. There is 
no doubt that errors were made during CREVICE, the implications of which 
only surfaced after the 07 July attacks in 2005.77 On the other hand, the 
Coroner’s report stated that in order to have uncovered the link between 
Mohammed Qayam Khan (MQK), a suspected leader of an Al Qa’eda team in 
Luton, Mohammed Sidique Khan (MSK) and Omar Khyam, “only an 
unjustified amount of intrusive investigative work would have led to the 
discovery of the link before that time” (Hallett 2011, para.19).  
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has explained what the CONTEST strategy is, what it aims to 
achieve and how the Intelligence cycle works within it. The Intelligence cycle 
does not operate in a vacuum in the UK’s counter-terrorism work. Within the 
Intelligence agencies it operates from the very top level, starting with the 
strategic requirements of the JIC, down to the lowest tactical level, such as 
the Intelligence briefings provided to armed Police officers before they forcibly 
enter a property to arrest a terrorist suspect. A JIC requirement such as 
“provide actionable Intelligence on the most serious, active terrorist plots 
within the UK” provides the direction from the Prime Minister’s office, which is 
promulgated to the Intelligence agencies who initiate their own collection 
plans. Collation begins simultaneously, as does the inter-agency collaboration 
required to ensure that all available and relevant information is retrieved from 
the various data repositories. As collection begins to produce relevant 
information and pieces of Intelligence, analysis is conducted by the individual 
agencies, and the results shared at regular progress meetings. Evaluation 
                                            
77
 See, for example, Section 18 of the Coroner’s report into the 07 July 2005 bombings, which details the links 
between  McDaid and Khan, and the fact that McDaid and Khan being in the same vehicle was not passed to the 
Security Service by West Yorkshire Police, even though the operation was jointly conducted by both of these 
organisations (Hallett 2011, para.18). 
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takes place throughout the process, providing the quality control aspects of 
the process, and ensuring that the Intelligence produced is subject to critical 
examination.  
The dissemination of actionable Intelligence (as well as background 
Intelligence) can occur multiple times. It can require additional collection, 
deeper analysis or a secondary evaluation to compare what is known now to 
what was known previously. It can also require an assessment of whether or 
not the new picture is plausible and accurate. In the example given above, 
this could end with a Police firearms team being briefed on the contents of a 
target package which provides them with the tactical information needed 
before they launch an operation to arrest a terrorist suspect who they expect 
to respond with firearms. It could also end with a much softer takedown, 
where the suspect is arrested in a similar manner to Dhiren Barot, in 
Operation RHYME. Due to a leak, the U.S. media had published details 
identifying Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan as a suspected terrorist who was 
helping the U.S. authorities with their enquiries. Khan was in email contact 
with Barot and the Police in the UK knew that they had no choice but to 
quickly arrest Barot, instead of continuing the surveillance on him to collect 
more evidence and to covertly penetrate Barot’s group. While under 
surveillance, Barot went for a haircut in Willesden. While he was sat in the 
barber’s chair, two detectives in plain clothes entered the shop and conducted 
a very low-key arrest (Doward, 2006). This was a much more effective way to 
ensure public safety than an armed intervention. 
All of this Intelligence work takes place within the framework of the CONTEST 
strategy. The PREVENT strand aims to negate the likelihood of an attack 
happening in the first place, by challenging the ideological landscape in which 
the terrorist groups operate; by identifying and working against the 
radicalisation of individuals to the terrorist cause, especially of vulnerable 
individuals such as minors, convicts, newly released prisoners and the 
mentally disabled; and by degrading the recruiting abilities of terrorist groups, 
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which consequentially degrades their ability to operate with an effective and 
sustained support network.  
The second strand, PROTECT, is closely tied to PREVENT. It aims to put the 
necessary measures in place to safeguard the elements of the national 
infrastructure deemed critical to the security of the UK. Two case studies were 
used as examples of the terrorist threat to the UK CNI and these 
demonstrated the considerable depth of planning which some groups have 
conducted in their attempts to destroy elements of this CNI. In addition to the 
CNI, the threat against crowded places was also outlined as this is considered 
a classic soft target by Al Qa’eda. The UK’s transport sector has already been 
subjected to terrorist attack in 2005, with deadly results. The current 
PROTECT strand has taken the lessons identified in incidents such as the 
London bombings, as well as from non-terrorist incidents such as the King’s 
Cross fire in 1985. It aims to strengthen the protective measures needed to 
secure these potential targets even further.  
The six priorities of the PURSUE strand are all aimed at preventing attacks 
from happening, by interdicting the abilities of individuals and groups to 
participate in terrorist activity. Some of the work conducted under this strand 
is concentrated in the UK, such as domestic, Intelligence-led operations and 
when appropriate, prosecutions under the UK’s legal framework. Other parts 
of this strand take place overseas, such as the mentoring of foreign officers 
and capacity-building programmes, particularly in developing nations. Liaison 
work and Intelligence-sharing with international partners spreads the workload 
and leads to a more effective division of labour for the countries involved in 
such agreements.  
In the event that an attack does take place, the PREPARE strand is designed 
to ensure the rapid establishment and maintenance of effective command, 
control and communications. This helps the authorities gain an accurate 
picture of the nature of the incident. They decide what assets are needed to 
deal with it and send the necessary assistance to bring the attack under 
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control. They can then deal with the aftermath so that normal business can be 
resumed as quickly as possible. Lessons from the London bombings and the 
Mumbai attacks have been used to make changes in key areas such as 
firearms tactics, weapons and ammunition, as well as in the areas of 
command, control and communication. This enables a more collaborative, 
multi-agency approach to be employed in dealing with the aftermath of a 
terrorist attack.  
This chapter has clearly demonstrated the functioning of the Intelligence cycle 
across the four strands and the sixteen sub-strands of the CONTEST 
strategy, covering a very wide spectrum of operational focus. This includes 
the softer aspects of the strategy, such as engaging with vulnerable 
individuals at serious risk of radicalisation, through to identifying and 
implementing the measures necessary to protect the UK’s CNI, and ending 
with disruptive, possibly lethal, action against active terrorist plots. The model, 
though simplistic in nature, is flexible enough to cover the majority of the 
CONTEST sub-strands, with the category of PREPARE being the only one 
which it is not specifically designed to support. That said, the model does still 
provide valuable inputs into this strand, especially in the areas of WMD and 
CBRN. The Intelligence cycle underpins the CONTEST strategy as without 
the continuous feed of Intelligence into the various sub-streams, the strategy 
would be almost impossible to implement. It can be said, then, that the 
CONTEST strategy is Intelligence-led, and that the Intelligence inputs 
resulting from the cycle drive the policy and action outputs.  Having covered 
the CONTEST policy in detail, Chapter 5 next examines the 6-stage 
Intelligence cycle itself. The cycle has been refined several times and is 
taught within the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ, DI, the military Intelligence 
branches of the UK Armed Forces and as part of Police analysis training 
(National Policing Improvement Agency, 2008:11). Chapter 5 explains the six 
stages of the model, and how they work together. The explanations of the 
stages are illuminated with observations from a number of serving and retired 
practitioners with long experience in the counter-terrorism Intelligence field. 
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Their experiences provide a unique understanding of how the components of 
the model function in actual counter-terrorism work, allowing for a deeper 
examination of the Intelligence cycle in action. 
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Chapter 5 The Intelligence Cycle 
“You have trivialized our movement by your mundane analysis. May 
God have mercy on you” - Ayman Al Zawahiri (Wright, 2002:29) 
 
“…to be a good watchdog it is not sufficient to detect the approach 
of danger – you must bark at the right time: not too early, for then 
your master becomes dulled to danger by too much barking, nor too 
late, for he may then be overtaken by disaster; and you must not 
bark at false alarms” (Jones, 1947:354) 
 
The previous chapter described the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy 
(CONTEST), to illustrate the framework within which the Intelligence process 
takes place. This chapter focuses on the actual model of the Intelligence cycle 
itself, examining each of the 6 component stages in detail, and showing how 
these stages work in the field of counter-terrorism. Various academic and 
organisational contributions are provided to show how the cycle and its 
components can be viewed in different ways. Effective counter-terrorism is 
heavily dependent upon sound Intelligence, yet Intelligence work is more 
often described as an art rather than a science (Burke, 2013; Richards, 
2010:97–144). The principal model used as the foundation of Intelligence 
collection for several decades has been the Intelligence cycle. In its earlier 
form in the 1980s, the Intelligence cycle was represented using just four 
components, and this model was the one taught in military Intelligence 
training in the UK during the 1980s.78 It was represented thus:  
                                            
78
 This version of the Intelligence cycle was taught by the British Army Intelligence Corps as early as 1984, and 
continued to be taught until at least early 1990. 
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14 British Army Intelligence Cycle, circa 1984 
 
The model currently used by the UK Police and the Intelligence agencies is 
the 6-stage model shown below (National Policing Improvement Agency, 
2008:11): 
 
 
15 The 6-stage Intelligence Cycle 
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5.1 Direction 
The Intelligence cycle notionally begins with direction, when Intelligence 
assets are provided with the collection requirements of the primary customer 
or customers. Within the Intelligence community this is also known as 
“tasking”. Taking a government as an example, the national Intelligence 
assets may be tasked with providing detailed Intelligence on a terrorist target 
about which they have little or no current insight. This could be the sudden 
and unforeseen eruption of major unrest in a foreign country. Contemporary 
examples include the rise of Islamic State in Syria and in Iraq, or a significant 
terrorist action carried out by a previously unknown group, or the appearance 
of a new and advanced weapon system in a country which has traditionally 
been perceived as hostile.  
The tasking of the UK Intelligence agencies has been subject to an extra layer 
of governmental authority since 2010, when it was announced that a National 
Security Council (NSC) would be established, as would a new post of National 
Security Adviser (NSA) (Prime Minister’s Office, 2010). The post of NSA 
started on 12 May 2010, with the appointment of Sir Peter Ricketts who 
handed over to Sir Nigel “Kim” Darroch in January 2012 (Rifkind, 
2011:36).The role of the NSC is a co-ordinating one, ensuring a joined-up 
approach across those agencies and departments which deal with threats to 
UK national security.79 Such agencies and departments include Defence 
Intelligence, the FCO, the MOD and the Home Office among others.  
Since its inception, the NSC meets weekly and is chaired by the Prime 
Minister. Permanent members of the NSC comprise the following: the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Foreign, Home, Defence, 
Energy and Climate Change and International Development Secretaries, the 
Minister for Government Policy and Security, Chief Secretary to the 
                                            
79
 Three Ministerial sub-committees were established under the NSC, which had specific remits: 1. Threats, Hazards, 
Resilience and Contingencies, which also includes a restricted group that examines Intelligence issues; 2. Nuclear 
Deterrence and Security; 3. Emerging Powers. A fourth, temporary sub-committee was established on 20 March 
2011, which focused on co-ordinating the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973.  
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Treasurer, Minister for Government Policy and with other Cabinet Ministers 
attending as required. The Chief of the Defence Staff (who also represents 
DI), Chairman of the JIC and Heads of the Intelligence and security Agencies 
also attend as required (Parliament, 2014:18). The NSC formulates and 
approves a National Security Strategy. This strategy details the 15 highest 
priority risks which the NSC perceives the UK to be facing. It lays out the 
strategic direction which the Intelligence community is expected to take, to 
produce Intelligence on these threats. Additional direction also flows from the 
following : Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR); the Strategic 
Priorities for Secret Intelligence Collection, coming from the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC); and the Intelligence agencies’ own Agency Strategic 
Objectives (ASOs). The importance of the National Security Strategy was 
underscored by the Chief of SIS, when he described it as “the starting point 
for the requirements and priorities on the intelligence Agencies” (Rifkind, 
2011:38) 
 
In the case of GCHQ and SIS, the Foreign Secretary confirmed to the ISC 
that he regularly tasks these two Intelligence agencies, saying: 
 
“We task them all the time and I discuss with [the Chief of 
SIS] and with the director of GCHQ on an almost continuous 
basis their work. So I think, you know, how they allocate their 
resources is very much guided by us in the Foreign Office. I 
would say it’s set by us predominantly, the overall oversight of 
these Agencies and their overall strategy is set by us” 
(Rifkind, 2012:10). 
 
The ISC explained how and why the Security Service is tasked differently. 
Operational control of the Security Service rests with the Director General 
(DG) of the Service, for two main reasons. First, the Security Service is 
mandated by the Security Service Act (Parliament, 1989:sec.1) to ensure: 
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 “the protection of national security and, in particular, its 
protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and 
sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and 
from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary 
democracy by political, industrial or violent means”.  
 
 
Second, it has traditionally been the case that each UK government continues 
to allow the Security Service to operate “free from political direction”, a policy 
which is ideally suited to a liberal democracy (Rifkind, 2012:sec.10). Another 
key difference between the agencies is the Ministerial approval required for 
warrants to be obtained. Both GCHQ and SIS obtain their Ministerial 
authorisation from the Foreign Secretary, as the potential risks involved in 
conducting Intelligence operations overseas are considered much higher and 
the potential for political fallout is much greater, should an operation be 
compromised. At the more extreme end of the scale, diplomatic relations 
could be adversely affected. The Security Service obtains its Ministerial 
approval for intrusive surveillance warrants from the Home Secretary, but 
crucially the DG retains day-to-day decision-making powers, within the limits 
laid down in the legislation of the SSA. The Home Secretary explained how 
this affects tasking, and how he saw the oversight of the Security Service: 
 
“I think it is important that there is an operational 
independence… but there is a process of discussion. I mean, 
the weekly discussions that I have with the Security Service 
are about where they are focusing their resources and 
particular operations that require that resource and questions 
I can ask about the issues that I see that need to be 
addressed and how they are doing them. So it’s a different 
sort of accountability” (Rifkind, 2012:sec.10). 
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Tasking not only provides the nature of the target, but it can also set priorities 
for Intelligence collection. Even the largest organisations have finite resources 
and Intelligence communities worldwide are no different in this respect. The 
prioritisation of tasking ensures that assets are devoted to targets in line with 
the requirements of the customers, and that agencies do not allocate 
resources unilaterally without clear direction. The priorities for Intelligence 
collection become Intelligence Requirements, or IRs.  
The military Intelligence machinery in the UK uses a slightly different system 
for defining Intelligence requirements. Standard NATO procedures are used, 
which first determine Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), usually 
strategic and therefore broad in nature. After this come Secondary 
Intelligence Requirements (SIRs) that continue at the lower levels of 
operational and tactical tasking. In NATO procedure, these PIRs and SIRs are 
the drivers for the process of an Intelligence collection plan. The PIRs and 
SIRs are just one part of the NATO system called Collection, Co-ordination 
and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM). The CCIRM process 
was begun in earnest in the early 1990s, in an effort to ensure that 
Intelligence collection and analysis was not being unnecessarily duplicated.80 
The PIRs are further refined into Information Requirements, which rather 
confusingly uses the same abbreviation (“IR”) as the other agencies use for 
“Intelligence Requirements” (Grebe, 2007). 
At government level, PIRs provide the Intelligence community with the top-
level questions to which the government requires answers. PIRs have been 
described as “information that directly feeds the key decisions that will 
determine the success or failure of the mission” (Gratch et al., 1999:2).81 The 
                                            
80
 When the CCIRM process was introduced, the author was working in a military Headquarters in an Intelligence 
function. The CCIRM process was met with a large amount of apathy and a small amount of resistance by the 
majority of the Intelligence division, who initially saw it as simply another layer of bureaucracy which had to be 
undertaken before requesting Intelligence collection against certain targets. Over time (approximately a year), the 
process became more streamlined and all elements involved in the CCIRM process became quicker and more 
efficient at carrying out the necessary procedures. The CCIRM process made a major contribution to minimising the 
duplication of effort. 
81
 According to FM 34-8-2, good PIRs do the following: “Ask only one question; focus on a specific fact, event, or 
activity; provide the Intelligence required to support a single decision; are tied to key decisions that the commander 
has to make; and give a latest time of information of value (LTIOV)” (Department of the Army, 1998:sec.D–2). 
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U.S. Army defines PIRs as “Intelligence requirements associated with a 
decision that will affect the overall success of the command’s mission” 
(Department of the Army, 1998:sec.D–1). PIRs at UK government level, 
although generally strategic in nature, can also be focused at the operational 
or even tactical level should the need arise. The JIC uses its own “JIC 
Requirements”, while the NSC uses Strategic Requirements (SRs). Instances 
of government PIRs descending to the tactical level include the operation 
launched in the immediate aftermath of the 07 July 2005 suicide bombings in 
London (Operation THESEUS), and the unsuccessful attempted suicide 
attacks in London on 21 July 2005 (Operation VIVACE). 
The unauthorised public release of almost a million classified reports from the 
U.S. and elsewhere, known as the “Wikileaks cables”, have also resulted in 
an enormous quantity of primary source material being made available. The 
unauthorised release of highly classified information is a serious criminal 
offence, but there is no altering the fact that these documents are now so 
widespread in the public domain as to be uncontrollable, thus they lend 
themselves to serious academic study. 
In the UK, direction for the Police comes ultimately from the Prime Minister via 
the Home Secretary, who sets the strategic priorities for policing. Each Police 
force, under the auspices of a Chief Constable, conducts a Strategic Tasking 
and Coordination (ST&C) process which enables the senior leadership of the 
Force to discuss, agree and set the strategic direction of the Force’s activities, 
in line with the resources available to it. This is done through the mechanism 
of the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (ST&CG). The main outputs 
of this process (relevant to this study) are the Strategic Assessment, the 
Tactical Assessment and the Control Strategy. The Strategic Assessment 
considers a very wide vista of scanning, including items such as local and 
national policing issues, the public’s perception of crime and social disorder, 
emerging criminal trends, the Force’s own performance assessment 
measured against the relevant performance indicators, the sources of 
information used to create the assessment (including the classification of the 
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assessment) and the priorities of the variously identified issues. The Strategic 
Assessment is a document which takes a long-term view of these issues, 
The Tactical Assessment, on the other hand, aims to identify and describe the 
short-term issues which need to be analysed in the Tactical Tasking and 
Coordination Group (TT&CG). The Tactical Assessment aims to identify 
specific problems (e.g. the smashing of a series of car windows in a quiet 
street, to steal satellite navigation devices) and to identify specific individuals 
or groups of interest for their criminal activities. Like the Strategic 
Assessment, it also aims to identify emerging criminal trends, but at a more 
localised level. It also conducts performance reviews at the local level, and 
prioritises activities to be carried out in support of the pillars of prevention, 
intelligence, enforcement and reassurance.  
The Control Strategy describes the operational priorities of the Force (or the 
Command area if below Force level), it sets the long-term plan for dealing with 
these priorities and enables the senior leadership team to better allocate 
resources to deal with the issues identified. The Control Strategy is set by the 
ST&CG and this is the only body which is empowered to review and to 
change the Control Strategy. An example of an IR is provided at Annex A. 
5.2 Collection 
Once tasked, the Intelligence assets will formulate a collection plan detailing 
specific subsets of the IRs. They will identify which assets are most capable 
of, and best suited to, collecting the necessary Intelligence. An example of an 
Intelligence Collection Plan is provided at Annex D. The collection of counter-
terrorism Intelligence usually encompasses both overt and covert sources. 
The overt aspect encompasses a wide range of sources including technical 
journals, eyewitness reports, interviews, trade exhibitions, conferences and 
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social media.82 Covert sources can include Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources (CHIS), covert surveillance of individuals and premises (both directed 
and intrusive, including lawful interference with property and vehicles) and the 
interception of communications. Satellites provide a significant portion of the 
technical collection capabilities for the UK and U.S. Intelligence 
communities.83 While most technical collection is automated to some degree, 
the collection of HUMINT remains largely non-automated.  
Overt sources can reveal a key piece of information which, with the addition of 
analysis, can produce Intelligence results beyond expectations. One example 
was given in chapter 3.2, regarding the deployment of “bunker buster” bombs 
to Diego Garcia. Another example occurred in 1981, and led to the 
confirmation that Israel had a nuclear weapons manufacturing programme. 
On 07 June, Israeli fighter jets launched a strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at 
Osirak, to deny Saddam Hussein the capability of enriching fissile material to 
weapons-grade standard. The raid was a success in military terms, with the 
reactor being destroyed and no Israeli fighters being lost. On 09 June, the 
Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin gave a triumphant press conference 
where he described the raid, boasting to television reporters that the Israeli 
jets had also destroyed a covert facility which he said was located forty 
metres below ground, and was involved in the production of nuclear weapons.  
There was no such facility forty metres beneath Osirak and the American 
Intelligence analysts knew this. What Begin had unwittingly described was 
Israel’s own, highly secret nuclear weapons construction facility located 40 
metres below the supposed research reactor in Dimona. The clue gave 
American Intelligence analysts the necessary opening to look at Dimona more 
                                            
82
 Some Intelligence academics, including former practitioners, (Omand et al. 2012) consider the field of social media 
as a standalone, additional category to the family of “-INT” branches, bestowing upon it the nomenclature of 
SOCMINT. In recent years, there have been other nomenclatures produced for the consideration of the Intelligence 
community, such as RESINT (Svendsen 2013). PROTINT (Omand 2010, p.32), PERSINT and others. There is a risk 
that such narrow distinctions dilute rather than reinforce the value of Intelligence categories when considering 
sources and methods as a family.  
83
 Much open source material exists on the nature and capabilities of intercept. Many open-source reports contain 
varying degrees of inaccuracy. The lawful interception of communications is one of the most sensitive areas of 
Intelligence collection by the UK government, and it is only natural that technical details about this capability are 
protected from unauthorised public disclosure. 
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deeply, specifically for evidence of a nuclear weapons programme. The heads 
of the Israeli Defence Force and Mossad were both aware of the implications 
of Begin’s mistake and the next day a press release stated that the facility had 
been four metres underground, not forty, but it was already too late. American 
Intelligence analysts were able to confirm the existence of the nuclear 
weapons facility as a result of the mistake. As a result, Israel was subjected to 
a prolonged and hostile media interest in its nuclear weapons programme 
(Claire, 2004:232–233; Turner, 1974; Clarke, 1980; Vanunu, 1987). 
The NPIA (2011:sec.22) provides the following advice to Police Intelligence 
analysts and makes a further distinction between potential sources of 
information being “open” or “closed”, stating: 
 
“Closed sources of information are those with restricted 
access, for example, police crime recording systems and 
information available through sharing agreements with 
partners. Open sources of information are those that are 
widely available. They may require the user to pay a small 
fee, for example, online news, media, academic research and 
the electoral roll”. 
 
According to a policy document released by Cumbria Police (2007:para.4.4), 
a sound Intelligence collection and management policy also assists with 
“compliance with other information-related legislation” such as the NIM, MoPI 
Code of Practice and Guidance (2005), the FIA, the DPA, the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act (1996), and the HRA (1998). This is a major 
benefit for law enforcement and Intelligence agencies, as they constantly 
have to ensure that their operations and daily work remain within the confines 
of the legal boundaries established by the various instruments of legislation 
which governs them. 
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Some targets may only require single-source tasking, or indeed may only be 
open to single-source collection. Since the various UK governmental inquiries 
after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a perception has persisted in the media that 
single-source Intelligence is inherently flawed and dangerous. This is not the 
case, and this misunderstanding has come about largely due to the 
revelations about the Intelligence derived from the source codenamed 
CURVEBALL, on the supposed 45-minute readiness capability of the Iraqi 
Armed Forces to lunch battlefield chemical munitions (Silberman & Robb, 
2005:83).84 The use of single source Intelligence requires greater care, and 
more solid analysis and evaluation. An organisation’s culture and procedures 
can negatively affect the credibility of such Intelligence. An example from the 
CIA highlights this problem. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the then Deputy 
Director of Intelligence in the CIA discussed with a group of CIA staff 
members an internal CIA review on the decision to invade Iraq. He noted that 
the internal review had highlighted “cases in which a single source has 
different source descriptions, increasing the potential for an analyst to believe 
they have a corroborating source” (Miscik, cited in Russell 2007:192; Jehel, 
2004). The Butler Report was very firm in its conclusion that single source 
reporting can be useful for operational purposes. It stated: 
 
 “It is incorrect to say, as some commentators have done, that 
‘single source’ Intelligence is always suspect. A single 
photograph showing missiles on launchers, supporting a 
division deployed in the field, trumps any number of agent 
reports that missiles are not part of a division’s order of battle. 
During the Second World War, innumerable Allied command 
decisions were taken on the basis of Intelligence reports from 
                                            
84
 The issue of single-source Intelligence and its influence on the UK and U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 largely 
derives from the inclusion of Intelligence material obtained from a human Source codenamed CURVEBALL. He was 
an Iraqi national who defected to Germany and sought asylum there, initially in exchange for information about 
Saddam Hussein’s WMD programme. Until the end of the invasion, CURVEBALL was only debriefed by his German 
handlers, and despite repeated requests for direct access to the Source, CIA Source Handlers were never allowed to 
debrief him (Drogin, 2007).  
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a single type of source (signals Intelligence, providing 
decrypts of high-level German and Japanese military plans 
and orders), and quite often (e.g. re-routing convoys in the 
middle of the Atlantic) important decisions had to be taken on 
the basis of a single report. As before, common sense and 
experience are the key” (Butler, 2004:11). 
 
Other terrorist targets may require all-source collection involving HUMINT, 
SIGINT, covert surveillance, OSINT and others. Such targets may be strategic 
ones, or targets involved in an active plot. When a terrorist cell moves from 
only talking about an attack, to actually planning an attack, it commensurately 
moves up the radar of the Intelligence agencies due to the overriding 
requirement to ensure public safety. The collection effort devoted to a cell 
involved in attack planning expands considerably, compared to a cell which is 
only involved in discussions. At this point, the full remit of the Intelligence 
collection apparatus will be directed at the cell. Solid and effective inter-
agency co-operation is vital in such cases, to ensure that all collection 
agencies know their responsibilities in the collection plan. This co-operation is 
also necessary to ensure that inadvertent compromises are not made, due to 
one agency not knowing that another agency is involved in covert activity. For 
example, if an Intelligence agency recruits a CHIS in a terrorist cell, it requires 
very careful management of the operation to maintain the anonymity and 
security of that CHIS. The Intelligence agency not only has a need for the 
CHIS to produce actionable Intelligence from his covert role, but the agency 
also has a duty of care to ensure the physical safety of the CHIS. This is more 
than simply assisting the CHIS in maintaining a cover story. It is also of 
paramount importance that there should be no possibility of another agency 
taking intervention action which could unwittingly put the life of the CHIS in 
danger. One of the biggest risks with this kind of operation is that a “blue on 
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blue” incident occurs, whereby government assets unwittingly engage in 
action against one of their own officers or covert Sources.85 
When requesting Intelligence collection against a target, it is important that 
the capabilities and limitations of the various collection agencies are 
understood. For example, SIGINT assets can be rapidly directed against a 
new target but if there is no “cueing” or “triggering” (i.e. providing them with 
the technical information necessary to know where and what to collect) they 
cannot begin the collection process. HUMINT assets may also be able to 
begin Intelligence collection immediately, if the HUMINT agency already has a 
source in place with the appropriate access to begin fulfilling the tasking 
requirements. If there is no human source close to the information required, 
the HUMINT agency may need to start the HUMINT process from the 
beginning, identifying a potential source, recruiting and training them, shaping 
their path to enable them to gain the access required, before beginning to 
produce meaningful Intelligence. This can be a time-consuming process and 
this is usually at the more operational to strategic end of the scale. IMINT may 
be able to furnish satellite or aerial imagery almost immediately and fulfil the 
initial Intelligence requirement, but this depends on the detail of the 
requirement, and whether the relevant imagery has already been captured 
and is retrievable.  
For example, in order to plan a covert surveillance deployment, detailed 
imagery of a terrorist target’s residence and immediate surroundings may be 
required. For initial planning purposes, the imagery does not necessarily need 
to be the most current available. More important may be the target overview, 
showing whether the house is detached or not, how densely populated the 
adjoining properties are, whether there are any public places close by, such 
                                            
85
 The term “blue on blue” originated in the Cold War period and was used by NATO forces to describe an 
engagement where NATO forces accidentally engaged their own troops, e.g. in a notional air strike on what were 
wrongly believed to be enemy troops.. On tactical maps, “friendly forces” (i.e. NATO) were always coloured in blue, 
while “enemy forces” (i.e. Warsaw Pact) were coloured in orange. In the early days of the Cold War, enemy forces 
were originally coloured in red. It was later changed from red to orange, to avoid tensions escalating between the 
U.S. and Soviet governments, as it was considered by the U.S. that it could be an unnecessary provocation to the 
Soviets, if enemy forces were always depicted in red. 
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as public houses or nightclubs, and even whether the immediate area is 
considered hostile to the Police. A detailed Community Risk Assessment 
would need to be conducted prior to any direct intervention taking place. 
When there is a direct intervention planned, such as an armed Police raid, 
then the imagery needs to be either near-real time” (NRT) or “real time” (RT). 
This may come from a variety of collection platforms, such as covert 
surveillance, intrusive surveillance probes and/or helicopter-borne cameras, to 
name but a few.  
Intelligence collection management has now become a field in its own right 
and each agency has staff involved in single-source and all-source 
management. Allen (1995:37) goes so far as to describe it as “the epitome of 
Intelligence professionalism”. Intelligence collection management can also 
impact upon what Intelligence material an analyst can and cannot see. Cases 
involving covert Intelligence collection can include major criminality, narcotics, 
national security issues or sensitive investigations such as child sexual abuse. 
Within UK Police forces, an analyst involved in a covert investigation is 
excluded from access to the raw Intelligence product to ensure that a “sterile 
corridor” is maintained, so that Intelligence does not unduly influence 
evidence (ACPO, 2006:42). 
While some collection methods allow Intelligence to be collected remotely, 
such as intercept, other methods carry a high degree of risk, such as the use 
of a CHIS to penetrate a cell or a group. Terrorist cells are usually made up of 
a small core of people who will be directly involved in an operation, all of 
whom may be bonded by family or religious ties. Surrounding them are an 
outer circle of people who provide the necessary support functions to enable 
the attack planning, and the attack itself, to take place. This support can 
include the provision of communications (mobile phone handsets, SIM cards, 
email addresses, laptops, etc.), weapons, ammunition and explosives (usually 
the responsibility of a “Quartermaster”), vehicles (stolen, purchased or hired), 
documentation (genuine and forged) and safe houses, among others.  
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The covert penetration of a cell is one of the most dangerous tasks in CT 
work, regardless of whether an existing cell member is recruited as a CHIS, or 
an undercover officer is placed into a position from which they can be 
recruited into the cell. Extensive and thorough risk assessments need to be 
conducted before such operations are approved as there is a much higher 
degree of risk for the CHIS to be compromised, as well as for the cell to 
become aware that it has been penetrated. This awareness could result in a 
potential dispersal and relocation of the group, leaving the Intelligence 
agencies blind.  
The collection of HUMINT is not exclusively derived from such high-risk, 
covert operations as the penetration of a cell. Telephone and internet hotlines 
also provide useful Intelligence and they have some advantages over the 
more covert methods. People who may not feel comfortable going to a Police 
station to provide information often have less resistance to providing 
information anonymously. The corollary that goes with this is that the flow of 
information can become a flood, requiring still more human resources to field 
calls, collate and analyse the information. In the case of the Washington 
Sniper crisis in 2002, more than 100,000 pieces of information were received 
as a result of the Police requesting information on the killers. Of these, around 
40,000 were deemed worthy of further investigation (Hulnick, 2006:970). An 
additional hazard is that hotlines are often used to name individuals to the 
Police, for reasons such as personal revenge, or to cause difficulties for a 
competing business interest. 
Interrogation also feeds into the collection part of the Intelligence cycle and it 
is a form of Human Intelligence. In the past decade, it has become 
increasingly controversial with globally recognised images such as those of 
abused Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib prison being broadcast around the 
world and causing violent protests in many countries. Interrogation frequently 
results in vital Intelligence being obtained on the identities and locations of 
terrorist figures and details of planned attacks. The divisiveness of the issue is 
mainly concerned with the techniques used and the line which separates 
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interrogation from torture. Interrogation is a divisive topic and one which 
regularly appears in media stories, more so since the U.S. began the “Global 
War on Terror”, but it remains a tool in the arsenal of the Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement communities.  
The conduct of interrogation is strictly legislated in the UK and it is carried out 
according to rules which dictate conditions, such as how long a suspect can 
be subjected to interrogation before being allowed to rest. Opinion is divided 
on whether techniques such as “water boarding” were a key enabler in the 
persuasion of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to cooperate with his interrogators, 
and to provide material on Al Qaeda personalities and operations (Stelter, 
2009; Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, 2014). While U.S. 
interrogation techniques such as “water boarding” have had extended 
coverage in media stories, the art of interrogation mainly depends on the 
psychological and social skills of the interrogator.86 
5.3 Collation 
The third stage of the cycle, collation, is omitted from some models of the 
cycle, while in others it is replaced with the term processing. Collation brings 
together all of the collected information and Intelligence to enable the 
analytical process to begin. Particularly if one or more of the sources is a 
HUMINT source, then a validation of both the source and the material will also 
be conducted. Collation is described by ACPO as: 
 
“the organisation of material into a variety of formats that best 
facilitate analysis. Examples of these include:  
                                            
86
 A legal memo from the U.S. Attorney General’s office (Byebee, 2002) to the CIA, authorising water boarding and 
other techniques for use during Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation, demonstrates the depth of consideration which was 
undertaken before authorising the techniques. For a contemporary account of the use of interrogation techniques 
used after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, see Lagouranis’ account of working as an interrogator at Abu Ghraib prison 
(Lagouranis, 2008). The book also details the various interrogation approaches used by the U.S. Army, explaining 
what each one aims to achieve and how and why it can be effective. 
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• Charts;  
• Spreadsheets; 
• Tables; 
• Databases;  
• Maps;  
• Commodity flows including financial material;  
• Communication flow and frequency charts.  
 
It is essential that such products are not considered to be the 
final analytical product. The evaluation and subsequent 
interpretation of collated material are the key processes that 
change material into analysis” (ACPO, 2006:66). 
 
Collation often involves a high degree of manual manipulation of data by 
dedicated staff or, more usually nowadays, by analysts themselves. The 
employment of analytical tools such as i2 Analyst Notebook across the 
Intelligence community has blurred the lines between collation and analysis, 
as a considerable proportion of collation work could arguably be classed as 
preliminary analysis. Collation assumes high importance in counter-terrorism 
in the last two examples in the ACPO list above, as it is the analysis of this 
information which results in so much actionable Intelligence.  
The tracking of terrorist financing is a key enabler in counter-terrorism work, 
but it is a specialist skill as the financial analyst needs a comprehensive 
understanding of how the international banking systems function, and how 
money is moved electronically between accounts and across borders and 
jurisdictions. The collation of financial transaction data can be time-consuming 
but it is a vital part in an investigation. Accurately depicting and labelling the 
paths of currency movements between accounts, individuals, banks and 
countries is all necessary to understand the money flow. Perri et al (2009:25) 
note that if the Police knew how terrorists were creating and obtaining their 
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funding, they would gain the ability to penetrate or disrupt the group before 
any terrorist acts were committed. A sample i2 Analyst Notebook chart 
showing the analysis of an insider trading crime is shown at Annex E (Visual 
Analysis, n.d.).  
The reading of all the available material may appear to be the sine qua non of 
the collation process but it is often overlooked. This omission has increased in 
line with the increase in the quantity of data now available for searching. The 
reading of collated material can serve as a coarse filter, showing the analyst 
which information gaps exist, which gaps could be filled quickly and simply, 
and which gaps may require more work in order to close them. In the early 
1980s most of the British Army’s information on the Warsaw Pact armed 
forces was extremely well organised, meticulously catalogued and usually 
available in printed form, but there was no easy way to search for information. 
Some Intelligence stations used 6” x 4” record cards for common queries but 
most searches involved a great deal of time spent in reading the various 
working aids. Some stations had full-time collators who knew their targets 
intimately and could quickly locate Intelligence almost on demand.  
Since then, the situation has changed beyond recognition. We are now in the 
era of what the large technology companies call “big data”, where there is a 
plethora of information available but one of the main difficulties encountered is 
in having the right tools, the access and the knowledge to be able to retrieve 
the required information (Duijvestijn et al., 2014). A key requirement in the 
counter-terrorism field is often described as “blowing away the hay, to help 
reveal the needle”, which requires the ability to aggregate, sift and search 
huge quantities of electronic material held in a variety of repositories. As 
Gannon (2008:217) observes: “The IC [Intelligence community] in one 
generation passed from an information-scarce environment to an information-
glut environment. Major advances in technical collection provided more data 
than analysts could exploit.” 
Spreadsheets still have a very important role to play in collation and analysis 
and they remain a cornerstone of analytic product. Even the most basic 
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spreadsheet allows data to be manipulated in ways which can reveal patterns, 
or can make more sense of a large amount of data. Users with a more 
advanced level of spreadsheet training can extract still more value by using 
tools such as pivot tables and modelling techniques. Spreadsheets are 
especially valuable in telephone call record analysis and they can be used to 
create timelines without the need for specialist charting software.  
Databases are one of the most powerful tools available to the counter-
terrorism analyst for collation purposes. The counter-terrorism collator or 
analyst will routinely access a multitude of closed databases accessible only 
to the Police and the Intelligence agencies. A sample of these databases and 
their potential uses is provided in the table below, but it should be noted that 
this is only a selection. Many more are used, especially in the areas of covert 
Intelligence. 
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Automatic Number Plate Reading (ANPR) Intelligence 
Crimelink 
Police National Computer 
Child Protection Records 
Telecommunications data (billing records, call records, etc.) 
Custody data 
National Method Index 
Forensic Data 
VODS/QUEST (Vehicle Online Descriptive Search), (Query Using Extended 
Search Techniques) 
Prison Liaison 
Sex Offenders Data 
Special Branch 
Central Ticket Office 
Safety Camera Unit 
Roads Policing Unit/Strategic Roads Unit 
Aliens Department 
Stop and Search database 
BADMAN (Behavioural Analysis Data Management Auto- 
Indexing Networking) 
CATCHEM (Centralised Analytical Team Collating Homicide Expertise and 
Management). 
Congestion Charge Database (Transport for London) 
Benefits Agency Organised Fraud Investigation Data 
DVAL (Driver Vehicle Licensing Authority) 
Europol (European Law Enforcement Organisation) and INTERPOL 
Forensic Intelligence Bureau (Part of the Forensic Science Service) 
HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) 
IND (Immigration and Nationality Directorate) 
HOLMES and HOLMES 2 
Inland Revenue Data 
Land Registry data 
NFFID (National Firearms Forensic Intelligence Database) 
VISOR (Violent and Sex Offenders Register) 
UKPS (UK Passport Service) 
Table 4 Sample of closed databases 
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5.4 Evaluation 
Compared to other parts of the Intelligence cycle, evaluation has probably had 
the most negative press. This is mainly due to the criticisms levelled against 
the Intelligence which was used as a key factor in the UK government’s 
decision to commit troops to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Butler Report 
(2004) provided the very detailed analysis of this Intelligence. The criticisms 
originated in the pre-invasion unease which was publicly debated by the 
Cabinet, the opposition, the media and the public, concerning the legal and 
moral justification for the UK going to war with Iraq in 2003. The UK’s system 
used for the evaluation of information and Intelligence in the Police is 
commonly known as the “five by five by five” system (usually written as 
5x5x5). The name comes from the construction of a Police National 
Intelligence Report, which has three separate evaluation criteria, each of 
which has five potential options. A sample report (The Scottish Government, 
2012:, sec.4.14) is shown below: 
   
212 
 
 
16 Example of a National Intelligence Report (5x5x5) 
 
Guidance from ACPO (NPIA, 2010:49) on information sharing provides a 
necessarily lengthy explanation of what ACPO considers evaluation to be, 
and why it is important: 
 
“Police information will undergo a form of evaluation 
appropriate to the policing purpose for which the information 
was collected and recorded. All police information, particularly 
that which comes from Intelligence, is evaluated to determine 
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its provenance, accuracy, continuing relevance to a policing 
purpose and any action to be taken. Provenance is the ability 
to determine the reliability and credibility of the source, and the 
value of the content of the information.  The evaluation process 
determines the type of action that should be taken on the 
information. Action may include an immediate response, 
further development of the information, whether to share the 
information with others or deciding not to do anything with the 
information at that point in time, subject to review. Evaluation 
should be proportionate to the nature of the information”.  
 
First to be evaluated is the source of the Intelligence. In HUMINT, this will 
reflect the evaluation of the actual Human Source providing the information, 
not the person or persons who the source obtained that information from. For 
example, CHIS A meets his Handler and tells him that one of his colleagues, 
B, wants to find a jihadist group in the UK, so he can “contribute something 
useful to the war”. The information has come from a regular meeting which A 
has with a group of associates, some of whom talk with admiration about 
jihadist groups. When the Handler writes his report after the meeting, he must 
evaluate the source of the information, which is CHIS A, not colleague B. He 
must grade the information according to his previous experience in handling 
CHIS A, the previous reliability which A’s information has shown, and the 
overall perceptions of the Handler (and Co-Handler if appropriate) regarding 
A’s reliability as a source. The second criterion is where the content of the 
information or Intelligence itself is evaluated, and it is here where the Handler 
may use his own knowledge and experience, in addition to what the CHIS has 
told him, to grade the information. Finally, the third criterion is the handling 
and dissemination protocols which the originator of the report deems to be the 
most appropriate for the information (or in some cases it will be the protocol 
dictated by policies). Reports containing terrorism-related information or 
Intelligence are more tightly controlled than most other Intelligence reports, 
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and dissemination is usually strictly limited. The originator of the report can 
keep the information ring-fenced within the originating agency by selecting 
number 4. For very sensitive information he can select number 5, which 
strictly limits dissemination to the original distribution list. The standard matrix 
used to select source evaluations by the UK Police is provided below (The 
Scottish Government, 2012):  
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A 
Always 
Reliable 
B 
Mostly 
Reliable 
C 
Sometimes 
Reliable 
D 
Unreliable 
E 
Untested 
Source 
1 
Known to be 
true 
2 
Known 
personally to 
source but 
not to officer 
3 
Not known 
personally to 
source but 
corroborated 
4 
Cannot be 
judged 
5 
Suspected to 
be false or 
malicious 
1 
May  be 
disseminated 
to other law 
enforcement 
and 
prosecuting 
agencies 
2 
May be 
disseminated 
to UK non-
prosecuting 
parties 
3 
May be 
disseminated 
to non EEA 
law 
enforcement 
agencies 
(special 
conditions 
apply) 
4  
Dissemination 
within 
originating 
agency only 
5 
No further 
dissemination 
Table 5  Breakdown of the evaluation variables in the National 
Intelligence Report (5x5x5) 
 
Harfield (2008:65) says of evaluation that it: “asks simply, to what extent can 
we believe each different piece of information before us? The faith invested in 
each individual item of information determines the influence it exerts in the 
overall interpretation of all the information available”. His description is 
succinct and serves as a working definition of what should be contributed by 
the process of evaluation. Harfield neatly links the perceived provenance of 
information with the influence which it carries with it. SIS has long used an 
evaluation process in its HUMINT work and it was this evaluation of HUMINT 
material which would come under such close scrutiny in the post-invasion 
governmental inquiry chaired by Lord Butler. Initially using the term validation 
rather than evaluation, Butler set the scene in his opening chapter. He 
described the questions he expected an Intelligence agency to ask of itself, 
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when evaluating the information it had gathered. Butler’s view (2004:23) of 
this validation process, while longer than Harfield’s, is one of the best 
summaries available:  
 
“The validation of a reporting chain requires both care and 
time, and can generally only be conducted by the agency 
responsible for collection. The process is informed by the 
operational side of the agency, but must include a separate 
auditing element, which can consider cases objectively and 
quite apart from their apparent Intelligence value. Has the 
informant been properly quoted, all the way along the chain? 
Does he have credible access to the facts he claims to know? 
Does he have the right knowledge to understand what he 
claims to be reporting? Could he be under opposition control, 
or be being fed information? Is he fabricating? Can the bona 
fides, activities, movements or locations attributed to those 
involved in acquiring or transmitting a report be checked? Do 
we understand the motivations of those involved, their private 
agenda,87 and hence the way in which their reports may be 
influenced by a desire to please or impress? How powerful is 
a wish for (in particular) financial reward? What, if any, 
distorting effect might such factors exert? Is there – at any 
stage – a deliberate intention to deceive? Generally speaking, 
the extent and depth of validation required will depend on the 
Counter-Intelligence sophistication of the target, although the 
complexity of the operational situation will affect the possibility 
of confusion, misrepresentation or deception”. 
 
                                            
87
 This was particularly relevant in the case of Ahmed Chalabi, who had provided Intelligence on Iraq to the U.S. 
agencies for years, but whose political ambitions often meant that the information he provided was distorted, either 
deliberately or unwittingly (Jehel, 2004:2). 
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In a highly unusual and hitherto unprecedented public speech, the then Head 
of SIS mentioned Butler’s concerns about the effectiveness of HUMINT 
evaluation and agreed with his criticism, saying that the report “…was a clear 
reminder, to both agencies and the centre of Government, politicians and 
officials alike, of how Intelligence needs to be handled” (Sawers, 2010). 
Butler’s criticisms (2004:116) of SIS source evaluation procedures was 
measured and non-emotive. He wrote that he had been led to question SIS’s 
standard procedures for checking on the validity of their human sources, the 
quality control procedures employed in their reporting, and whether these 
standard procedures were actually adhered to, in the production of the Iraq-
based Intelligence. In his conclusions he identified two factors which were the 
main contributors to the doubts with which the SIS Intelligence on Iraq was 
viewed: the first was the actual implementation of the validation process, and 
the second was the inadequate resourcing of it (2004:152).  
5.5 Analysis 
The analysis stage can be as brief as examining a list of numbers called by a 
target, in order to scan for a known number, or it can be so lengthy as to 
require months or years of effort by teams of analysts working to identify and 
locate an individual or individuals.88 The area of Intelligence analysis is one of 
the most widely written about areas in the Intelligence cycle. Examining the 
works of various writers on Intelligence provides an idea of why analysis 
appears to be such a divisive topic for practitioners and academics alike. 
                                            
88
 An example of the latter would be the analytical effort devoted to positively identifying, locating and interdicting Abu 
Musab Al Zarqawi, a prolific terrorist who operated in Iraq between 2004 and 2006. In the two years in which Zarqawi 
was operationally active in Iraq, the UK and U.S. Intelligence agencies (among others) dedicated several entire 
teams to the task of locating and capturing or killing him. Following Intelligence provided by an informant, coalition 
forces were able to locate his spiritual adviser, Sheikh Abd-al-Rahman, who was placed under surveillance and who 
was eventually tracked to a safe-house on the outskirts of Baqubah, where he held a personal meeting with Zarqawi. 
Once Zarqawi was positively identified, an airstrike was conducted on the building, using two air-launched 500-lb 
bombs. Zarqawi was pulled out alive, but died almost immediately afterwards, not surviving the airlift to hospital. The 
U.S. government stated that the operation to locate him “did not occur in a 24-hour period. It truly was a very long, 
painstaking, deliberate exploitation of intelligence, information- gathering, human sources, electronic, signal 
intelligence that was done over a period of time - many, many weeks - that led us last night to that target" (Caldwell, 
2006). The Intelligence effort to locate Osama bin Laden took even longer than that to locate Zarqawi. 
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Lowenthal, a former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and 
Production (IAFIE, 2014), considers the literature on Intelligence analysis to 
be rich (2003:96). Gentry (1993:207) on the other hand, considered it to be a 
much smaller realm some 22 years ago,  “filled with judgments and assertions 
at variance with ...reality”, illustrating how far the literature has advanced in 
this area. Definitions of Intelligence analysis have covered a wide area and 
have been crafted with reference to “the sources and classifications of 
information, processes, purposes, individual and organizational efforts, and 
consumers” (Mangio & Wilkinson, 2008:3). LeFebvre (2004:11) provides a 
detailed definition of Intelligence analysis, of his own crafting, which he 
describes thus: 
 
“Intelligence analysis is the process of evaluating and 
transforming raw data acquired covertly into descriptions, 
explanations, and judgments for policy consumers. It involves 
assessing the reliability and credibility of the data and 
comparing it to the knowledge base available to the analyst to 
separate fact from error and uncover deception. Each 
collected item is then examined to determine its nature, 
proportion, function, relevancy, and interrelationships. Related 
items will be grouped together and the extent to which they 
confirm, supplement, or contradict each other will be 
determined. Once done, the relevant information will be 
synthesized in order for the analyst to make predictions, gain 
insight, identify information gaps, or explain a complex set of 
facts and relationships”. 
 
 
His definition captures much of the analytical process, particularly the 
transforming of raw product into something which can assist the decision-
making processes of those whom he considers “policy consumers” (Lefebvre, 
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2004:11). Another key item in his definition is that outputs should somehow 
have a transformative effect, such as providing a better understanding of 
relationships, or a clearer picture of a timeline. LeFebvre’s definition is one of 
the most useful definitions of Intelligence analysis available in the current 
academic literature of Intelligence studies. He continues with another theory, 
that most analysis is predictive and therefore follows a simple pattern, namely 
that it “describes what is known…it highlights the interrelationships that form 
the basis for the judgments…it offers a forecast” (Lefebvre, 2004:112).  
The relationship between what Intelligence reports, and the subsequent 
decisions to take action based upon it, is complex and frequently 
misunderstood. This is especially the case with civil servants who often 
receive Intelligence product for the first time, when they are more advanced in 
their career. A number of them will only remain in such a role for one tour 
before moving on to another role. During the delivery of Intelligence training 
overseas, a foreign Intelligence officer asked why the Intelligence being 
produced did not include a course of action, or a recommendation for 
interdiction. This simple question resulted in around 20 hours of classroom 
discussion about the collection, the analysis and the dissemination of counter-
terrorism reporting. It was a useful reminder about the importance of 
Intelligence speaking truth unto power, yet not making the decision for the 
policymaker.89  
Two analytical processes have entered the academic discussion of analysis 
since at least the mid-1980s. These are generally defined as “bottom-up” and 
                                            
89
 The quotation “speak truth unto power” is widely used in the UK Intelligence community. Its exact origins are 
uncertain, and it is often attributed to Sir Winston Churchill, but the most probable source of the original quote is from 
the Quaker movement in the 18th Century.  An expanded extract explains this as follows (Cary et al., 1955:1): “Our 
title, Speak Truth to Power, taken from a charge given to Eighteenth Century Friends, suggests the effort that is 
made to speak from the deepest insight of the Quaker faith, as this faith understood by those who prepared this 
study. We speak to power in three senses: To those who hold high places in our national life and bear the terrible 
responsibility of making decisions for war or peace. To the American people who are the final reservoir of power in 
this country and whose values and expectations set the limits for those who exercise authority. To the idea of Power 
itself, and its impact on Twentieth Century life. Our truth is an ancient one: that love endures and overcomes; that 
hatred destroys; that what is obtained by love is retained, but what is obtained by hatred proves a burden. This truth, 
fundamental to the position which rejects reliance on the method of war, is ultimately a religious perception, a belief 
that stands outside of history. Because of this we could not end this study without discussing the relationship 
between the politics of time with which men are daily concerned and the politics of eternity which they too easily 
ignore”.  It remains one of the most compelling instructions to an Intelligence community. A more detailed explanation 
can be found on http://www.quaker.org/sttp.html accessed on 01 August 2012. 
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“top down” analysis. The most authoritative writing on this is by Schum and 
others, whose work encompasses a wide area which includes Intelligence 
analysis, hypotheses and legal argument. Schum (1988:52) describes the 
bottom-up model as one in which “reasoning proceeds from observable 
evidence to possible conclusions” and describes the top-down model as one 
in which “a possible conclusion allows us to generate a chain or hierarchy of 
events leading to one or more potentially observable events whose 
occurrence or non-occurrence would be evidence bearing upon our possible 
conclusion”. The focus of each model is also different, with the bottom-up 
model being data driven, and the top-down model being inference driven.90 
The bottom-up model is much more common within the UK Intelligence 
community, particularly in counter-terrorism, although these terms are rarely 
used in the UK community. The data-driven emphasis of the “bottom-up” 
approach concentrates on the information collected, highlighting any gaps to 
drive additional collection, and including a critical evaluation of the data made.  
The critical evaluation should ideally lead to a subsequent hypothesis (or 
hypotheses) which can be tested. Naturally, hypotheses can also appear 
during the collection phase, or during the initial reading of the material, in the 
collation phase. They do not necessarily fit into the neatness of an academic 
plan for their creation. This is how the majority of the UK’s Intelligence 
machinery functions and it appears to be effective. The top-down method has 
been criticised by some Intelligence academics, such as Ryan (2006) and 
Johnson (2005), as it takes a hypothesis as a starting point and tests the data 
against the hypothesis. Johnson (2005:22–23) takes issue with the top-down 
approach, saying:  
 
“What tends to occur is that the analyst looks for current data that 
confirms the existing organizational opinion or the opinion that seems 
most probable and, consequently, is easiest to support.... This 
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 Schum (1988:20) also writes on the differences between deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning, all of 
which have direct relevance to the field of Intelligence analysis, especially regarding the way in which an analyst 
might approach a given problem. 
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tendency to search for confirmatory data is not necessarily a conscious 
choice; rather, it is the result of accepting an existing set of 
hypotheses, developing a mental model based on previous corporate 
products, and then trying to augment that model with current data in 
order to support the existing hypotheses”.  
 
In academic terms, this in itself may not necessarily be a negative factor, and 
it has clear uses in social science research. In the field of counter-terrorism 
Intelligence, however, this method leaves analysts open to two particularly 
dangerous pitfalls. Firstly, it can encourage an analyst to “make the facts fit 
the story”, a common media criticism. If one starts with a hypothesis, and 
initial analysis appears to confirm the analysis, it can have a blinding effect on 
the analytical process. That process could then suffer from impediments such 
as linkage blindness, groupthink and bias.91 Secondly, such an approach can 
actually facilitate analysts being given one particular hypothesis for 
investigation, which at the extreme end of the scale paves the way for 
accusations of the politicisation of Intelligence.  
In the post-2003 period following the UK governmental inquiries into the 
Intelligence process and the Iraq war, accusations of encouraging the 
politicisation of Intelligence are something which no agency wants to find itself 
on the receiving end of. Ryan (2006:309) believes that credibility problems 
could be reduced by the avoidance of this hypothesis-based analysis which 
she considers “lends itself well to extreme politicization of Intelligence”. Her 
critical examination of this hypotheses-based analysis cites the example of 
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 Linkage blindness is generally considered to have been identified as a pathology of Intelligence by Professor 
Steven Egger (Egger 1984; Egger 1999; Egger 1992). Janis (1972), a Yale University psychologist, detailed the 
concept of “groupthink” in 1972, after studying the abortive “Bay of Pigs” operation to overthrow Fidel Castro’s regime 
in Cuba. In his paper, Janis described how it was possible for a group of individuals, working collectively on a 
problem, to actually decide upon the worst possible outcome, as their combined decision. In brief, Janis postulated 
that loyalty to the group often becomes the highest motive for the members of the group, and this in turn acts as a 
powerful disincentive for an individual to speak out against the direction the rest of the group is taking. Professor 
Heuer (1999) published an internal paper for the CIA in 1999, originally classified as SECRET, which analysed the 
psychological processes which affect the work of Intelligence analysts. A declassified version of this work was later 
released to other agencies. This author referred to Heuer’s work extensively while working on counter-terrorism 
cases. Heuer’s work is widely considered to be the definitive work on how psychological processes impact upon our 
ability to process and analyse information in the Intelligence field. His chapters on bias (Chapters 9-13) cover all the 
various types which analysts experience. 
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the US-produced National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (Walpole, 2002), which played a fundamental role in the 
U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Describing the period immediately 
preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Ryan (2006:287) states: 
 
“Rather than constructing a ‘fact-based hypothesis’, the 
Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP), followed to a 
significant degree by the CIA particularly in the pivotal 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of October 2002, 
designed an (sic) ‘hypothesis-based analysis’, which started 
with a preferred scenario and then found data that might 
support that. In effect, it was a worst-case scenario presented 
as a probability.”  
 
Johnson (2005:22) agrees with Ryan, tackling the subject directly and pointing 
out this tendency for an analyst to look for facts which fit a theory, rather than 
looking at facts and deducing meaning from them:  
 
"What tends to occur is that the analyst looks for current data 
that confirms the existing organizational opinion or the opinion 
that seems most probable and, consequently, is easiest to 
support.... This tendency to search for confirmatory data is not 
necessarily a conscious choice; rather, it is the result of 
accepting an existing set of hypotheses, developing a mental 
model based on previous corporate products, and then trying to 
augment that model with current data in order to support the 
existing hypotheses." 
 
Analysis is sometimes shown as “Analysis/Processing”. This is due to the 
amount of electronic processing which now takes place in order to turn a large 
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proportion of information collected into a format that is understandable and 
useable by analytical staff. The term “processing” can be ascribed to a variety 
of both automated and manual workings which can include decryption, 
translation of material from the original language, as well as the conversion or 
enhancement of audio-visual files, among others. The importance of 
processing in the Intelligence cycle can be gauged by a comment from a 
former Director of NSA. When asked by Loch K. Johnson what were the three 
biggest problems facing his agency, he replied; “processing, processing, 
processing” (Johnson, 2006:120). Due to the highly sensitive nature of this 
topic, processing is not covered in further detail in this paper.  
5.6 Dissemination 
The dissemination of product is the final stage of the Intelligence cycle and 
usually consists of some kind of report being issued to the customers. At the 
tactical end of the scale, this can be as brief as a formatted “tipper” consisting 
of a single paragraph to alert customers to time-sensitive material. At the 
opposite end of the scale, a strategic report can stretch to several thousand 
pages of dense material, such as a classified, all-source country profile.92 
Some reports are single-source, an example of which would be a HUMINT 
report describing a meeting of Intelligence interest, attended by the source. 
Other reports are all-source, such as a terrorist profile which could contain 
relevant Intelligence information from a variety of collectors, including 
HUMINT and surveillance.  
Since at least 1990, the “Intelligence support to the war fighter” initiative has 
aimed to push actionable, sanitised Intelligence down to the lowest possible 
levels which require it. This initiative was important as it was the real starting 
                                            
92
 The author has worked on such strategic papers, some of which were built up over many years. It is not 
uncommon for an Intelligence specialist to spend several years covering one or several countries, mainly updating 
and expanding such country profiles. 
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point of the move towards sanitising an Intelligence product to the lowest level 
for use, instead of the classification of the Intelligence report being immovably 
applied.93 Today this has been refined into the “tear line report”, a system 
which enables a finished Intelligence report to be written at two or more levels 
of classification. A section below the tear line is produced at the lowest 
suitable level, and enables the Intelligence staff to simply detach the lower 
part of the report and to hand it to tactical assets for operational use. This 
system is now widely used in NATO, and the same system is also used 
among the coalition nations contributing forces and assets to the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  
Nowadays, UK Intelligence reports usually include some kind of feedback 
mechanism, to provide customers with a vehicle for stating whether a 
particular report met their requirements, and if not, why this was the case. 
Some models of the Intelligence cycle include feedback as a component part, 
while others either leave it as an implied factor, or include it as a dotted 
“feedback loop” between some or all of the components of the cycle. Among 
the elements of the UK Intelligence community, there exist both formal and 
informal feedback mechanisms. Formal feedback is often an integral part of a 
report, most often placed at the end of the content. This format usually asks 
readers a set of questions, requesting customers to grade topics such as 
relevance and timeliness, whether or not they found it useful and if they would 
be interested in further reports on this or similar topics.  
Alongside the formal mechanism for customer comments, an informal 
mechanism also takes place and this is just as important as the formal 
system. In the decade from 2000-2010 in particular, inter-agency liaison and 
inter-departmental co-operation increased significantly among the UK’s secret 
Intelligence agencies. Individual analysts, case officers and other specialists 
are continuously building their own personal networks with their colleagues in 
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 To the Author’s knowledge, this was the first occasion on which this “Intelligence support to the war fighter” was 
actively embraced by the Intelligence elements of the UK’s Armed Forces.  
   
225 
 
other agencies, and discussing cases, Intelligence access, best practice, 
problems and opportunities.  
Customer comments have become invaluable in helping collectors, analysts 
and reporters to refine their understanding of customers’ requirements. This 
commentary mechanism assists an agency with its internal auditing, allowing 
it to streamline the degree of fit between tasking, collection, analysis and 
reporting. At the same time, it allows valuable feedback from other agencies. 
While these feedback mechanisms are important on a daily basis, another 
tool introduced by the Intelligence agencies during the past decade was score 
carding. Similar to the process used within corporate companies, score 
carding allows representatives from one Agency to meet formally with 
representatives from another agency or agencies, to discuss the Intelligence 
reports it has issued. Usually carried out on a monthly basis, this process 
encourages a frank assessment of all the issued product of a department or a 
team. The score carding results in a percentage score for the agency 
producing the Intelligence reports. The results are then fed back to the team 
or department, providing a detailed critique of the accuracy, usefulness and 
timeliness of the Intelligence. When working in a team providing direct support 
to another Intelligence agency, this score carding mechanism was invaluable 
in helping the team to ensure that their collection and reporting was aligned 
with the needs of the external customer. 
Within the UK Intelligence community, dissemination has traditionally been 
conducted using the “need to know” principle. Until April 2014, this was 
defined by the Cabinet Office (2011) in Her Majesty’s Government Security 
Policy, through the framework of the Government Protective Marking System, 
as the principle that “access must only be granted to those who have a 
business need and the appropriate personnel security control (BPSS or 
National Security Vetting)”. The principle of need to know is at the heart of 
Intelligence sharing and is fundamental to the security of all protectively 
marked Government assets, as the allowing of casual access to government 
protectively marked assets is never permitted.  
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This principle underwent some revisions during the decade of the 2000s, and 
although these do not appear to have been formally codified, the expanded 
version being communicated downwards to become “need to know – need to 
share – need to hold”. This expands the principle to include a check on 
whether someone who has this classified knowledge also needs to share it 
with others, or whether distribution should remain only to the original 
recipients. Need to hold was added as an aid to document security, partly to 
ensure that hoarding of highly classified documents does not take place and 
partly to ensure that no more copies of a highly classified document were in 
existence than were necessary. As the Commander of the United States 
Marine Corps said in 2005, “It’s not a technical issue any more. It’s really 
more about culture and the “need to share” rather than the “need to know” 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013:chap.V–2). 
The GPMS system was replaced in April 2014 by a new system called the 
Government Security Classifications Policy (GSCP) (Cabinet Office, 2014) 
which replaced the previous five categories (TOP SECRET, SECRET, 
CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED, UNCLASSIFIED) with 3 main categories 
(TOP SECRET, SECRET, OFFICIAL)  although the classification of 
OFFICIAL now has a sub-set of OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. This sub-set is 
defined as covering information which “could have more damaging 
consequences (for individuals, an organisation or government generally) if it 
were lost, stolen or published in the media which can be applied” (Cabinet 
Office, 2014:8). The principle of access, mentioned previously, was re-written 
as “Principle Three”, which stated: “access to sensitive information must 
ONLY be granted on the basis of a genuine “need to know” and an 
appropriate personnel security control” (Cabinet Office, 2014:5).  
Additional measures, such as special handling caveats, descriptors and 
codewords, can also be applied to further restrict dissemination of sensitive 
Intelligence. Special handling caveats cover especially sensitive areas such 
as some collection methods. Descriptors cover restrictions such as 
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“COMMERCIAL”, “LOCSEN” and “PERSONAL” (Cabinet Office, 2014:11).94 
Codewords add an additional layer of “need to know” protection, which further 
restrict access to, and dissemination of, an Intelligence product.95 The new 
policy was introduced in the aftermath of a number of massive leaks of highly 
classified information which has had wide-scale implications for UK policy.96  
The dissemination of Intelligence product is a perennial topic among 
Intelligence staff. The Australian government’s “Report of the Inquiry into 
Australia’s Intelligence Agencies” (known as the “Flood report”) (2004:7) 
provided a concise and useful summary of what the committee expected the 
dissemination of Intelligence to provide: 
 
• “Warning, notably of terrorist plans, but also of potential conflicts, 
uprisings and coups 
• Understanding of the regional and international environment with 
which decision makers will need to grapple 
• Knowledge of the military capabilities and intentions of potential 
adversaries, a vital ingredient in defence procurement and 
preparedness 
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 The Cabinet Office (2014:para.21) defines the use of a descriptor as “…to identify certain categories of sensitive 
information and indicate the need for common sense precautions to limit access…descriptors should be used in 
conjunction with a security classification and applied in the format: “OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE [DESCRIPTOR]”. Three 
core descriptors are maintained by the Cabinet Office, and these are defined as follows: “COMMERCIAL”: 
Commercial- or market-sensitive information, including that subject to statutory or regulatory obligations, that may be 
damaging to HMG or to a commercial partner if improperly accessed. “LOCSEN”: Sensitive information that locally 
engaged staff overseas cannot access. “PERSONAL”: Particularly sensitive information relating to an identifiable 
individual, where inappropriate access could have damaging consequences. For example, where relating to 
investigations, vulnerable individuals, or the personal / medical records of people in sensitive posts (e.g. military, 
SIA). The new policy from the Cabinet Office (2014:para.23) further dictates that information covered by descriptors 
cannot be sent to international partners, due to the potential for confusion.  
95
 The Cabinet Office (2014:para.24) defines a handling codeword as “…a single word expressed in CAPITAL letters 
that follows the security classification to providing security cover for a particular asset or event. They are usually only 
applied to SECRET and TOP SECRET assets”. 
96
 One of the most damaging Intelligence leaks in the USA’s modern history was the series of “Wikileaks” revelations 
entitled “The Afghan War Logs” and the “Iraq War Logs”. These consisted of more than 500,000 classified reports 
from the U.S. Military Intelligence network SIPRNET, and they were leaked along with a further 250,000 classified 
U.S. diplomatic cables. At the time of writing, the legal case against Specialist Bradley Manning, now legally known 
as Chelsea Elizabeth Manning, was concluded with Manning being sentenced to 5 years' confinement, reduction in 
rank to Private, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonourable discharge. Manning will be eligible for 
parole after serving one-third of the sentence imposed. Many of the diplomatic cables covered topics and regions 
about which Manning had no “need to know”, in his Iraq-based role as a Military Intelligence Analyst. Had the correct 
systems been in place, his access would have been markedly more limited. 
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• Support for military operations, minimising casualties and improving 
the environment for operational success 
• Support for an active and ambitious foreign, trade and defence 
policy 
• And beyond these vital roles of Intelligence in providing information, 
modern Intelligence can be a more active tool of government – 
disrupting the plans of adversaries, influencing the policies of key 
foreign actors and contributing to modern electronic warfare.”  
 
The U.S. Armed Forces also produce finely detailed documentation on almost 
every area of the operational spectrum including military Intelligence. A U.S. 
Joint Publication by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) describes eight factors 
which are assessed as important for disseminated Intelligence products. They 
broadly follow the UK military principles, a fact not surprising given the high 
degree of joint working between the UK and U.S. Armed Forces in the period 
since the Second World War. These factors provide a sound checklist for 
Intelligence managers, prior to releasing an Intelligence report or product to 
consumers and customers. The JCS (2013:chap.II–7) list eight “attributes of 
Intelligence excellence”.97 This is an updated version of their previous concept 
of “five tenets of Intelligence”.  They consider that, in order to achieve the 
standards of excellence required, an Intelligence report should be: 
 
1. Anticipatory (allowing commanders to  
2. Timely 
3. Accurate 
                                            
97
 The full definitions of these eight attributes of Intelligence excellence, as considered by the JCS, can be found at 
Annex I 
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4. Usable 
5. Complete 
6. Relevant 
7. Objective 
8. Available 
5.7 Summary 
In its current form, the Intelligence cycle used by the UK Intelligence 
community is a simple, 6-stage process. This chapter conducted a detailed 
examination of these stages, describing what each stage means, how it is 
conducted and how it relates to, and functions in, the work of counter-
terrorism.  The chapter started with direction, or “tasking”, examining the UK’s 
political process and its role in Intelligence direction. This included the 
changes imposed in 2010, such as the establishment of a new coordinating 
body (the NSC) and a new Adviser position (the NSA), to better coordinate 
the work of the various agencies and departments involved. The throughput of 
this additional body and additional post, in the form of the National Security 
Strategy, were also covered. An explanation was provided, of how this 
dovetails with other strategies and other bodies, such as the Strategic 
Priorities for Secret Intelligence Collection which are promulgated by the JIC. 
Commentary from former politicians was provided, showing how individuals 
such as a former Home Secretary considered the nature of tasking and how 
the resources of the UK’s secret Intelligence agencies are then deployed in 
accordance with this. The method of categorising this direction into 
Intelligence Requirements was next described, showing how primary and 
secondary requirements are developed from the initial direction.  
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The next stage, collection, began with an expansion of some of the overt and 
covert sources and methods which can be deployed in this phase. A UK 
Police definition of “open” and “closed” Intelligence sources was provided, and 
the topic of single-source Intelligence was expanded upon, to explain some of 
the reasons why this is such a perennial topic, especially in the media. This 
section outlined why single-source Intelligence is not always a negative 
concept, using commentary from the Butler Report to reinforce this principle. 
Some of the limitations of the various sources and methods were also 
detailed, using examples to highlight how the various sources and methods 
work together in close collaboration in a counter-terrorism operation, such as 
the “cueing” by one source (e.g. covert surveillance) to notify another source 
or method to begin collection. The use of covert sources carries a high risk in 
counter-terrorism operations. Some of these risks were described in detail, 
such as the compromising of the source, or the target group dismantling their 
operation and relocating, thus forcing the Intelligence agencies to expend 
extra efforts just locate the group again.  
Collation is often ignored or misunderstood, even by Intelligence 
professionals. As this section explained, it is a necessary part of the model. 
Beginning with a definition of collation by ACPO, this section provided a 
sample of some of the databases available to the UK Police, emphasising just 
how large the scale and scope of a simple query of available data sources 
could be. Unless all available data is gathered together at the initial stage 
prior to analysis commencing, there is a risk that the omission of a key facts 
could inadvertently skew the initial direction of an investigation. The 
importance of collation in military Intelligence was also covered, showing just 
how far technology has advanced in the last 30 years. It has moved from 
wooden trays of 6” x 4” record cards to 3-dimensional databases accessed by 
charting technology such as i2 Analyst Notebook, which can identify 
relationships between people/bank accounts/mobile phones and other entities 
and display this graphically.  
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The automation of tasks in the Intelligence process increases all the time, 
partly due to the vast volumes of information being searched through and 
partly due to the development and introduction of new techniques to speed up 
parts of the process. There is much debate within the Intelligence community 
about how far such automation can, and should, go. Despite the 
improvements brought about by technological developments, the human 
factor remains paramount and the Intelligence analyst, particularly in counter-
terrorism, is unlikely to be replaced by machines in the near future. Goodman 
confirms this view, stating that “…while the target may change, and the 
means by which Intelligence is procured will alter, the analyst will remain 
crucial” (Goodman, 2011:275). 
The process of evaluation was described in considerable detail, partly due to 
the very public debate which raged about this, following the UK’s participation 
in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The importance of the provenance of information 
was covered, explaining why the source of the information, as well as the 
information itself, must be evaluated in order for the cycle to function as 
accurately as possible. Butler’s thoughts were provided, on the types of 
questions which he considered should be asked during the evaluation 
process. Some of the criticisms of the evaluation process carried out before 
the 2003 invasion were also described. Samples were provided of the current 
UK Confidential Intelligence Report and of the grading and evaluating system 
currently in use by the Police, the Armed Forces and the Intelligence agencies 
of the UK. This section finished with a quote from the Chief of SIS at the time, 
clearly indicating that he fully accepted the need for a robust evaluation 
process, in order to avoid the mistakes made prior to the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq.  
The description of the sixth and final stage of the cycle, Dissemination, began 
with a brief comparison of the differences in a tactical report and a strategic 
report, before going on to explain how the dissemination of Intelligence has 
progressed in the last 30 years. It has advanced from the principle of need to 
know, through to the concerted push in 1990-91 for classified Intelligence to 
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be sanitised so that it could be fed down to the lowest levels required, where 
action could still be taken on it. This section then covered the advance of 
Intelligence reporting to include the tear line report, which allows highly 
classified Intelligence to be sanitised to a much lower level, removing any 
reference or indicator to the source of the Intelligence, yet still providing the 
salient points of actionable Intelligence. The principle of customer feedback 
was also covered, and the section concluded with a comparative list from a 
U.S. Manual on Intelligence, containing the eight attributes of Intelligence 
excellence which the U.S. Joint Forces are expected to abide by in their 
Intelligence reporting.  
The language used in a report can be a key factor in determining whether the 
disseminated report is misunderstood or not. Intelligence customers and 
consumers need to clearly understand that absence of evidence does not 
necessarily equate to evidence of absence. The Nicoll report (1981:para.58 
cited in Goodman, 2007:20) identified this more than thirty years ago, noting:  
 
“The Chairman of the JIC has made the point that readers of JIC 
reports may sometimes read more than is intended into a JIC report of 
‘no evidence’. In this field of indicator and warning intelligence, where 
aggressors will do their best to conceal their preparations, it is 
especially important for the JIC to make it clear how far we would 
expect to receive evidence, and how far ‘no evidence’ simply means an 
absence of information”. 
 
No model is infallible and the next chapter considers the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the Intelligence cycle, complete with the addition of 
primary source material. The opinions of more than a dozen serving or retired 
Intelligence practitioners are used in the following chapter to add a unique 
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perspective on how the cycle functions in actual counter-terrorism work, and 
how these practitioners view the model in their various roles.  
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Chapter 6 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Intelligence Cycle  
“If we are to think seriously about the world, and act effectively in it, 
some sort of simplified map of reality, some theory, concept, model, 
paradigm, is necessary” (Huntington, 2011:29).  
 
 
This chapter builds upon the theoretical framework, the detailed analysis of 
the Intelligence cycle and the policy framework of the CONTEST strategy. It 
considers the relative strengths and weaknesses of the model, using another 
author’s critical paper (Hulnick, 2006) as a framework, and overlaying these 
criticisms onto the UK’s 6-stage model. Various challenges and vulnerabilities 
are then detailed, as perceived by a number of prominent authors in this field. 
The ground-breaking work of Sheptycki’s classification of Intelligence 
pathologies (Sheptycki, 2004) is described, to provide a comprehensive 
overview of some of the perceived weaknesses within the Intelligence 
process. Redressing the balance of analysis, the strengths of the model are 
then discussed.  
6.1 Weaknesses of the Intelligence Cycle 
Identifying and analysing weaknesses in the Intelligence cycle is not a simple 
task as many factors identified as vulnerabilities of the model are not actually 
components of the model itself, rather they are often behaviours which directly 
influence the model.  A former U.S. Intelligence officer, Hulnick is now a 
Professor of Intelligence studies (Boston University, 2014). He authored a 
paper which criticised the concept of the Intelligence cycle and is therefore the 
most appropriate paper to use for an analysis of some arguments against the 
Intelligence cycle. In his opening abstract (Hulnick, 2006:959) he presents the 
following arguments against the model: 
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“In the modern era, almost all intelligence professionals will 
study the Intelligence Cycle as a kind of gospel of how 
intelligence functions. Yet it is not a particularly good model, 
since the cyclical pattern does not describe what really 
happens. Policy officials rarely give collection guidance. 
Collection and analysis, which are supposed to work in 
tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel. Finally, the idea 
that decision makers wait for the delivery of intelligence 
before making policy decisions is equally incorrect. In the 
modern era, policy officials seem to want intelligence to 
support policy rather than to inform it. The Intelligence Cycle 
also fails to consider either counter-intelligence or covert 
action. Taken as a whole, the cycle concept is a flawed 
model, but nevertheless continues to be taught in the U.S. 
and around the world”. 
 
Hulnick’s approach to this paper is understandably a US-centric one, but his 
paper has importance not least because some of his criticisms of the model 
are echoed elsewhere (Davies et al., 2014; Davies, 2002; Richards, 2014). It 
is worth examining the individual components of Hulnick’s abstract with a UK-
centric lens to ascertain how accurately, if at all, these components map to 
the UK experience of the model as used within the counter-terrorism sphere. 
Within the context of UK counter-terrorism, the Intelligence cycle is an 
accurate descriptor of the processes which take place within it. As chapter 5 
covered in detail, the classic depiction of the cycle only shows the progressive 
movement from one stage to the next. The feedback loops are traditionally 
explained as sub-processes which can happen at any stage of the cycle, and 
do not necessarily have to revert to the preceding stage.  
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A feedback loop can take the process back to any stage as far as the start 
and this happens frequently in the actual work carried out by the agencies. 
For example, direction may be given to collect Intelligence on a named 
individual who is suspected of material involvement in terrorist activities. The 
collection process begins and while this is ongoing, the collation process 
would also be carried out. The combined data resulting from the collection 
and collation would be analysed and evaluated, possibly as part of a wider, 
ongoing investigation. As the picture on the individual is built up, it may 
become apparent to the analyst that the named individual is unlikely to be 
involved in the suspected activities because of the pattern of life, movements 
and other evidence of the individual’s daily activities. The case would be 
discussed internally, and could possibly require a multi-agency discussion 
involving other partner agencies. A decision may be taken to remove the 
individual from the collection plan. This decision would be communicated to 
the originator of the direction, whereupon new instructions may be given to 
target a different individual. Conversely, no new individuals may be added to 
the collection plan, but an instruction may be provided to continue with the 
ongoing investigation. 
Hulnick’s next criticism is that policy officials rarely give collection guidance. 
This comment muddies the waters somewhat, when considering this from the 
UK perspective, as Hulnick has used the second phase of the UK cycle 
(collection) instead of the first phase (direction). In the case of the UK if we 
assume that by “policy officials” Hulnick would mean the senior political 
leadership, both elected (such as the Prime Minister) and non-elected (such 
as the Permanent Under-Secretary of State (PUS)), his point would be 
correct. Policy officials such as these do not usually provide detailed collection 
guidance, as this is not their function. This would then flow down to the 
Directors of the Intelligence agencies and onto their staff. This guidance 
would come as a result of the process of the JIC, as the Chairman of the JIC 
reports directly to the Prime Minister for the overall supervision of the JIC’s 
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output.98 The JIC produces its list of priority collection requirements, and the 
agencies collect against these requirements. Moving Hulnick’s criticism back 
one stage to “direction” (which is where it was most likely aimed), it is an 
inaccurate criticism when applied to the UK cycle as the UK model does 
receive direction from policy makers, which is then translated into a collection 
strategy within the agencies. Chapter one of this paper described the UK’s 
Intelligence machinery in detail and it is clear from this that the task of 
collection, unlike direction, is not one which sits under UK policy officials 
within government. 
His next point states that “collection and analysis, which are supposed to work 
in tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel”. Both parts of this statement 
can be said to be true in the UK model. It can be argued that this is a 
necessary function of the cycle, and that this is a common misunderstanding 
of the model often criticised by opponents of the concept of Intelligence work 
being carried out according to a cyclical model. Yet the model was designed 
to be a simple, functional and easily memorised process primarily aimed at 
military Intelligence staff. The current, 6-stage cycle still adheres to this 
principle.  
Where a common misunderstanding frequently occurs is that, in depicting the 
cycle as a circular process with 6 stages, it can be interpreted as meaning 
that one stage cannot start until the preceding stage has finished, and at the 
point when the cycle moves on to a new stage, the preceding stage must, by 
definition, have ceased completely. This is not the case. Intelligence staff who 
undergo formal training in Intelligence, which necessarily includes the cycle, 
are not simply provided with a 6-stage, cyclical model and told to follow each 
stage in isolation, ending one stage completely before moving onto the next 
stage. The cycle is usually depicted in its current form for simplicity, 
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 See Chapter 1.4 
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particularly when students new to the field of Intelligence work are being 
instructed.99  
The detailed descriptions of the cycle, however, include a considerable 
amount of time devoted to the explanation of the feedback mechanisms upon 
which the model relies upon in real life. The instructor usually draws these by 
hand, to explain how the cycle can move back to any preceding stage, 
including all the way back to the start, as discussed in the above paragraph. 
The lines are added by hand to allow the core model to remain as simple as 
possible, and are erased afterwards to return the model to its natural, 6-stage 
state. Adding just one feedback loop to each stage results in the model 
looking much clumsier and less clear, as can be seen below: 
 
                                            
99
 This is an area which requires additional, specialist research in collaboration with the UK Intelligence community. 
The Author is currently discussing this possibility with various officials. 
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17 Intelligence cycle with single-stage feedback loops 
Once all of the possible permutations for feedback loops have been added in, 
the model becomes very messy indeed, as can be seen below on a diagram 
annotated by hand and used by the author in a training course for foreign 
students: 
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18 Intelligence cycle with hand-drawn, multiple-stage feedback 
loops 
The next issue raised by Hulnick is that “in the modern era, policy officials 
seem to want intelligence to support policy rather than to inform it”. Phythian 
states that “the Intelligence-policymaker interface has long been viewed as 
the most frequent location of Intelligence failure” (Phythian 2011, p.115).The 
professionals in the UK Intelligence community are acutely aware of the 
debate on whether the UK has Intelligence-led policy or policy-led 
Intelligence. An oft-raised criticism of the period immediately prior to the allied 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was that Intelligence was being moulded to fit a 
desired policy outcome, i.e. a legally acceptable (and possibly more 
importantly, a legally defensible) provision of a casus belli for a ground 
invasion of Iraq to be joined by UK troops.100 One of Butler’s (2004:155) 
conclusions on the use of Intelligence by policy-makers  stated that: 
                                            
100
 See the text of the U.S. State Department’s press release (2002) detailing the casus belli used by the U.S. 
President for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. For the detailed summery of the UK’s decision to go to war, see The Butler 
Report (2004:93–97). Butler (2004:96) considered that the UK’s decision was based partly on UNSCR 1441 (UNSC, 
2002), but also based on the advice from the Attorney General that UNSCR 687 (UNSC, 1991) provided sufficient 
casus belli, as it “……suspended, but did not terminate, the authority to use force under Resolution 678”.  
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“….if intelligence is to be used more widely by governments in 
public debate in future, those doing so must be careful to 
explain its uses and limitations. It will be essential, too, that 
clearer and more effective dividing lines between assessment 
and advocacy are established when doing so”. 
 
Yet one of the underpinning principles of secret Intelligence lies in the 
descriptor, viz. that the end product of the process is almost always classified. 
As discussed previously, the maxim of “need to know” was expanded to 
include “need to hold” and “need to share”.101 It is this “need to share” which 
will require intensive consideration by the appropriate elements of the 
government of the day including the Prime Minister, should they contemplate 
a similar, sanitised release of classified material for public consumption in the 
future, in order to explain a given situation to the general public. 
Gannon (2008:221-222) considers politicisation to be just one of two distinct 
types of what he calls the distortion of analysis and he defines politicisation as 
“the wilful distortion of analysis to satisfy the demands of Intelligence bosses 
or policymakers”. The other form is one he calls “analytical bias”, defining it as 
“a subtle but pervasive influence based on the unconscious exertion of 
pressure”. Ott (2003:69-94) concurs with Gannon, adding that: “the value of 
Intelligence to senior policymakers and to the nation rests to a critical degree 
on the confidence  that the process is not corrupt – that Intelligence collectors 
and analysts speak truth to power, however unpalatable that might be at any 
one time”. Writing from a more UK-centric viewpoint, Phythian believes that as 
far as the Intelligence and Security Committee is concerned, a more important 
question needs to be asked: “…to whom are the oversight committee 
accountable?..appointed by the executive, reporting to the executive and 
                                            
101
 See Chapter 5.6, Dissemination.  
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holding membership at the pleasure of the executive…” (Phythian, 
2006:conclusion).  
Treverton (2008:93) identifies five distinct form of politicisation of Intelligence, 
which are shown in the following table, together with his descriptors and the 
ways in which he believes these forms can potentially be mitigated: 
 
Type Description Ways to Mitigate 
Direct 
pressure 
from policy 
Policy officials intervene 
directly to affect analytic 
conclusion 
Rare but can be subtle - logic is 
to insulate Intelligence 
"House" view Analytic office has 
developed strong view 
over time, heresy 
discouraged 
Changed nature of target helps, 
along with need for wide variety 
of methods and alternative 
analyses. NIE-like process can 
also help across agencies 
"Cherry 
Picking" 
Policy officials see a 
range of assessments 
and pick their favourite. 
Better vetting of sources, NIE-
like process to confront views 
Question 
asking 
How the question is 
framed, but Intelligence 
or policy, affects the 
answer 
Logic is closer relations 
between Intelligence and policy 
to define question, along with 
contrarian question-asking by 
Intelligence 
Shared 
"mindset" 
Intelligence and policy 
share strong 
presumptions 
Very hard - requires new 
evidence or alternative 
arguments 
19 Treverton’s forms of politicisation 
 
The dividing line between groupthink and “shared mindset” can be a thin one 
at times. This is less common in the counter-terrorism field than it is in more 
strategic areas, such as the specific focus on one particular country or regime. 
This is possibly due to the faster-moving scenarios in counter-terrorism, and 
the fact that a large part of counter-terrorist Intelligence work dwells mainly in 
the tactical and operational areas, but it is difficult to accurately identify the 
reasons with any certainty. Treverton, discussing the Cold War analysis of 
Soviet capabilities, sees a distinction between this more strategic, long-term 
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work, and the international terrorism landscape of the current era. He notes 
that “the terrorist target, however, is utterly different. It is the ultimate 
“asymmetric threat”, shaping its threat to our vulnerabilities” (Treverton, 
2008:97).   
An enemy which conducts asymmetric warfare is a very difficult opponent to 
fight and this is precisely why asymmetric warfare is so popular with the 
groups which engage in it. It is almost as difficult to define as terrorism, with 
academic papers devoted entirely to the debate on how to define it. Buffaloe 
(2006:2) highlights some of the variations which may or may not be 
considered the same as asymmetric warfare, such as “low-intensity conflict, 
military operations other than war, asymmetric warfare, fourth-generation 
warfare, irregular warfare”. Former U.S. President John F. Kennedy 
encapsulated the spirit of asymmetric warfare in 1962, describing it as  
 
 
“another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—
war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by 
ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of 
aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the 
enemy instead of engaging him. . . . It preys on economic 
unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations 
where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of 
challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom 
is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different 
kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of 
military training”.102 
 
 
                                            
102
 President John F. Kennedy, Remarks to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, on 06 
June 1962, cited by Buffaloe (2006:1–2) in “Defining Asymmetric Warfare”. 
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Perhaps the most apt description of it comes from Taber (1965:27–28) who 
wrote: “The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers 
the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous and agile 
an enemy to come to grips with”. The current spectrum of the UK’s 
Intelligence collection for counter-terrorism purposes takes place in the 
environment of opponents who engage in asymmetric warfare. The 
importance of Intelligence-led operations is paramount in this fight. 
Politicisation of Intelligence in the UK is not something which any of the 
interviewees mentioned having observed or having been part of. In the 
author’s opinion it is a rarity, but that is not to say that it does not occur.  
Of Treverton’s five forms, “cherry picking” and direct pressure from policy are 
probably more likely than the other three forms, with regard to the political 
landscape of the UK. An inherent danger of “cherry picking” is that in the 
majority of cases, it would be invisible to, and thus remain undetectable by, 
the Intelligence community if it were done at the highest levels of 
policymaking in Whitehall. As for direct pressure, in the period preceding the 
decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 the declassification of material graded top 
secret, and the subsequent publication of it for the consumption of the general 
public in the UK was unprecedented. Direct pressure from policy certainly had 
a part to play in the solidifying of cross-party support for a ground invasion. 
Butler (2004:150–151) commented on this in his conclusions, stating: 
 
 
“When the Government concluded that action going beyond 
the previous policy of containment needed to be taken, there 
were many grounds for concern arising from Iraq’s past 
record and behaviour. There was a clear view that, to be 
successful, any new action to enforce Iraqi compliance with its 
disarmament obligations would need to be backed with the 
credible threat of force. But there was no recent intelligence 
that would itself have given rise to a conclusion that Iraq was 
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of more immediate concern than the activities of some other 
countries. Intelligence on Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical 
and ballistic missile programmes was used in support of the 
execution of this policy to inform planning for a military 
campaign; to inform domestic and international opinion, in 
support of the Government’s advocacy of its changing policy 
towards Iraq; and to obtain and provide information to United 
Nations inspectors”. 
 
From the narrative in what has become known as “The Secret Downing Street 
Memo”, it is clear that the Director of SIS recognised the politicisation of 
Intelligence which was occurring within the inner circle of the U.S. President’s 
closest advisers. The memo contains the following statement” “C reported on 
his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. 
Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, 
through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But 
the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” (Rycroft, 
2002:1). 
Butler also identified the customers of Intelligence as being part of the 
problem, noting how important it is for the end users of Intelligence product to 
be aware of the material they receive, the provenance of it and in particular, 
the pros and cons of such material. He wrote (Butler, 2004:14-15): 
 
“JIC judgements have to cover both secrets and mysteries. 
Judgement must still be informed by the best available 
information, which often means a contribution from intelligence. 
But it cannot import certainty. These limitations are best offset 
by ensuring that the ultimate users of intelligence, the decision-
makers at all levels, properly understand its strengths and 
limitations and have the opportunity to acquire experience in 
handling it. It is not easy to do this while preserving the security 
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of sensitive sources and methods. But unless intelligence is 
properly handled at this final stage, all preceding effort and 
expenditure is wasted”. 
 
Thus the actual risk of politicisation is omnipresent, although academics seem 
to disagree on the severity of it compared to other issues. Betts (2004:7), for 
example, takes a slightly divergent stance, noting that “the typical problem at 
the highest levels of government is less often the misuse of Intelligence than 
the non-use”. Interestingly, Phythian (2009:353) seems to accept the 
inevitability of some degree of politicisation in the oversight of UK Intelligence, 
commenting that “Oversight of Intelligence, whoever carries it out, is 
inescapably political and those conducting it must remember that they are 
engaged in contests of power in which the stakes are high”. 
Returning to Hulnick’s criticisms about the Intelligence cycle, he next cites the 
absence of covert action and counter-Intelligence as a flaw in the cycle. It 
should be noted that the model was designed for the Intelligence process, and 
was not designed to encompass specific, operational aspects. The cyclical 
model, as far as can be determined, had its inception in the military world 
which to this day maintains a clear distinction between two disciplines: that of 
Intelligence, designated as J2, and that of Operations, designated as J3.103 
Within the contemporary concept of Intelligence-led operations, it is the 
Intelligence itself which usually dictates which operations can and cannot take 
place, thus the Intelligence is the key driver for the operation. Previously, this 
concept was inverted and operations were conceived, then planned. 
Intelligence was requested as required, to support the operational planning 
and execution. The aspect of covert action is the implementation or execution 
of policy and should not be included in the Intelligence cycle.  
                                            
103
 When considered as a joint or all-arms function, the designator letter is “J”; otherwise the designator letter reflects 
the single-service designation, i.e. N2 for Navy, G2 for Army, A2 for Air Force. 
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Much hard work has been done in the past three decades to dismantle the 
physical and psychological barriers between the disciplines of operations and 
Intelligence.104 On the battlefield the two are unequivocally intertwined, to the 
extent that they are usually co-located, from as low down as a Company-level 
HQ to as high up as a Corps HQ. In permanent locations such as Permanent 
Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) both J2 and J3 staffs work in joint teams, often 
with the addition of J5 staff who focus on contingency planning. In a purely 
military context it is possible for the military Intelligence machinery to own the 
entire Intelligence cycle, with no input from external sources. As the military 
also own the operational actors, such as the “teeth Arms” (usually classed as 
the infantry, artillery, armour and engineers), joint working is essential for 
battlefield success. In the less-clearly defined sphere of counter-terrorism, the 
same co-operation exists between the Intelligence arm and the assets tasked 
with operational response, the difference being that the operational actors are 
not owned by the Intelligence chain. The UK Police ensure that a so-called 
“sterile corridor” is maintained, between the Intelligence 
collection/analysis/production elements and any “evidential functions”, to 
ensure that officers working on the investigation are not exposed to raw 
Intelligence which is not evidence.(Harfield 2013, p.365) It also excludes, as 
far as possible, an officer inadvertently disclosing sensitive Intelligence, for 
example, during a Police interview with a suspect. The sterile corridor enables 
the Intelligence to drive the investigation or the operation, and this is aided by 
the Intelligence cycle. Instead of a system wherein the investigation or 
operation is launched, and Intelligence is requested to support it (which was 
more usual in the 1970s and 1980s), the cycle now aids the symbiosis 
between the Intelligence and the operation, resulting in a continuous 
refinement of the available information and of the processed product. 
                                            
104
 In the 1980s, the divide between Intelligence (J2) and Operations (J3) was very often physical. When the author 
worked in a military Intelligence role overseas, the analysis function was in a different part of the building to the 
operational planning function. The physical divide encouraged the separation of the two elements. By the early 
1990s, the experiences of the Gulf War in Iraq had contributed much to the realisation that Operations and 
Intelligence needed to occupy the same office space. By the time that the second Gulf War started, there was a firm 
belief that J2 and J3 needed to be enmeshed, so that intelligence could actually steer operations in real time. 
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For domestic counter-terrorism work in the UK, this function is usually carried 
out by Counter-Terrorism Command (SO 15) officers, who may be supported 
by other assets such as Specialist Crime and Operations Specialist Firearms 
Command (SC&O 19).105 For counter-terrorism operations overseas, the 
operational responsibility for this has traditionally fallen to the UK’s Special 
Forces (Urban, 2010). The cycle exists to produce Intelligence which should 
ideally be “actionable”, informing a policy- or decision-maker to enhance their 
ability to select a course of action as a result of the Intelligence received. Not 
all Intelligence is actionable, and much of it fleshes out the bigger picture 
without adding anything significant, Actionable Intelligence remains the “gold 
standard” sought by Intelligence professionals. Hulnick’s desire to see covert 
action and counter-Intelligence added to the cycle would result in a much 
larger, more hybrid model as it would, by necessity, become an “Intelligence-
Operations Cycle”.  
Returning to a previous comment, a fundamental principle of Intelligence is to 
“speak truth unto power”.106 The provision of accurate and timely Intelligence 
to policy-makers is a desired output of the cycle. A range of options will be 
available to the policy-makers and these options will change with every case. 
These options can be considered as a tactical menu (Burke, 2014). As an 
example, an individual may be under surveillance as he is suspected of being 
involved with a terrorist group operating within the UK. As the collection phase 
contributes more data regarding his pattern of life, analysis reveals that he is 
the main “Quartermaster” for the group. He is responsible for the provision of 
material support (which could include money, vehicles, safe houses, mobile 
phones, computers and even weapons and explosives). Once the individual is 
confirmed as the Quartermaster, the options on the tactical menu may be as 
follows: 
1. Cease surveillance on the target 
                                            
105
 Counter-Terrorism Command was formed in 2006 from an amalgamation of the Special Branch and the Anti-
Terrorism Branch (ATB).  
106
 See Chapter 5.5 
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2. Continue surveillance (directed / intrusive) 
3. Conduct covert penetration of the target group 
4. Overtly warn the target 
5. Disrupt the group 
6. Arrest and interview 
7. Prosecution and conviction 
8. Hard arrest (if suspected that the individual or group will use 
weapons or explosives to resist arrest) 
There are several potential courses of action and the planning required to 
carry out an operational response can require sizeable teams from multiple 
agencies and departments. It is difficult to see how the Intelligence cycle 
could be modified to include the potential operational actions (such as covert 
action or counter-Intelligence,) which may follow from the dissemination of 
actionable Intelligence to policy-makers. The workflow for such a model would 
need to include not only the potential feedback loops inherent (but traditionally 
not shown) within the model, but would also need to include the expanded 
processes, from dissemination through to eventual operational action. Would 
such a model also need to include additional process loops for the possibility 
of an operational action being unsuccessful and needing either an additional 
iteration, or a return to the Intelligence-producing aspects of the model? If so, 
it would rapidly become very large and unwieldy.  
The following diagram shows a different approach taken to the Intelligence 
cycle, this time using a “systems approach” (Johnston, 2005). The model has 
four representation described as stocks, flows, converters, and connectors 
and these purport to show the various relationships (e.g. systemic, process 
flow) between the four components. The difficulties in explaining this model’s 
processes to new recruits into an Intelligence function would be considerable. 
It would be unrealistic to expect a student to learn a diagram such as this one, 
and to subsequently apply it in operational Intelligence work. This diagram 
constitutes more of a workflow than an actual model. 
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20 A systems approach to the Intelligence cycle 
At this point we have moved from the original Intelligence cycle of 1948, 
containing just four components, to a systems model produced in 2007, 
containing more than 30 components and a large number of interactive 
processes and dependencies. The previous paragraph mentioned the 
complexities involved in trying to include the various operational options of the 
tactical menu within an intelligence cycle model and it would be useful here to 
state a consideration which is often ignored by critics of the Intelligence cycle. 
The cycle was designed as a model, largely for the purposes of instruction; it 
was not designed as an all-encompassing workflow, against which could be 
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mapped all the inherent processes, sub-stages, feedback mechanisms and 
potential outcomes. A common criticism of the Intelligence cycle is that it does 
not fully represent the interactions which take place within the process. In 
order to map all the interactions which take place, any model would be much 
larger in scope and complexity than the system-focused model shown 
previously.  
Management experts at Gartner, one of the world’s largest research and 
advisory companies, define a workflow as “….a form of flow management 
technology that coordinates interactions between people and software 
systems”, and further clarify that a workflow “coordinates the flow, the 
interaction patterns across manual and systemetized (sic) tasks” (Hill, 
2010:1). Some models of the Intelligence cycle clearly display these 
characteristics, such as the systems model above. Clark is a former U.S. Air 
Force Intelligence officer and is now a Professor of intelligence studies (Sage 
Publications, 2014). His work is particularly relevant as he writes extensively 
on models, their classification and their application within the Intelligence 
world. Clark (2012:37) defines a model as: “a replica, or representation, of an 
idea, an object, or an actual system. It often describes how a system 
behaves”. He considers that conceptual/descriptive models are the most 
useful model types within the Intelligence sphere and he posits that instead of 
a cyclical model, or a linear model, the most appropriate type of model for the 
contemporary Intelligence community would be what he describes as a 
“network process” (Clark, 2012:37). Where Clark’s approach has merit is the 
focus on the target, as opposed to the process. His work builds on that of 
Cebrowski and Garstka (1988:28-35) which examined the concept of a 
“network-centric collaboration process” used by commercial entities such as 
General Electric and Wal-Mart, and the pair then applied it to the military 
sphere. Clark (2012:35) provides a useful, diagrammatical representation of a 
hierarchy of models, reproduced below. 
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21 Clark's Hierarchy of Models 
Clark (2013:8) also provides a model of his own version of the Intelligence 
cycle, which he calls “the target-centred view of the Intelligence process”, and 
considers this new approach necessary in order that this process can take 
fully exploit the current information systems, and can ably tackle complex 
challenges. His model is shown below (Clark, 2012:8):   
 
 
22 Clark’s target-centred view of the Intelligence Process 
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In Clark’s process, the customers identify what they want to know and 
communicate this to the analysts, who then produce requirements from this 
stated need. Working together with collectors, the analysts build up a picture 
of the target which at some point is provided to the customer. Apart from the 
fact that there is no evaluation in this model, it does not refine the process 
further, by bringing anything new or more efficient to that described in detail in 
Chapter 5. The customer provides direction on what Intelligence is required; 
analysts and collectors collaborate on the collection and collation work; as 
material is collected, it undergoes analysis (having almost certainly have been 
evaluated in addition); when necessary, an Intelligence product is provided to 
the customer(s), who may ask additional questions requiring the process to 
continue. Or they may ask for deeper clarification or refinement, requiring the 
process to be entered at a later stage, such as analysis, and thus requiring 
another iteration from that point forwards.  
In describing the actual functioning of the target-centric process, however, 
Clark does bring added value with his consideration that the work inside the 
process is more of a networked, or meshed, model. By placing the target at 
the centre of the model, he emphasises that the target (and the need to build 
up a picture of it) is central to the process, and that the process exists to carry 
out this function. It is a useful reminder that the aim of the cycle is to produce 
actionable Intelligence. Yet the model does not suffice as a standalone 
description of the process, as far as the UK’s machinery and concepts are 
concerned. Taking a contemporary example, concern is growing within the 
Security Service about the number of British citizens or residents travelling, or 
planning to travel, to Syria in order to actively support groups such as Islamic 
State, or Al Nusra Front. In 2014, the Metropolitan Police estimated the 
number of British citizens fighting for the Islamist groups in Syria to be in the 
mid-hundreds, which they saw as a substantial increase from the previous 
year (Whitehead, 2014; BBC, 2014b). At a strategic level, this issue may be 
passed to the JIC with an instruction to produce a JIC paper for the Prime 
Minister and others. Or it may already come under an existing JIC priority, 
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such as “prevent harm to the UK and prevent harm to other nations from 
individuals travelling from the UK”. The need to collect against this target 
cannot simply be passed directly to analysts, as this would omit the collection 
management function which exists to ensure that: there is no duplication of 
collection; that priorities are set correctly and realistically against the JIC 
requirements; that sufficient assets are allocated to the collection work; and 
that the question has not already been answered previously, or is already 
undergoing collection. The target-centred process of Clark’s is therefore more 
a depiction of the inner functioning of the cycle once it is underway.  
Treverton (2001:49) took the complexity formed from combining the 
Intelligence cycle with the feedback process, and attempted to clarify it, 
depicting it thus:107 
 
 
23 Treverton's "Real Intelligence Cycle" 
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 Cited by Johnston (2005:49) 
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He combines processing and analyses, which is a sensible amalgamation, 
and the cycle moves thence to policy, receiving and reacting with the received 
output. Once policy has received the product, which we assume to be a 
finished, disseminated product, an examination of Intelligence needs is 
conducted. This then feeds the tasking and collection component. In this 
model, once Intelligence is processed and analysed it is disseminated to the 
customer, in this case to policy makers. As with other models, however, there 
is no explicit evaluation function in this model, which leaves a functional gap 
in the overall process. The use of the term “raw Intelligence” is more opaque 
than enlightening, as this would usually be classed as “information”, as it has 
not been subjected at this stage to an analytical process.108 
Keagan (2004:3–5) does not describe an Intelligence cycle per se, but lists 
“five fundamental stages” of Intelligence, which he considers to be essential, if 
Intelligence is to be of use. The first stage is acquisition, noting that 
Intelligence has to be found. Next we have delivery, and Keegan notes that 
the Intelligence must be sent to what he describes as the “potential user”. The 
third stage is one unseen in other models – acceptance, i.e. the Intelligence 
must be believed. Fourth is interpretation, which involves the assembly of the 
various pieces of Intelligence and information into as whole a picture as 
possible. The final stage is implementation, which Keagan interprets 
differently than what one might expect from the use of the term. He sees 
implementation as the task of Intelligence officers being content with the 
accuracy of their raw material, in order to convince their superiors that the 
finished Intelligence product is also accurate.  
Keagan’s stages are interesting for their very different take on the process of 
Intelligence. His first stage of acquisition equates to collection, but misses out 
any direction or tasking. He considers that Intelligence has to be found, but in 
most cases the Intelligence only comes towards the end of the process.  At 
that stage, much of what is collected or acquired is only raw information. The 
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 See Chapter 3 for a fuller explanation. 
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third stage moves straight to the credibility of the Intelligence, considering that 
it has to be believed. There is no mention of any evaluation or validation 
aspect, only whether the material is believable or not. This is not the same as 
evaluation and chapter 5.5 of this paper explained why this stage is so crucial 
in the process. His fourth stage of interpretation corresponds to analysis 
(which could possibly be said to implicitly include processing). This puts the 
pieces of the jigsaw together to form a clearer picture. His final stage is 
difficult to map against other models, but it emphasises the importance of the 
product’s recipients being convinced of its reliability. Keagan’s five stages are 
an interesting aspect of study and they provide some good points for thought, 
but they are unsuitable for practical use as a model or a process. 
6.1.1 Challenges and vulnerabilities in Intelligence 
Considerable academic research has been conducted into the problems 
encountered in the Intelligence process, with the foremost research in this 
field coming from the likes of Sheptycki (2004), Heuer (Heuer & Pherson, 
2011), Krizan (1999), Trent (Trent et al., 2007) and Hutchins (Hutchins, S. G., 
Pirolli, P., and Card, 2007).109 The majority of this research has focused on 
the analysis of Intelligence, as this is one of the more subjective functions in 
the process. The subject of Intelligence analysis is vast and many specialist 
works are devoted just to this one part of the process. As mentioned 
previously, the basic Intelligence analysis course for the British Army’s 
Intelligence Corps lasts 14 weeks, but the subject of analysis is truly 
immense, with a very substantial written corpus of both practical and 
academic theory (Martenson & Horndahl, 2005; Bar-Joseph, 2011; Gannon, 
2008; Betts, 1978; Marrin, 2007; Marrin, n.d.; Richards, 2010). The following 
table (Zelik et al., 2007) provides just a sample of some of the perceived 
vulnerabilities and challenges in the field of Intelligence analysis, identified by 
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 Also see Stanier (2012) for more contemporary research on Sheptycki’s pathologies. 
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Krizan (1999), Heuer (1999), Trent (Trent et al., 2007), Hutchins (Hutchins et 
al., 2007) and Johnson (2005):  
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Intelligence Analysis Challenges and Vulnerabilities 
Krizan Heuer Trent, et al. Hutchins, et 
al. 
Johnson 
Prematurely 
Formed Views 
The Vividness 
Criterion 
Inappropriate 
Mental Set 
High Cognitive 
Workload 
Secrecy 
versus 
Efficacy  
Trade-off 
Wilful Disregard of 
New Evidence 
Absence of 
Evidence 
Environmental 
Pressure 
Potential for 
Error 
Focus on 
Current 
Production 
Lack of Empathy Base-Rate 
Fallacy 
Fixation Time Pressure Time 
Constraints  
Ethnocentrism & 
Mirror- Imaging 
Oversensitivity 
to Consistency 
Recognition of 
Relevant Data 
Coping with 
Uncertainty 
Confirmation  
Bias, Norms, 
and Taboos 
Ignorance Anchoring Trust Data Overload Analytic 
Identity  
Rational-Actor 
Hypothesis or 
Denial of 
Rationality 
Assessing 
Probability of a 
Scenario 
Experience 
viewed as 
Expertise 
Synthesizing 
Multiple 
Sources of  
Information 
Production-
based 
Rewards and 
Incentives 
Proportionality 
Bias 
Availability 
Rule 
Learning Insufficient 
Tools 
Analytic 
Training  
Defensive 
Avoidance & 
Wishful Thinking 
Similarity of 
Cause and 
Effect 
Tool 
Understanding 
Organizational 
Context 
Perception of 
“Tradecraft” 
Versus  
Scientific 
Methodology 
Conservatism in 
Probability 
Estimation 
Internal vs. 
External 
Causes of 
Behaviour 
Sustained 
Attention 
Complex 
Human 
Judgments 
  
Presumption that 
Support for One 
Hypothesis 
Disconfirms Others 
Persistence of 
Impressions 
Based on 
Discredited 
Evidence 
      
Best-Case 
Analysis or Worst-
Case Analysis 
Overestimating 
Our Own 
Importance 
      
Image and Self-
Image 
Illusory 
Correlation 
      
 
Overconfidence in 
Subjective 
Estimates 
 
Expression of 
Uncertainty 
      
Inappropriate 
Analogies & 
Superficial 
Bias Favouring 
Perception of 
Centralized 
Direction 
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Lessons from 
History 
Evoked-Set 
Reasoning 
Coping with 
Evidence 
      
Excessive Secrecy of Uncertain 
Accuracy 
      
Presumption of 
Unitary Action by 
Organizations 
& Organizational 
Parochialism 
Bias in Favour 
of Causal 
Explanations 
      
Table 6 Intelligence Analysis Challenges and Vulnerabilities 
 
At first glance, it may seem that the Intelligence process is beset by 
pathologies. Yet the problems which are often cited as examples of 
weaknesses within the Intelligence cycle are not strictly problems of the 
model’s architecture per se. The majority could be more accurately classed as 
human failings, with a smaller number classed as system failings or cultural 
failings. Although these factors can certainly have a direct impact upon the 
processes and outputs of the model, there is a strong argument which posits 
that such factors should not be considered as de facto weaknesses of the 
model. Other factors, also suggested as weaknesses of the model, could be 
labelled as cultural factors, such as time constraints, which may be decreed 
by senior managers, or which may be self-imposed by the analyst. Still other 
factors could be labelled as systemic factors. One such example is data 
overload, which can occur as a result of inefficient filtering of raw data when 
querying against a database, thus returning too many results to allow the 
analyst to find a start point for his work. It can also result from a temporary 
inundation of crucial information, which frequently happens in the immediate 
aftermath of a major incident. An example of this was the sheer volume of 
calls to emergency services in the period immediately following the first 
explosions on 07 July in the London terrorist attacks.110 
                                            
110
 Another example occurred while the Author was working in an Intelligence role covering the Middle East and 
Africa region. During the Allied bombing campaign designated OPERATION DESERT FOX against Iraqi targets in 
December 1998, many analysts and managers were swamped with tactical and strategic reporting in the first few 
hours of the CRUISE missile strikes, resulting in a delay in the ability to provide an overall situational report to 
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Reconstructing this list to show the challenges and vulnerabilities listed 
taxonomically as human/systems/cultural factors shows a different picture, as 
seen below, though it should be noted that some factors, e.g. analytic training, 
can arguably lie in more than one taxonomical class: 
 
                                            
customers. A number of factors caused this data tsunami, including insufficient filtering of reporting, reports being 
repeated by various elements which resulted in needless duplication, as well as frequent interruptions from 
customers and internal staff wanting real-time updates.  
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Table 7 Intelligence challenges and vulnerabilities listed by 
taxonomy 
 
Some issues such as groupthink and mind-set have been discussed 
previously, and it would be incorrect to consider many of these challenges 
and vulnerabilities as constituting weaknesses in the model itself. The model 
describes the top-level processes which should happen in order to facilitate 
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the Intelligence process taking place. If individuals involved in various stages 
of the process are unwittingly engaged in groupthink, or have a particularly 
trenchant mind-set supporting one belief system or another, the fault does not 
lie within the model itself. The fault then lies with how the model is being used, 
either by people (human factors), the organisational culture (cultural factors) 
or by the systems within it (system processes). In the same way, a model 
depicting how to construct an item of flat-pack furniture could not be held to 
be flawed if an individual decided to use a hammer instead of the 
recommended screwdriver to assemble the item. 
One of the vulnerabilities, bias, is of particular note as it can take various 
forms. Cognitive bias is a frequently mentioned problem amongst analysts. 
Davis (2008:160) summarises cognitive biases as “…essentially unmotivated 
(i.e. psychologically based) distortions in information processing),  which he 
differentiates from what he calls “Motivational biases”, describing these as 
“distortions in information processing driven by worldview, ideology or political 
preferences”. The most influential work in this area is without doubt that done 
by Heuer (1999) who wrote a seminal work for the CIA in 1999 entitled “The 
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis”. Heuer studied the impact of bias upon 
the various processes involved in Intelligence analysis and produced a book 
which was originally classified SECRET and was authorised solely for internal 
distribution within the CIA. It has since been sanitised and released as a 
declassified book, allowing for even wider distribution. It remains the foremost 
work on this topic within the UK Intelligence community.111 Heuer (1999:111) 
defines cognitive bias in the following way: 
 
“Cognitive biases are mental errors caused by our simplified 
information processing strategies. It is important to distinguish 
                                            
111
 During several years of working in a UK agency, with frequent interaction with colleagues from the U.S.A, no other 
work on bias and the psychological processes involved in Intelligence analysis had the impact which this book has 
had. Analysts from the U.S. agencies appear to be considerably more familiar with Heuer’s concepts, such as 
cognitive bias, and the analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH), than their counterparts in the UK. 
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cognitive biases from other forms of bias, such as cultural 
bias, organizational bias, or bias that results from one’s own 
self-interest. In other words, a cognitive bias does not result 
from any emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a 
certain judgment, but rather from subconscious mental 
procedures for processing information. A cognitive bias is a 
mental error that is consistent and predictable”.112 
 
It is unavoidable that bias, both cognitive and personal, has a direct influence 
on the tasking process and this is closely linked to the problem of 
“groupthink”.113 The individual and group perceptions play an important part in 
the whole process. An analyst’s own individual perceptions are intrinsic to 
how s/he carries out the analytical process, and being provided with relevant 
training goes a long way to ensuring that the analysis is as rigorous as 
possible. Teamwork is not something which is often covered in analytical 
training, but it is of great importance in helping to negate the effects of 
individual bias. The opinions of other analysts can encourage groupthink, but 
they can also help to force new thinking about an issue or to propose new 
hypotheses for the Intelligence already held.  
A senior GCHQ official (Source_12, 2011) lamented that “there is never 
enough time to analyse everything that we’d like to, or ought to” which he 
believed led to “not enough long-term Intelligence” being produced. This 
particular problem seemed to resonate more with the SIGINT community than 
with the HUMINT community, possibly due to the sheer volume of raw data 
now being processed in the SIGINT world. The GCHQ official also considered 
that evaluation should be done by more experienced and properly trained 
staff, to ensure the quality control of the whole process (Source_12, 2011). 
                                            
112
 In his extensive book, Heuer gives credit to Tversky and Kahneman (1974:1124-1131) specifically recommending 
their work “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”. 
113
 See chapter 5.5 
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This was echoed by a military Intelligence expert (Source_10 2011), who 
stated that “evaluation should really be a specialisation in its own right. When 
you think of the importance it has, we should be selecting and training our 
best people to provide the evaluation, in the reporting phase, and definitely in 
the QC (Quality Control) phase before release”. 
6.1.2 Pathologies of Intelligence Sharing 
Sheptycki (2004) published a detailed study of the problems “manifest in 
Police Intelligence systems”, and this study has become a core work on the 
problems encountered in the field of Intelligence sharing. His work took the 
results of a 2003 UK study and compared these findings to the issues noted 
among the Police forces of the Netherlands, Canada and Sweden. He found 
that the majority of problems in Intelligence sharing were also encountered in 
the overseas Police forces, not just in the UK (Sheptycki, 2004:307-332). He 
identified eleven distinct pathologies which a decade later, remain just as 
current as when the paper was published. The following brief summary of 
these pathologies will illustrate how they still have a negative impact in the 
field of Intelligence. 
The “digital divide” manifests itself in two ways. The first is in the number of 
disparate databases which may contain similar or even identical data, 
resulting in difficulties experienced when database searches are necessary. 
Sheptycki illustrates this with an anecdote from one UK Police force which 
had two separate databases for firearms, weapons and ammunition data, 
which resided on different, standalone machines. Another database of 
firearms incidents was housed in a Force-wide system which was not linked to 
the two firearms databases. The second type of divide manifests itself through 
the medium of communication. Sheptycki’s example describes an actual case 
wherein two young boys were reported missing, and a 12-hour search 
ensued, involving assets such as police dogs and a helicopter. It was 
eventually discovered that the boys had been found one hour after they were 
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reported missing, and had actually been at a neighbouring Police station for 
the duration of the search. Counter-terrorism work in the UK relies on 
databases held by SIS, Security Service, GCHQ, NCA and Special Branch, to 
name but a few. Each of these agencies has a multitude of databases, with 
varying degrees of ease of access by partner agencies. The creation of JTAC 
in 2003 was a major step in combating the “digital divide” in UK counter-
terrorism, by bringing together in one location a number of officers from each 
of the main agencies, together with access to their own databases and tools, 
with the aim of the collective power being greater than the sum of its 
composite parts.114 A GCHQ official did not consider the digital divide to be an 
issue of significance within that agency (Source_11, 2011). 
Linkage blindness results from a paucity of data, rather than analysts having 
to contend with multiple databases. It differs from the digital divide in that the 
failure is a systems one, not a technical one. The sharing of Intelligence 
between agencies is never a simple process, requiring formal agreements as 
well as informal support. Sheptycki (2004:315) makes a prescient point about 
the passage of information within an organisation, saying that “horizontal flow 
in information hierarchies is often poor because most effort is directed at 
ensuring vertical flow”. The degree to which the UK’s Intelligence agencies 
now co-operate is unprecedented, and nowhere is this clearer than in the area 
of counter-terrorism. Specialists from all the agencies are seconded to other 
agencies, to learn their processes and to understand the organisational 
culture of the hosting agency in which they are embedded. A military 
Intelligence specialist held the opinion that this issue is of considerably more 
importance in deployed theatres of operations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
                                            
114
 The author visited JTAC on various occasions and was a recipient of JTAC product on a regular basis. Its 
establishment was one of the most significant steps forward for UK counter-terrorism work in the last twenty years. 
As Intelligence officers from the various agencies were all equipped with desktop computers connected to their own 
Agencies’ databases, the speed of all-source access was vastly increased compared with previously. In addition, 
they were embedded in geographical or themed teams, with the result that a report released by an agency could be 
reviewed, discussed and formally assessed from a truly all-source perspective, with discussion being enhanced by 
the immediate access to all of the various agencies’ repositories. As the remit of JTAC was clearly aimed at 
assessing and analysing existing reporting, it was able to quickly establish itself in the Intelligence community as a 
real “value-add” partner. The impact of JTAC’s work on the Intelligence cycle itself is difficult to assess from an 
outsider’s perspective, but in the stages of evaluation and analysis, the author considers this area to have been 
markedly improved by the input and reporting commentary of JTAC staff. 
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He observed that, in the military Intelligence community, “we can feel like the 
poor relation a lot of times, especially when we’re in the sand” (Source_10, 
2011). 
Although he does not define noise, Sheptycki points to the concept which he 
has borrowed from the idea of “signal to noise” ratio, or threshold, familiar to 
SIGINT analysts. The concept can best be described using the analogy of the 
chaff being sorted from the wheat. As in the analogy, the real Intelligence can 
be missed due to the quantity or volume of the noise. The noise can render 
analysts unable to correctly discern the importance of a piece or pieces of 
important information which could be transformed into useful Intelligence. 
Sheptycki (2004:316) also highlights the problem with the quantity of raw 
data, stating that “the larger the volume of bytes gathered for interpretation, 
the greater the capacity to produce noise”. 
 
Intelligence overload refers more to a problem of analytical capacity than 
anything else and this can be especially acute during periods such as a build-
up in tension (e.g. the period before the decision was announced to deploy 
UK troops to support the allied invasion of Iraq in 2003), or once a terrorist 
incident is underway (e.g. the immediate aftermath of the 07 July bombings in 
central London). If the overload is extreme, it can result in analytical paralysis 
and/or decision paralysis.115 Several comments from interviewees confirmed 
this problem, especially when in the middle of an ongoing operation or 
incident, or while deployed in overseas theatres. An SIS officer (Source_06, 
2011) remembered “this feeling that you just can’t write your report fast 
enough, because as you do, more and more info is hitting you”. A GCHQ 
official (Source_11, 2011) concurred, saying “You have your team, and 
they’re all working flat out to produce…..and the other departments are adding 
to the picture, which all takes more analysis, and more evaluation……and you 
might need to discuss it all with colleagues in another agency, but just when 
                                            
115
 An example of such an overload was at the start of the allied invasion of Iraq during the first Gulf War of 1991, 
sheer volume of reporting coming into analytical centres paralysed some of them and they were rendered temporarily 
non-functional. 
   
267 
 
you’re about to, your boss asks you for a SITREP [situation report] and you 
just know you’re at max capacity”. 
The highly dynamic environment described by the SIS and GCHQ officers 
above mirrors the situation described in Chapter 6.1.1 concerning the sudden 
and overwhelming overload of sensor data and spot reporting which occurred 
in the first couple of hours of Operation Desert Fox. The Intelligence cycle is a 
resilient tool but the Intelligence staff who employ it have a finite limit of 
capacity, both mental and physical, a fact often overlooked in crisis planning 
and in real-time crisis management. These physical and mental limitations 
have had an additional factor overlaid across them in recent years, especially 
the past decade – the massive quantities of data now available, which result 
in analytical searches returning much greater volumes of semi-processed 
information than previously. Professional tools such as i2 Analyst Notebook 
have brought an increasingly accurate search capability to the assistance of 
Intelligence analysts but when collection sources such as telephone billing 
data are involved, the results can still take days or weeks to refine, before 
something is produced which can be worked on effectively. Modern collection 
methods can be a victim of their own success, as a bottleneck is easily 
created in the collection stage, which then cripples the analysis or evaluation 
stages.  
Two or three decades ago, one of the biggest problems facing the Intelligence 
agencies was a paucity of information. This problem has become inverted in 
the last decade, to the point where the agencies now have more data than 
they can easily process. New techniques have had to be employed and new 
tools developed to conduct faster, more accurate, more semantically-capable 
searches of vast data repositories, to try to draw linkages and relationships 
from an increasingly larger pool of raw information. Information produced by 
IBM in 2012 showed that in one average minute, users of the video-sharing 
platform YouTube uploaded around 50 hours of video content; 200 million 
email messages were transmitted; the Google search engine received 2 
million queries for information and Facebook users uploaded around 600,000 
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distinct pieces of content.116 The processing and storage capabilities of the 
Intelligence agencies have had to expand to keep pace with this increase, but 
the work of the analyst has become more difficult  as a result of this data 
explosion. 
Non-reporting and non-recording of information deprives the wider system of 
being able to include the missing data in any search results, and can result in 
an Intelligence failure, where the key information was actually known, but was 
either not reported or it was not satisfactorily recorded. Sheptycki (2004:318) 
provides a clear example of this in the firearms area, stating that “there may 
be separate data-banks relating to the ammunition, the weapon and/or the 
incident that generated the report. Further, each separate report could 
necessitate double (or even treble) keying the same information”.  
Intelligence gaps can occur for many reasons, and they are an occupational 
hazard for professional Intelligence staff.117 Sheptycki’s example concentrates 
on criminal who are assessed to lie somewhere between level 2 and level 3 
targets, according to the National Intelligence Model, although this primarily 
relates to criminal targets.118 Analysts often experience gaps in collecting and 
analysing Intelligence pertaining to terrorist targets. Due to the interest in 
terrorist trials in the UK, mainstream media reporting has gradually increased 
the level of technical detail which is reported on such cases. Revelations of 
the presence of listening devices in the cars and houses of terrorist (and 
major criminal) suspects (Court of Appeal, 2013; Cobain, 2006; BBC, 2007d) 
have contributed to a growing awareness by the terrorist-criminal-narcotics 
community, regarding the technical capabilities of the law enforcement and 
Intelligence agencies.  
                                            
116
 From IBM internal documentation dated 2013, on information dated 2012. 
117
 See chapter 3.1.1 
118
 For a fuller examination of recommendations for closing Intelligence, information and capacity gaps in UK policing, 
see “Closing the Gap - A Review of 'Fitness for Purpose' of the Current Structure of Policing in England & Wales” 
(HMIC, 2005). Level 2 targets are those whose activities cross Force boundaries, such as narcotics supplies moving 
from Liverpool to Manchester. Level 3 targets are those who activities are national, or international, such as the 
narcotics “kingpins” who bring in shipments from the Balkans through the Netherlands, into the UK, in large 
quantities. 
   
269 
 
An Intelligence gap can occur, for example, because the agencies have no 
access to a source of information which could provide Intelligence on a certain 
target. Hypothetical examples might include the targeting of elements of the 
North Korean political and military leadership, or the inner workings of 
Albanian organised crime groups in London. Both groups may be considered 
as “difficult to target” and/or “difficult to penetrate” for various reasons. 
Identifying Intelligence gaps is an integral part of the PIR process.119 
The issue of duplication is multifaceted. Sheptycki only discusses the 
duplication of targeting, wherein two or more agencies may be looking at the 
same target, yet each of the agencies may be unaware of the other’s 
involvement in the same case. At the extreme end of the scale, this could 
result in what the Police and military term a “blue on blue” incident, in which 
officers open fire on other officers, mistaking them for criminals or terrorists. 
Sheptycki cites Marx (1988) and Fijnaut and Marx (1995) for deeper 
examinations of these issues.  
This problem has been somewhat mitigated by allocations of primacy to one 
agency or another in certain areas. For example, Sheptycki (2004:319) cites 
Customs officials having the lead in investigations into overseas importations 
of narcotics into the UK. Another fact of duplication is that of the same data 
being entered more than once in the same data repository, usually with 
differing details. Sometimes detailed are entered into multiple repositories, 
again with differing details. The implications of this can be severe. One UK 
Intelligence repository had 28 different spellings of the name “Mohammed”, 
resulting in many individuals being missed out of search records, if a user 
were simply to enter a casual search against the name “Muhamed” 
(Source_10, 2011). 
The problem of institutional friction between SIS and the Security Service is 
well-known historically, and it has been extensively written about, particularly 
                                            
119
 See chapter 5. 
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during the height of the Cold War.120 The levels of rivalry which existed in the 
1960s have greatly diminished and the threat of international terrorism now 
receives an impressive level of multi-agency co-operation in the UK. Friction 
can occur not just between agencies but at all levels, from inter-departmental 
through to simple animosity between two individuals. Institutional friction 
presents a bigger headache as it is often the by-product of an organisational 
culture which unofficially encourages it. 
The build-up to the first Gulf War in 1991 saw a rapid push to break down the 
traditional Intelligence-hoarding culture which had been prevalent for the 
previous decades, especially in the UK and U.S. military Intelligence 
communities. Along with this organisational push came a sustained effort to 
reduce the debilitating effect of information silos. It was made clear that this 
desire for an end to information hoarding was coming from the very top of the 
U.S. military command chain and was supported by the most senior levels of 
the UK military and civilian Intelligence functions. A frequent culprit for the 
existence of hoarding is the age-old maxim that knowledge is power. The 
possession of more knowledge on a very topical issue can be perceived as 
endowing the possessor of such information with a cachet unavailable to 
others. In addition, the concept of “need to know” has been applied over-
zealously in many branches of the Intelligence community. This has resulted 
in valuable Intelligence not being sanitised and/or released to the operational 
elements which could have acted upon it. In counter-terrorism, this philosophy 
is no longer the culturally entrenched and regularly occurring phenomenon 
which it used to be.  
Information silos can be created deliberately or unwittingly. The ability to map 
the desired flow of information and Intelligence within and between 
departments and agencies is vital if the cycle is to function effectively. The 
introduction of customer feedback tear-off slips has been very useful use in 
helping departments and agencies to establish whether the dissemination of a 
                                            
120
 See Corera (2012) and Thomas (2009) for more background on this rivalry. 
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product is being received by the correct customer base. They also show 
whether the information is timely, accurate and of use, providing a mechanism 
for customers to give quick opinions on such product. Nevertheless, silos still 
exist and sometimes are only noticed during a crisis or emergency, when 
there is little time to analyse why such a silo came into being. A senior Police 
officer (Source_04, 2011) commented that information silos have now 
become more complex due to the terrorist threat, saying that “they are now 
very specialised…..which can lead to the problem of self-tasking”.  
Another negative function of silos is the inhibition of information and 
Intelligence flowing horizontally across and between teams, departments and 
agencies, because the flow has been optimised for vertical transmission. The 
concept of an information silo was identified by an organisational development 
consultant named Ensor, who used the term “functional silo” in a report while 
working for the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (1988:16). Ensor noticed 
that the vertical hierarchies in several large companies led to problems with 
the flow of information in any other direction other than strictly vertical, with 
the majority of the flow only travelling upwards. He produced the following 
diagram (Ensor, 1988a:09-11) from a case study carried out at a Goodyear 
factory. It is easy to extrapolate from Esnor’s diagram, replacing the industrial 
components with those of an Intelligence agency, to visualise the same 
problem which silos can produce in the Intelligence world. 
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24 Engineering and production functions isolated in their own 
separate functional silos 
 
The issue of defensive data concentration appears to be similar to that of data 
duplication at first glance, but Sheptycki provides it with its own taxonomical 
class. Defensive data concentration constitutes the creation of separate data 
repositories for single-issue analysis, or for specialist analytical topics. His 
examples include firearms incidents, tobacco smuggling, sex crimes and other 
such single-issue topics. This problem was also witnessed in Iraq, where a 
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specialised data repository was established in one Intelligence team, to focus 
on nominals of interest. Within a short period of time, almost all the 
information produced on any individual was only being logged in the nominal 
database. The result of this was that analysts conducting queries against 
multiple terms were unwittingly missing out on a large amount of primary data, 
due to this defensive data concentration. 
Occupational subcultures are broken down by Sheptycki into two categories: 
intra-agency and inter-agency subcultures. The intra-agency issues are often 
reinforced by the prevalent culture within one agency or Force. This has been 
a particular issue within the Police, as Sheptycki highlights, citing Reiner 
(2000:115-137) who describes the animosity between Police officers and 
Intelligence analysts. Much of this came about because Police officers initially 
saw the introduction of a civilianised Intelligence cadre as posing a threat to 
the cadre of detectives who had traditionally done their own research and 
analysis. As mentioned previously, there was also a traditional rivalry between 
SIS and the Security Service, most notably during the decades of the Cold 
War, but this has now largely waned.121  
Within counter-terrorism work the problem of inter-agency subcultures also 
has the potential for a negative impact. The lack of operational awareness 
within one team or department can result in missed leads, duplication of effort, 
analytic blindness and elitism. The impact of organisational culture is a very 
important factor in the Intelligence process but it is often overlooked during 
internal reviews and workshops. The cross-pollenisation of staff moving 
between specialisations makes a positive contribution to the understanding of 
other organisational cultures, in the same way that foreign travel helps to raise 
one’s personal awareness of other cultures. This cross-pollonisation 
contributes equally to building mutual understanding at inter-agency as well 
as intra-agency level.  
                                            
121
 See Andrew (2010) for a detailed history. 
   
274 
 
 
6.2 Strengths of the Intelligence Cycle 
 
“Pursuit of a perfectly correct model is, as a result, only relative to 
the purpose of the model and the audience that uses that 
model.”122 
 
A model can be described as a human construct which provides a simplified 
depiction of a system. The system is often considerably more complex than 
the model which represents it. Returning to the primary purpose of the 
Davidson and Glass Intelligence cycle (1948), it was designed as an 
instructional aid to help teeth-arm commanders (i.e. those in the infantry, 
tanks, engineers and artillery) to understand the importance of Intelligence on 
the battlefield. It was also designed to educate them in the provenance of the 
Intelligence they received. As the authors clearly state in their introduction:  
 
“Intelligence is not an academic exercise, nor is it an end in 
itself. Its prime purpose is to help the commander make a 
decision, and thereby to proceed more accurately and more 
confidently with the accomplishment of his mission” (Glass & 
Davidson,1948:f.1).”123 
                                            
122
 Comments by Prof. Paul Cook, American Military University, in critical response to an article entitled “Let’s kill the 
Intelligence Cycle” by Kristan J. Wheaton, Associate Professor of Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst University 
(Wheaton, 2011). 
123
 From the book’s flyleaf. 
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As a high-level construct, the 6-stage Intelligence cycle presents the neophyte 
with a simplified yet comprehensible overview of the entire Intelligence 
process in terms which s/he can understand. It does not overwhelm the 
beginner with the various collection mechanisms (e.g. SIGINT, HUMINT and 
IMINT) or by the intricacies which take place within the cycle, in order to 
produce a finished product (e.g. decryption, geospatial analysis, pattern of life 
mapping). This is a particular strength when it is used for the instruction and 
training of ab initio students, as it helps them to gain a simplified impression of 
this foundational precept. A basic course of instruction in techniques of 
Intelligence analysis, as used by some elements of the UK Intelligence 
community, lasts for 14 weeks of full-time study. The Intelligence cycle is one 
of the very first topics covered, and the importance of the model is 
emphasised in the first week, as students are instructed in how the model 
underpins everything that they will learn on the course. The position of analyst 
is a key one in the various government departments which deal with 
Intelligence, either as collectors, producers or consumers. It is often the first 
position which an individual fills, in an Intelligence-focused career. The 
importance, quality and relevance of the training which they receive will be an 
important foundation for future roles and training courses, so it is vital that 
new staff are able to conceptualise the Intelligence domain quickly and 
accurately. This is where the Intelligence cycle adds real value as a model.  
As the course progresses the students learn how the parts of the model 
function in the real world, through the medium of exercises based closely on 
actual scenarios. The six-stage model can thus be considered as an 
expository tool which helps to lay the foundations for any formal course of 
instruction in Intelligence work. Johnson confirmed this concept of simplicity in 
his authoritative book on the analytical culture in the U.S. intelligence 
agencies, which is still used by the CIA and FBI today. He wrote that the 
Intelligence cycle is “…represented visually to provide an easy-to-grasp and 
easy-to-remember representation of a complex process” (Johnson, 2005:47). 
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This was confirmed by a senior Police officer, stating: “the thing about the 
cycle is that it's not standalone. People draw it as a circle but the reality is that 
it’s active and it’s receiving and disseminating Intelligence at all levels. Its 
disseminating internally and externally, and collection is also being done 
internally and externally” (Source_02, 2011). Sims (Sims & Gerber 2005:40–
41), a former CIA officer and now Professor of Intelligence Studies, confirms 
the benefits of the model’s simplicity, stating: 
 
“The theoretically ideal intelligence process is a simple intelligence 
cycle…What makes this model useful is not that it is an accurate 
depiction of the American intelligence system, or even of most 
systems, but that it allows us to develop simple metrics for 
performance and to compare the Intelligence system in any 
government to what is perhaps ideal”. 
The simplicity of the model is a key strength when looking at the workflow of a 
particular Intelligence department, in order to assess or evaluate the flow of 
information and Intelligence within it. As discussed previously, other models of 
the Intelligence cycle can be considerably more detailed and have been 
designed to encompass more of the systemic elements within the complete 
workflow. This inherent simplicity provides one of the model’s core strengths. 
Phythian (2013:15) goes so far as to point out that a strength of the model is 
its wide-ranging utility:     
 
“The traditional Intelligence Cycle is essentially a process-
oriented model, whose four or five (or sometimes more) boxes 
describe the set of processes that are under-taken between 
actors in the intelligence business. The actors themselves are 
implied rather than specified in the model and this is one of its 
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strengths as a conceptual process model, since it allows it to 
be applied to any number of organisations and situations. 
Indeed, other sectors have developed similar process models, 
such as Microsoft's four-box Business Intelligence cycle which 
comprises Analysis, Insight, Action and Measurement. That 
the commercial world has adopted a similar notional model 
attests to its simplicity and validity”.   
 
A Police Intelligence analyst might use the SARA (Scanning-Analysis-
Response-Assessment) model as a foundational structure with which to 
approach their daily workload. A representation of the model is provided 
below. 
 
 
25 The SARA model 
 
It is unreasonable to assume that the SARA model would incorporate all 
aspects of the analytical tasks performed during a typical day. Such a model, 
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as described previously, would more accurately be classed as a workflow. It 
would need to encompass actions such as interrogating data repositories, 
liaising with other departments/forces/agencies, conducting deep analysis of 
linkages and relationships using specialised tools such as i2 Analyst 
Notebook and others. In much the same way as the SARA model is deployed 
in community policing, the Intelligence cycle enables users to ensure that the 
processes which they carry out to produce Intelligence are mapped against a 
model which ensures that the most important aspects of the Intelligence 
process have been taken into account. As one Police Intelligence specialist 
notes: “the semantic purists might say that it's got to be done THIS way or 
THAT way, but it doesn't really - it's broadly telling you what the process is” 
(Source_02, 2011). 
The 6-part UK model has functioned equally effectively in some of the largest 
counter-terrorism investigations in the UK, as well as in foreign Intelligence 
departments comprised exclusively of ab initio recruits with no previous 
training in Intelligence or investigative work. Much of the reason for this 
success is down to the speed with which the model can be deployed, being a 
simple, 6-part process. A military Intelligence specialist (Source_10, 2011) 
noted that: 
 
 “…when we’re sent to the back of beyond, and told that 
elements such as the Special Forces and RAF Aircrew will be 
dependent on the Intelligence we will produce, it focuses the 
mind that we have to start quickly, that others are relying on 
us, and that if we screw it up, people can get killed. That’s the 
reality of what we deal with. So if I’m asked if the Intelligence 
cycle works for us, the answer is yes. It’s simple, it’s effective 
and we all understand it. Do I want to see it replaced with 
something that looks like a circuit diagram? No. It isn’t just 
Intelligence specialists that are involved nowadays. 
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Everybody collects, so it needs to be understandable by the 
lowest common denominator”.  
 
This statement resonates strongly with the concept introduced by the U.S. 
Armed Forces during the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, which 
stated with elegant simplicity “every solider a sensor” (Magnuson, 2007; U.S. 
Army, 2013). The idea behind this philosophy is that, while out on patrol, each 
member of the sub-Unit has the potential to collect and produce raw 
information, partly based on what they observe and partly based on what they 
are told by the local populace. At the end of a patrol, it is now standard 
practice for the patrol leader to submit a patrol report, which is a collective 
effort, based on the experiences of the patrol members. This is entered into a 
database and analysed, sometimes by professional Intelligence staff and on 
other occasions by infantry soldiers trained in Intelligence work, who then 
work in a Battalion or Brigade Intelligence cell. The analysts can request 
further details from the patrol members, should their information require 
further analysis.124 
The 6-stage model is also useful when it is provided to a person with little or 
no formal Intelligence training. It allows them to assimilate the concepts of the 
cycle and to extrapolate the deeper linkages from it such as the feedback 
loops, allowing the model to portray a sufficiently clear representation of the 
reality in which it functions. Thus the model provides a valuable construct 
which is equally useful, both in training and in operational deployment. This 
has a direct impact upon the collection stage of the model, as newly trained 
Intelligence staff can begin to collect effectively, because they understand 
where their work fits into the wider picture. The Australian Attorney General’s 
office wrote a paper (McDowell, 1997) to encourage the development of 
                                            
124
 The U.S. Army  (2013:sec.9.1) calls the concept ES2, and defines it thus: “ES2 ensures that Soldiers are trained 
to actively observe for details for the commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) while in an AO. It also 
ensures they can provide concise, accurate reports. Leaders will know how to collect, process, and disseminate 
information in their unit to generate timely intelligence”. 
   
280 
 
strategic Intelligence in the Australian Federal and State Police. The paper 
strongly supports the importance and validity of the Intelligence cycle as: “… 
the basis for the development of all forms of intelligence, principally because it 
is such a logical sequence of processes that lends itself to flexible application 
depending upon the particular requirements of the intelligence task” 
(McDowell, 1997:14).  
During the mentoring of an Intelligence department in a foreign agency, it was 
this 6-stage version of the Intelligence cycle which the author selected to be 
taught during the initial training for the analysts, as well as to explain the 
strategic processes to the senior management of the department.125 The 
same model was then used by the senior leadership team as a continual 
checklist of the processes ongoing within the department. Within one year, the 
6-stage model became the standard Intelligence cycle for this foreign 
Intelligence department. It was codified still further when the Minister of the 
Interior for that country formally enshrined a local variant of the National 
Intelligence Model as the standard to be followed by all the security forces in 
that country.126 
Within the modern Intelligence community of the UK, there is a very wide 
range of roles which contain “analyst” in their job description, and it follows 
that the duties and responsibilities of these analysts will have an equally wide 
spectrum, even when they work within the same Intelligence discipline. One 
COMINT analyst may typically spend his working day looking at the actual 
content of messages, extracting information to build up the knowledge about a 
particular subject such as a new weapon system. Another analyst in the same 
department may concentrate solely on network analysis, examining the 
                                            
125
  The author was responsible for mentoring this department and its senior leadership team. The selection of the 6-
stage model was made in preference to the U.S. model, partly because of the inclusion of evaluation as a 
component, and partly because the author had seen this model deployed in various theatres of operations, against a 
variety of targets and it was considered to be the most appropriate tool for this assignment. 
126
 The initial draft of the local National Intelligence Model was written by a colleague of the author, who wishes to 
remain anonymous. It was subsequently enlarged and made more suitable for local consumption by the author. 
Essentially a cut-down version of the UK NIM, it helped to provide a structure and a framework for the eventual 
improvement of the department from a purely tactical focus, to the eventual production of more strategic Intelligence. 
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relationships, identities, locations and relative importance of component parts 
of that network. This could include individuals, modes of communication, 
geospatial details, responsibilities, etc.  
One HUMINT analyst may focus primarily on a single individual’s pattern of 
life, possibly to collect enough Intelligence on that person to enable the 
agency to approach them with a view to recruiting them as an Intelligence 
source. Another analyst in the same department could be conducting analysis 
on an individual who is involved in terrorist activities. The primary aim of the 
analyst’s work could be to develop sufficient Intelligence to create a target 
folder which can be used to locate and arrest the individual, or to disrupt his 
activities. The range of tasks and the variations within the different roles of 
analysts renders it impossible to construct a model which would serve every 
use case. Hence the requirement for a generic and holistic tool which can be 
applied to all instances of the Intelligence domain. As one practitioner in 
SIGINT states:  
 
“In my career, I’ve covered different countries, languages, 
threats and targets but everything I’ve worked on has been 
based on the Intelligence cycle. Now that I manage a team, 
I’m more involved in the cycle as a whole, not just the analysis 
and reporting. I get more involved in the tasking process, I ask 
questions about why certain things are tasked, and how they 
fit in to what I know is going on elsewhere, from colleagues in 
other teams. I also QC [quality control] reports now, so I’m big 
on evaluating the reports which we send out. It’s so 
important……. because other agencies will come back and 
ask “why did you say X in this report?”, but then again, we do 
the same. If it’s relevant, I discuss their reports and ours with 
my opposite numbers in the other agencies” (Source_12, 
2011).  
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Omand (2010:248-249) states that the analyst is being asked to “generate in 
the mind of the policy maker the equivalent of a virtual reality model of a 
possible future to which the policy-maker needs to respond”. The application 
of the 6-stage model is the precursor to the analyst being able to provide the 
policy-maker with Omand’s virtual reality model of the future. He goes on to 
question the inevitability of the Intelligence cycle being a zero-sum game, 
accepting that this was arguably more the case during the Cold War. He 
posits that in more contemporary times, both sides can be seen to gain. He 
uses the example of the UK-U.S. revelations about the A. Q. Khan network 
which illicitly supplied the Libyan government with WMD technology. In this 
case, the Libyan government benefited from dismantling its WMD programme, 
and the UK and U.S. governments benefiting from the effective neutralisation 
of this serious threat to peace (Omand, 2010:134-35).  
The Intelligence cycle was used effectively in the UK during several decades 
of the Cold War. At its highest point it operated on the grand strategic level, 
aimed at providing long-term policy guidance to senior, political decision-
makers including the Prime Minister. It also functioned right down to the 
tactical level, providing Unit-level military commanders with detailed 
Intelligence on the capabilities of the Soviet elements which opposed them.127 
In the last two decades, as the threat of international terrorism has increased 
substantially, the cycle has been deployed against large groups, whether 
organised or semi-organised, as well as against small cells of active plotters 
numbering only three or four individuals. It has also been deployed effectively 
against “lone actors”, one of the most difficult Intelligence targets to collect 
against.128 The problem of the “lone actor” in terrorism is a relatively new field 
                                            
127
 In the Armed Forces of the UK, a Unit is classed as a Regiment/Battalion or above. Elements below a 
Regiment/Battalion, such as a Company or a Platoon, are classified as sub-Units/ 
128
 One of the prime difficulties in targeting a “lone actor” is the absence of a known start point from which to begin an 
Intelligence collection effort. Gill, Horgan and Deckert (Gill et al., 2013) identified seven major findings: there was no 
uniform profile of lone-actor terrorists; In the time leading up to most lone-actor terrorist events, evidence suggests 
that other people generally knew about the offender’s grievance, extremist ideology, views and/or intent to engage in 
violence; A wide range of activities and experiences preceded lone actors’ plots or events; Many but not all lone-actor 
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of study, and recent research of interest is by Gill (Gill et al., 2013) and Borum 
(Borum et al., 2012).  
In certain circumstances, Intelligence professionals are required to establish a 
new team or department at very short notice. In such a situation, they may 
have little or no prior knowledge of the target(s) which they will be tasked with 
collecting and reporting on. One such instance could be the deployment of 
British troops being sent to a small African nation which has descended into 
violent, internecine conflict such as the deployment of elements of the British 
Army to Sierra Leone as part of Operation PALLISER in 2000. Another such 
instance could be the establishing of a new team to conduct multi-agency 
cooperation within the Intelligence community. Intelligence professionals are 
often required to begin their operations from a blank sheet of paper. The 
pressure for the team or department to become fully operational as soon as 
possible can be very intense, especially if the operation receives Ministerial 
interest or if it takes place in the midst of constant media interest. In these 
circumstances it is imperative that the Intelligence collection plan can be 
transformed from theory into action, quickly and effectively. The Intelligence 
cycle has been deployed in numerous examples such as the ones described 
above, and has enabled targeted, actionable Intelligence to be collected 
within hours of the team being deployed.129 
A key strength found within the UK Intelligence community is that the same, 
simple model of the cycle is widely understood across the agencies, which 
allows for a shorter timescale from the standing-up of a new, multi-agency 
team or department to the start of productivity. As one SIS officer commented: 
                                            
terrorists were socially isolated; Lone-actor terrorists regularly engaged in a detectable and observable range of 
behaviours and activities with a wider pressure group, social movement or terrorist organization; Lone-actor terrorist 
events were rarely sudden and impulsive; Despite the diversity of lone-actor terrorists, there were distinguishable 
differences between ideological subgroups. Due to the sensitivity, it is not possible to discuss this particular “lone 
actor” case. 
129
 The Author has been personally involved in a number of similar operations, working in a variety of roles including 
collector, analyst, and reporter and later directing the Intelligence operation.   
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, “…it helps that we are all on the same page as far as the 
basics go. When we work with the other agencies, everyone 
knows what needs to happen and, in general, we just get on 
with it. Don’t get me wrong, we don’t all sit in a meeting and 
discuss the intelligence cycle, or ask who does what. We’ve 
been working together for a long time now, and we all know 
what the others can bring to the table. I’d say that below the 
age of fifty, everyone is going to be familiar with it in our 
place. I can’t speak for the other agencies in terms of 
numbers, but personally I’m used to working with people who 
understand the Intelligence cycle” (Source_05, 2011).  
 
Within the military Intelligence community of the UK, the use of “cross-
pollenisation” (also known as cross-fertilisation in the Policing community) has 
constantly grown over the past 20 years. This principle is based on the 
recognition that there is much benefit to be gained by taking Intelligence staff 
from one specialisation, or agency, or even country, and embedding them 
with a different specialisation, agency or country. In the British Army’s 
Intelligence Corps, this has long been a formalised process, wherein a 
language specialist, for example, could apply to train as a HUMINT source 
handler. The language specialist could then spend two or three years working 
in their new discipline before returning to their core specialisation.  
As all specialist Intelligence operators are trained in the same model of the 
Intelligence cycle, they understand from the outset how different disciplines fit 
into the wider panorama of the Intelligence landscape. The linguist brings to 
the HUMINT Unit a different perspective, usually involving deeper and longer-
term analysis which adds greater benefit to the targeting and recruitment team 
in particular. Conversely, the HUMINT Unit’s work shows the linguist that the 
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evaluation of a HUMINT source, in particular, is usually a more time-
consuming process than it can be in SIGINT, particularly if the linguist is more 
used to working against a military target than a terrorist one. Once the linguist 
returns from the HUMINT world and resumes work in the SIGINT sphere, s/he 
will have gained a wider appreciation of the Intelligence collection effort and 
will have learned additional skills which can be employed in their daily 
Intelligence work.  
This cross-pollenisation pays the largest dividends in the area of all-source 
fusion and this is especially strong in counter-terrorism, where multi-agency 
collaboration is essential. At the collection stage of the cycle, Intelligence 
specialists often work in uni-disciplinary teams or units, especially in the early 
years of their careers. This can result in an unintentionally blinkered 
weltanschauung of the collection field, as less experienced staff only see the 
collection, collation and analysis within their own field. Direction may be 
invisible to them, as they may simply receive their daily workload in their 
electronic in-box, which instructs them what to work on. Evaluation may also 
be invisible to them, as it may be conducted as a distinct, yet detached, 
process which takes place outside of their involvement or even awareness. 
While this may appear to be an ineffective, or even an elitist process, this is 
not necessarily the case. Some collectors may only be cleared for 
CONFIDENTIAL access and the output of their work moves up the chain to an 
area in which the staff may be cleared for access to SECRET or TOP 
SECRET material. The collected and processed material which left the 
analyst as a CONFIDENTIAL output would then be evaluated and analysed, 
and possibly reported on by staff with access to more than one source of 
Intelligence, or in some cases, to all-source Intelligence.  
Examples of this in the UK include the Permanent Joint Headquarters 
(PJHQ), and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). In organisations 
such as these, Intelligence staff witness the complete cycle in action. At the 
highest level of security clearance, an analyst or manager would have access 
to the relevant JIC priorities, established in conjunction with the Prime 
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Minister. Collection of Intelligence would be conducted by the multiplicity of 
sources and methods, which could include SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, 
MASINT, OSINT and GEOINT among others. Collation would be done within 
PJHQ, accessing a vast array of data repositories using powerful aggregators 
and analytics engines designed to cope with “big data”. This helps produce 
detailed insights and reveal linkages and patterns which would otherwise 
remain invisible to the human eye.  
Evaluation would be conducted as an on-going process by a multi-agency 
collection of staff, both military and civilian. They would look at all of the 
collection material from all of the providing sources, allowing for comparative 
analysis to be carried out across a wide range of incoming Intelligence. 
Analysis would also be done by a mixture of staff from different backgrounds 
and specialisations, which provides for a robust system of checks and 
balances. The intelligence is examined from multiple viewpoints and is 
comparatively assessed on a source by source basis. 
The reporting work is sometimes done by the same team of analysts. At other 
times it is done by a dedicated team of reporters, and this can vary from 
section to section. The finished product which leaves PJHQ can be 
disseminated downwards and upwards. It can be sent to deployed Units in 
operational theatres, and it can equally be sent to the 4-star General holding 
the appointment of Commander Joint Operations. This could be the case for a 
strategically important report on a particular hot topic, such as the impending 
evacuation of UK nationals from a country in crisis, or a major change in the 
disposition of enemy forces in a theatre in which UK troops are engaged on 
the ground. 
The cycle runs continuously in all-source establishments such as PJHQ and 
JTAC, covering foci such as geographical (e.g. Middle East and Africa), 
thematic (e.g. WMD proliferation), targeted (e.g. Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP)), or even single-person (e.g. the previous hunt for Abu 
Musab Al Zarqawi). All Intelligence staff, regardless of which areas of the 
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cycle their work covers, are familiar with the cycle. They understand where 
their work fits into it and are able to deploy the cycle from scratch when a new 
Intelligence tasking is received, which has little or no existing information 
against it.  
This requirement, for a team to be able to produce Intelligence as soon as 
possible after deploying, is commonplace for military Intelligence staff. The 
requirement brings with it the pressure to deliver accurate results in a 
potentially short time. At a strategic or operational level, there are generally 
not the same pressures on the staff. At the tactical level, the self-perceived 
responsibility can generate increased stress on the Intelligence staff, 
especially if operational action will be undertaken as a direct result of the 
Intelligence produced. As one Special Forces operator noted, “when we go 
through the door, we want to know that it’s the right door, and we want to 
know what opposition we’re expecting. Going into the wrong building is a 
nightmare, but going into the right building and being out-gunned is a whole 
different kind of nightmare” (Source_07, 2011).  
Several practitioners highlighted the importance of evaluation in the cycle. 
Talking about the process of evaluation, an experienced senior analyst in 
GCHQ (Source_11, 2011) stated:  
 
“…it starts immediately after direction. We usually know why 
we are collecting on the various targets, and without going 
into detail, there are many ways to skin a cat, so even before 
collection begins, there may be discussions about the 
suitability of this method versus that method, as the best way 
to provide what we are looking for. As an analyst, I’m involved 
in that process when it has a direct bearing on my work. I’ll 
also routinely evaluate the collection, and when I’m engaged 
in the actual analysis, of course I’m evaluating what I’m 
   
288 
 
analysing at the same time. Sometimes it’s a subconscious 
process that I’m doing while I work, and I’m not really aware 
of it until I reach a natural break, or the end of the working 
day, when I look back over what I’ve been working on, and I 
can see my own evaluation process running through the day’s 
work”. 
 
This comment raises an important point in the composition of the cycle. The 
placing of evaluation as a discrete component of the cycle carries with it a 
number of implications: that the evaluation process does not start until 
midway through the cycle; that the evaluation itself is carried out en bloc; and 
that once it is complete, the part of evaluation in the complete process has 
finished. An SIS officer (Source_06, 2011) agreed, adding that: 
 
 “…in HUMINT, evaluation is one of the most important things 
we do. When you’re dealing with people, and what they tell 
you, it’s crucial for us to evaluate not only the source, but also 
what they tell us. So while they’re talking, I’m not just listening 
to what they are saying, and taking notes on the content. I’m 
also evaluating their words, their body language, how it fits 
with what I actually know already, whether it makes any alarm 
bells ring. I’m constantly evaluating, during the meeting and 
then afterwards, when I do the write-up. Because when I 
press the send button, you know, I have to be able to justify 
what I’ve written. I mean, internally, to my own people, and 
…… more and more now, externally, to customers outside my 
own organisation”.  
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This is underscored by a comment by Butler (2004:09), stating: “for imagery 
and signals intelligence this is not usually an issue, although even here the 
danger of deception must be considered. But for human intelligence the 
validation process is vital.” Towards the end of the 1990s, SIS had realised 
that their evaluation processes should be strengthened. As the former 
Controller of SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove, testified to the Butler commission:  
 
“The Service has a very tough source evaluation process which 
was completely revised in the period late 1999 to 2001. It was a 
long exercise and we introduced new processes and systems. 
Now they, for resource reasons, obviously couldn’t be 
immediately applied, because they are heavy duty, to every 
case but . . . it’s something that we take incredibly seriously, 
where we have a highly developed process” (Butler, 2004:103). 
 
What Butler (2004:09) described in his overview of the validation process 
provides a succinct summary of the kinds of questions which analysts should 
ask themselves when evaluating information and Intelligence.130 The raison 
d'être for the Butler report specifically included the evaluation of Intelligence, 
as Butler (2004:01) clearly pointed out in his introduction: 
 
“to investigate the intelligence coverage available in respect of 
WMD programmes in countries of concern and on the global 
trade in WMD, taking into account what is now known about 
these programmes; as part of this work, to investigate the 
accuracy of intelligence on Iraqi WMD up to March 2003,and 
                                            
130
 See chapter 5.4 
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to examine any discrepancies between the intelligence  
gathered, evaluated and used by the Government before the 
conflict, and between that intelligence and what has been 
discovered by the Iraq survey group since the end of the 
conflict; and to make recommendations to the Prime Minister 
for the future on the gathering, evaluation and use of 
intelligence on WMD, in the light of the difficulties of operating 
in countries of concern”. 
 
In the aftermath of the allied invasion of Iraq, the issue of evaluation came 
under very public scrutiny by large segments of the international media. A 
military Intelligence analyst agreed with the focus of attention, saying that: 
 
 “if we got it wrong about something as important as the 
invasion of another country, then it stands to reason that the 
decision-making should be examined. We all do evaluation as 
part of our jobs. You can’t work as an analyst and not do it. 
But that’s half the problem, isn’t it? Who’s to say if my 
evaluation is on target? I’m experienced enough, and 
sufficiently long in the tooth, that my bosses trust my 
judgement. I’ve been doing this a long time, and I learned 
from some of the best in the business. So when I put my 
name against a report, I’m also putting my professional 
reputation on the line, in a way. Below me, I’m a lot harder on 
my juniors, because what they tell me will have a major 
influence on what I report. That’s the way it works. It probably 
doesn’t sound very fool-proof, but all I can say is that you 
don’t usually get put in a position of such responsibility until 
the system sees that you’re the right fit, that you mainly “get it 
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right” and that you’re experienced enough to know what’s 
what” (Source_10 2011).  
 
6.3 Summary 
As with any model which attempts to show a high-level view of a process, the 
6-stage Intelligence cycle has strengths and weaknesses. Certainly one of the 
most highlighted weaknesses from the range of interviews conducted with 
Intelligence practitioners was the fact that the evaluation component needed 
strengthening, and also that evaluation was not a single stage in the process. 
The pathologies identified by Sheptycki are rightly well-known within the 
academic study of Intelligence, as they created the first concrete contributions 
to the lexicon of such problems. It is often easier to tackle a problem when it 
can be identified and bounded. Some of these pathologies are almost so 
close to one another that there is an argument for some combinations being 
classed as a single pathology, but the work that Sheptycki did was unique. He 
led the way in classifying some of the more common problems which can be 
seen to afflict Police forces (and Intelligence agencies) in various parts of the 
world.  
As with Hulnick’s observations, though, it cannot be said that all of the 
problems, issues, vulnerabilities and challenges considered in this chapter are 
failures of the Intelligence cycle. The model describes the high-level 
processes which should ideally occur for the Intelligence process to take 
place. The large majority of the vulnerabilities identified by a number of 
academics are more human factors than anything, and while the model 
depends on the human input throughout its life-cycle, the mental processes 
undertaken by people, along with all of the resultant impedances such as 
bias, groupthink, etc., cannot be taken as flaws within the actual model. 
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One of the biggest strengths of the model is its simplicity, which allows it to be 
assimilated more quickly than, for example, the systems model described in 
this chapter. Another of its strengths is its ubiquity across the UK Intelligence 
community. This facilitates joint working in the counter-terrorism area, as 
there is a common understanding of the top-level processes which need to 
happen for the collection, production and dissemination of Intelligence to take 
place successfully. The description of how the cycle runs continuously in 
PJHQ illustrates how the entire model can run within one organisation. It 
collects and produces at tactical, operational and strategic levels if necessary, 
to support operations.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
The aim of this research was to examine the Intelligence cycle, specifically to 
assess whether it is still a suitable model for use in UK counter-terrorism. The 
Intelligence cycle would benefit from some restructuring and consolidation, 
resulting in an updated model called the “Intelligence triosphere”.  
More so than Intelligence, the concept of terrorism is especially contentious. 
Defining a concept is never an easy task as any definition is inherently 
subjective in nature. The concept of terrorism holds an additional problem: 
chapter 3.1 demonstrated that there is a fundamental disagreement among 
the academic and legal community about whether the idea of defining 
terrorism can even be considered as a sound premise. The use of one or 
another definition to demonise and de-legitimise the opposition was also 
described, and within this issue resides one of the particular difficulties of 
creating a definition of terrorism which is seen as fair, inclusive, accurate, 
non-politicised and legally enforceable in accordance with UK, EU and UN 
concepts of rights. Indeed, the employment of a particular definition to 
delegitimise opposing views, groups or ideologies has been described as the 
weaponisation of terrorism definitions (Burke, 2013). Various definitions of 
terrorism were examined, which were created by international bodies, 
instruments of legislation, think-tanks, academics, legal scholars and others. 
One only needs to look at the decades of conflict between Palestinians and 
Israelis to see how the application of the terrorist label can be used as a 
political weapon, and how the labelling of various acts as terrorist acts can be 
amorphous. Even the United Nations has been incapable of formulating an 
organisation-wide definition for this problem. The academic discourse on 
defining terrorism is considerable and the many definitions of terrorism testify 
to the amount of study directed at this problem. Regarding the UK, however, 
the definition of terrorism which has the most relevance is that enshrined in 
   
294 
 
the Terrorism Act 2000, as it is this definition against which acts are deemed 
to be, or not to be, terrorist acts.  
The work of the Intelligence cycle in UK counter-terrorism takes place within 
the context of the CONTEST strategy, with its four constituent components: 
PURSUE, PREVENT, PROTECT and PREPARE. The CONTEST strategy is 
currently in its second revision, with a third revision due sometime in 2016. It 
has been shown that CONTEST is a broad yet deep strategy. It aims to stop 
terrorist attacks from taking place, to prevent individuals from being 
radicalised, to ensure that the critical national infrastructure is protected, and 
to allow post-attack recovery to take place as quickly and efficiently as 
possible.  
CONTEST has not been without its critics, who raise concerns such as state 
surveillance, the ethics of detention and interrogation, and the delicate 
balance between free speech and glorifying or condoning terrorism. 
Nevertheless, the strategy is well constructed and its component parts have 
strong linkages between them, providing a cohesive national strategy. Some 
enhancements to CONTEST have come about as a result of non-terrorist 
action. One example is the realisation after the Kings Cross Underground fire, 
that robust and effective communications networks are essential for managing 
a major incident, and for implementing the post-incident/attack recovery 
phase.  
The 6-stage Intelligence cycle was described in detail and each of the six 
stages were examined within the context of counter-terrorism work. Direction 
is set at the top level, by bodies such as the JIC and the NSC. This direction 
flows down to agency level and a collection plan is formulated for specified 
requirements. The collection process begins and it can involve one or more 
agencies, including those that do not collect Intelligence as a primary function. 
As the collection process gets underway, collation happens simultaneously. 
Complex searches are carried out against an array of data repositories, to 
retrieve existing data relevant to the target. Evaluation takes place at multiple 
layers and at all stages. In HUMINT and SIGINT, the source is evaluated 
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separately from the Intelligence it provides. The importance of evaluation in 
the UK Intelligence cycle was underscored by Lord Butler’s review following 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq  
Analysis is often the most complex stage in the cycle. Despite the automation 
of some elements of the process, the human factors are still critical to the 
process. Nuances of language are still beyond the abilities of machine 
translation for any kind of fully automated process and are likely to remain so 
for some years. Various challenges have been identified in the field of 
analysis, and it remains the component most vulnerable to the vagaries of 
human behaviour.  
The desired aim of an Intelligence product is usually to inform the decision-
making process. This is the final stage of the model, dissemination, which 
produces the end product and distributes it to the relevant audience. 
Dissemination is controlled by caveats, such as security clearance, functional 
role and nationality. This final stage has undergone several changes in the 
past 30 years. The principle of “need to know” enshrined in Cold War policies 
underwent a dramatic change to “Intelligence support to the war fighter” in an 
effort to sanitise Intelligence and push it down to the lowest possible level at 
which it could be used, but could still be protected. The tear-line report 
provided a mechanism for this, allowing a report to be written at TOP 
SECRET above the dashed tear-line, and a highly sanitised version to be 
produced at a lower classification, below the tear-line. 
Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of the Intelligence cycle were 
reviewed, drawing heavily on the experience of long-serving Intelligence 
professionals from across the UK Intelligence community. The various 
challenges of the analytical process were mapped against a range of common 
identifiers such as human factors, system factors and cultural factors. 
Challenges within the analysis phase are often labelled as weaknesses of the 
Intelligence process itself. As chapter 6 explained, however, many of these 
challenges exist because of the human factors involved in analysing 
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information. These can include an array of various biases, the conscious or 
unconscious pressures of peers that can result in groupthink, and the 
politicisation of Intelligence by policy makers or influencers.  
Evaluation was identified as a weakness by Butler and others and the 
importance of this component to a valid and effective Intelligence process 
cannot be understated. This is an aspect that has had to be strengthened in 
the UK community during the decade following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The 
politicisation of Intelligence poses particularly difficult problems for those 
engaged in collecting, analysing and reporting. The higher up the politicisation 
occurs, the greater the potential ramifications can be. The example of the 
Downing Street Memo was used as an example of this, showing how Sir 
Richard Dearlove believed the US administration were moulding their 
Intelligence to fit a desired political aim or outcome, an inversion of the 
concept of Intelligence-led policy.  
A large number of challenges and vulnerabilities were detailed, which have 
been identified by a number of academics. The large number of challenges 
listed in the table gives an insight into some of the reasons why things can 
and do go wrong in the Intelligence process. These factors were mapped onto 
a separate landscape of human, system and cultural factors. The sheer 
number classified as human factors testifies to the pervasive roles which 
personality, mind-set, bias and previous experience play in the whole process 
of Intelligence production. Criticism has been levelled at the Intelligence cycle 
for being too simplistic, or for not reflecting the actual processes of real life. As 
chapter 6 explained, however, the simplicity of the model is also a key 
strength. 
The importance was made of distinguishing between a model and a workflow. 
While a model is a simplified depiction of a process, a workflow can be 
expected to encompass a much greater level of detail. Some models put 
forward in recent years are highly detailed breakdowns of inputs, decision 
junctions and outputs, yet these are less suitable for the purposes of 
instruction, and for rapid deployment, due to their level of complexity. One of 
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the main advantages of the 6-stage model is its simplicity. The ability to take a 
simple yet functional model and employ it in inter-agency work is a key 
strength. Likewise is the ability to use the model as an easy-to-understand 
tool when training Intelligence officers in developing nations. Attempting to 
teach a very detailed Intelligence workflow in such situations would be 
counter-productive, whereas even trainees with no prior Intelligence 
experience are able to grasp the components of the cycle. They can 
understand how the components interact with each other, and how feedback 
can loop back from any stage to any preceding stage. 
This thesis has examined the Intelligence cycle in detail, not only insofar as its 
composition and components, but also within the wider context of the UK’s 
counter-terrorism policy landscape. The contours of this policy landscape, like 
geographical contours, are not impervious to change and this policy 
landscape demonstrates displays evidence of change. The 6-stage cycle 
fulfils a necessary role within the counter-terrorism community and it has been 
used in many different conflicts and operational theatres with high success. 
There are some changes that could be made, however, that would make the 
model yet more effective.  
While some US models have started with a joint component of planning and 
direction, the UK model has traditionally omitted the function of planning. In 
US models, this is widely perceived to take place at the policy level, and 
before direction is promulgated. Accepting that the model of the Intelligence 
cycle cannot encompass every aspect of the process from political decision-
making through to covert action, it is suggested that the revised model still 
begins with direction, yet adds planning as the next function. Direction thus 
remains as the first step, when the Intelligence agencies are formally tasked 
with a target or a topic of interest. This direction is typically set at the national 
level by the JIC and its list of priority topics, and/or by the NSC. Chapter 1.5 
explained how the JIC process functions and how the JIC priorities are 
derived. It is this strategic direction that arguably starts the planning process.  
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Planning becomes the second stage in the revised model, but in a slightly 
different capacity to that implied in US models. Here, the planning is more the 
designing of the Intelligence collection plan that outlines which assets, 
sources and methods will be used to conduct the collection. In temporal 
terms, this function sits between the formal tasking of the agencies and the 
start of the collection and collation process. It is an oft-unconsidered but vitally 
important function. Not only does it allocate resources but it also ensures that 
deconfliction is properly planned as a key part of the process. 
The importance of collation in the Intelligence process was explained, and the 
point was made that collation and collection often take place simultaneously. 
Both processes are not just conducted once in the cycle. When agencies are 
collecting against a high-value target (HVT) for example, collection can be 
instigated and continue for days, with no dissemination taking place during 
that time. Separating the two processes implies firstly that one process 
naturally follows the other. It also implies that one process cannot begin until 
the previous process has ended. In the case of collation and collection, this is 
not strictly true. Combining the processes into one component is a more 
accurate reflection of reality, and also ensures that collation is not dispensed 
with as a valuable and necessary process. 
Analysis has traditionally been an individual component in the UK model, 
whereas in US models it is often combined with processing. Chapter five 
touched on this point, mentioning some of these processing tools such as 
decryption, translation, conversion, enhancement, etc. As so much raw 
information currently collected needs to undergo some kind of processing, it is 
beneficial to include it in the cycle. The natural bedfellow of processing is still 
analysis and the two components are better suited when combined in one 
stage. 
Placing evaluation before analysis implies that no further evaluation takes 
place once the analysis begins. This is not the case, and evaluation plays a 
very important role in the analytical process. A good analyst will constantly be 
evaluating the material and its potential meaning or significance. Placing 
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evaluation after analysis implies that everything which happens in the cycle 
until that point has taken place with no evaluation being done at all. Again, 
this is not an accurate reflection of the reality of the model in action. It is clear 
that the evaluation of Intelligence is less of an independent component in a 
cyclical model, and more of an intrinsic and omnipresent aspect that must be 
considered at every stage in the cycle. These considerations did not require a 
tabula rasa re-design from the ground upwards, but resulted in a revised 
model of the Intelligence cycle which is evolutionary, not revolutionary.  
The revised model is the “Intelligence triosphere”. It has a single composition, 
but with three distinct yet mutually connected spheres. Evaluation is placed 
within the outer, encompassing sphere, to more accurately reflect that the 
Intelligence cycle actually takes place within the environment of evaluation. 
Chapter 5.4 was devoted to the importance of evaluation and this importance 
is reflected in the new model. The triosphere model strengthens the concept 
that every part of the cycle, from planning to dissemination, must be subject to 
continuous evaluation to ensure that the necessary rigour of quality control 
takes place. . 
Inside the middle sphere is the model itself, now consisting of the five 
components mentioned above, but presenting a more realistic depiction of the 
key processes. Finally, at the core of the model lies the mission. It is the 
mission that drives the cycle and without the mission, or an aim, the cycle is 
redundant. The mission is central to each component. At every stage of the 
process, Intelligence staff should be asking themselves whether their work is 
supporting the mission, and if not, what needs to change to ensure that it 
does. The updated model, the Intelligence triosphere, is depicted below: 
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 26 The Intelligence Triosphere 
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The Intelligence domain has undergone major changes over the past 30 
years. In 1984, much of the existing body of knowledge existed in printed 
form. Analysts commonly maintained individual “databases” in card index 
systems. Often these would be unique, meaning that it was difficult or even 
impossible to query the data within, unless one was physically located in the 
same place as the card index, or if there were secure communications with 
that location. Information was hard to come by, and there was generally a 
shortage of it, as a raw material for the Intelligence process. Nowadays the 
opposite is true. Intelligence officers are often engulfed in a “data tsunami”, 
and it can be a very time-consuming process to instigate a query and then 
have to pare down the results to a meaningful quantity, before any real 
analysis or evaluation can begin.  
New skills have been added to the analyst’s profession, such as the ability to 
calculate geo-locational positions of various entities through highly technical 
means, such as the analysis of mobile phone metadata. Newer data sources 
can provide real-time Intelligence, especially in investigations into high-value 
targets.131 Modern technology such as i2 Analyst Notebook has given 
analysts the ability to identify connections and relationships invisible to the 
naked eye, due to the complexity and size of the data sets involved. These 
include linkages between people and the things that they interact with, such 
as cars, international flights, mobile phones and email accounts. 
Yet the fact remains that the work of Intelligence officers in UK counter-
terrorism still follows a recognisable process that is best depicted as a cyclical 
model. The Intelligence triosphere proposed in this paper comes as a result of 
a thorough investigation into the functioning of the 6-stage cycle. This analysis 
has been enhanced through the personal experiences of a range of 
Intelligence officers familiar with its use in counter-terrorism. It has also been 
aided by the analysis of a substantial corpus of written material, primarily 
                                            
131
 One example of this is the ability for Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) to generate a real-time alert 
when a target vehicle passes an ANPR sensor, providing genuinely real-time Intelligence to Investigators and 
analysts. 
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academic in nature, regarding the wider ecosystem within which the 
Intelligence process takes place. The enhancements made to the model are 
subtle refinements rather than ground-breaking alterations, as this paper has 
shown that the 6-stage cycle was not in need of major surgery, only a “nip and 
tuck”. Presenting this updated and refined model to Intelligence practitioners 
in governmental bodies would not involve any major re-think of the way in 
which their core business is conducted. Neither would it require much 
additional work in explaining this model to ab initio students encountering 
Intelligence theory and practice for the first time.  
While the cycle itself benefits from this research, there is still work to be done. 
Defining terrorism is beset with an array of issues that strongly polarise the 
topic. As far as UK legislation is concerned, the definition enshrined in law 
continues to be that laid down in section one of the Terrorism Act 2000. Even 
if we accept that defining terrorism may be close to impossible, the debate 
itself generates useful material and ensures that the subject remains high on 
domestic and foreign agendas. The attempts to define Intelligence also 
encounter problems, but in this field the mix of academics and practitioners 
will hopefully ensure that research in this area continues to expand. Both of 
these areas of study can have a direct impact upon Intelligence work and the 
various models employed by agencies.  
There will be criticism of any model of the Intelligence cycle, as anyone 
involved in the study, whether academic or practitioner, brings to the debate 
his or her own particular perception of the process. This can result in 
differences regarding a definition’s scope (e.g. broad and inclusive, or narrow 
and specific), or its focus (e.g. the process, or the outputs), or its targets (e.g. 
primarily foreign, or covering a wider spectrum of potential threats). There will 
also be criticism of the need to even have an Intelligence cycle, especially 
from those academics who see the model as an anachronism. Without a 
process, the collection and use of Intelligence cannot function effectively and 
the Intelligence triosphere is a simple yet robust model. The 6-stage cycle 
worked effectively, this much is evident from the comments from experienced 
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practitioners as well as from the research detailed in this thesis. The main 
enhancements it required was that of evaluation being changed into a 
continuous aspect, rather than a distinct component, and the mission being 
placed at the core of the process. The updated Intelligence triosphere model 
proposed in this thesis refines the 6-stage Intelligence cycle but retains its 
core principles.    
Counter-terrorism work in the UK will continue to be Intelligence-led for the 
foreseeable future, this much is certain. The employment of a simple, robust 
and effective model such as the Intelligence triosphere can only help to 
ensure that the Intelligence process is carried out effectively. 
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Annex A - Example of a Priority Intelligence Requirement  
PIR Intelligence Required OSINT SIGINT HUMINT IMINT MILO DIP 
UN / 
NGOs 
                  
1.0.0 
How significant is 
ASEAN area as a 
generator of terrorism, 
internally and 
externally? 
              
1.1.0 
What is the Terrorism 
threat in each country?               
1.2.0 
What is the Terrorist 
threat between the 
ASEAN states?               
1.3.0 
How significant is the 
area, as an exporter of 
terrorism?               
2.0.0 
Does ASEAN have 
effective CT structures 
and measures in 
place? Are they 
effectively supported 
or implemented by 
ASEAN members? 
          
2.1.0 
What CT structures, if 
any, does ASEAN have 
in place?               
2.2.0 
What CT structures 
should ASEAN have in 
place?               
2.3.0 
What CT measures, if 
any, does ASEAN have 
in place?               
2.4.0 
What CT measures, if 
any, should ASEAN 
have in place?               
2.5.0 
How effectively are 
these CT strategies and 
measures supported by 
ASEAN states?               
2.6.0 
How effectively are 
these CT strategies and 
measures implemented 
by ASEAN states?               
2.7.0 
Are there any external 
factors which influence 
ASEAN CT strategies 
and their 
implementation?               
2.8.0 
What are the effective 
capabilities of ASEAN               
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states to counter the 
terrorist threat? 
2.9.0 
Is ASEAN 
efficient/effective in 
influencing CT in the SE 
Asian region?               
2.10.0 
What counter-
subversion capabilities 
does ASEAN have?               
  
How important a factor is 
corruption of officials, in 
the overall CT issue?               
3.0.0 
What are the particular 
strengths/weaknesses 
of main ASEAN states 
in fight against 
terrorism, and what 
influence can the UK 
bring to bear to 
improve their 
performance? 
              
3.1.0 
Which are the main 
ASEAN states, and 
why?               
3.2.0 
Has Thailand been 
successful in countering 
the terrorist threat? If so, 
why? If not, do they 
have a different terrorist 
threat to other ASEAN 
states?               
3.3.0 
Could the FPDA be used 
as a model for inter-
State cooperation?               
3.4.0 
what did Australia do, 
post-Bali attack, in order 
to increase co-operation 
and effectiveness on CT 
strategies               
3.5.0 
What does/could the UK 
do in the region to better 
stabilise the region?               
3.6.0 
Can/should ASEAN 
countries deal/talk with 
terrorist organisations?               
  
What opportunities and 
threats does the UK 
face, in any CT 
cooperation with 
ASEAN?               
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Annex B - Participant Consent Form 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN DOCTORAL THESIS 
EXAMINING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
Research Project: 
FIT TO FIGHT OR UNFIT FOR PURPOSE? THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
INTELLIGENCE CYCLE IN UK COUNTER-TERRORISM SINCE 2003. 
.  
 
Researcher 
Paul Burke 
 
Dear Participant, 
My name is Paul Burke and I am a former Intelligence professional who has 
spent his career working in this area. I am studying for a Professional 
Doctorate in Policing, Security and Community Safety at London Metropolitan 
University (LMU) in the United Kingdom. I am examining the effectiveness of 
the Intelligence cycle in UK counter-terrorism since 2003, as part of the 
requirement for the completion of this Doctorate. My credentials and affiliation 
as a student at the LMU can be established by contacting Dr. Nicholas Ridley, 
senior lecturer for the Department of Applied Social Sciences (DASS) at the 
LMU. He can be reached at: 
email: (removed only in thesis copy) 
tel: (removed only in thesis copy)This document constitutes an 
agreement to participate in my research project, the objective of which is to 
establish whether or not the Intelligence cycle is fit for purpose as a tool for 
UK counter-terrorism.  
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This portion of my research project consists of a participant’s interview 
consisting of several open ended questions regarding your views and 
opinions in this particular area. Your involvement in this process is foreseen to 
last no more than 90 minutes.  
Information will be recorded in hand-written format and/or will be captured by 
computer data entry or audio recorded for future transcription. Any information 
you disclose will be coded, analyzed, and compared to data obtained from 
other research participants. Where appropriate, information will be 
summarized in an anonymous format in the body of the final report. At no time 
will any specific comments be attributed to any individual unless specific 
agreement has been obtained beforehand. Audio recordings will not be 
disseminated publicly. Raw data including notes and tapes obtained from 
interviews will not be retained beyond the following durations. Audio 
recordings will be transcribed as soon as possible after the interview, 
following which the audio recording will be securely shredded beyond U.S. 
Department of Defense recommended standards (seven complex overwrites). 
Written notes will only be retained until the doctoral thesis has been accepted 
as submitted by London Metropolitan University, and until the oral defence of 
the thesis (the Viva) has been successfully conducted. Once these stages 
have been passed, the written notes will also be deleted. Until that time, all 
written and audio records of interviews will be encrypted using strong, 
commercial encryption.  
In addition to submitting my final report to the LMU in partial fulfilment for a 
Doctorate of Policing and Community Safety Degree, I may discuss my 
research findings in general terms with UK government officials, but this will 
not involve any discussions on sources, roles, identities or other potentially 
identifying details. I may use the final paper for personal reasons and may 
include all or portions of it in future presentations, workshops or seminars. In 
the future, I may also use my findings and completed report for a journal 
submission or to be included in a book.  
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A copy of the final report will be offered by the Author to all respondents who 
provided an interview. It is planned that public access to the final paper 
through London Metropolitan University will be restricted at the Author’s 
request, but this cannot be guaranteed.  
If you choose to provide an interview, you are free to withdraw your consent at 
any time without prejudice. Any research data obtained from you will not be 
included in the research and will be destroyed as detailed above. If you would 
prefer to decline the audio recording of your interview, in preference for a 
written record only, this can be arranged. At any point in the interview, if you 
wish the audio recording to be stopped, and/or the written notes to cease, this 
will be complied with immediately.  
If you have any further questions, I will be pleased to answer them prior to 
beginning this interview process.  
By signing this letter, you give free and informed consent to participate in this 
project.  
 
Name (Please Print)_______________________________________ 
 
Signed:_________________________________________________ 
 
Date: ________________________________ 
Further to the above, if you do not wish to review the audio recording or 
transcribed version of your interview, please complete the below portion: 
 
Name (Please 
Print):______________________________________________ 
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Signed______________________________________________ 
 
Date__________________________________ 
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Annex C – UN Conventions 
The relevant UN conventions and instruments relating to terrorism are: 
 
1. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312;  
2. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 
l261;  
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668;  
4. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, IMO. Doc. 
Sua/Con/l6/ Rev.1; 27 I.L.M. 685 (l0 Mar. l988);  
5. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 2 I.L.M. l042;  
6. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircrafts 
(Hijacking Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, l8 I.L.M. 1419;  
7. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
(CWC Convention], Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800;  
8. Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
[Terrorism Financing Convention];  
9. U.N. Doc. a/54/l09 (9 Dec. l999) l33 (l6 Dec. l970);  
10.  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation, Jan. 26, 1973, l0 I.L.M. 1151;  
11.  Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving Civil Aviation [Montreal Protocol], Jan. 12, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627;  
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12.  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 
[Diplomats Convention], Dec. 14, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 41;  
13.  Convention Against the Taking of Hostages [Hostage-Taking 
Convention], Dec. 17, 1979, l8 I.L.M. 1456;  
14.  Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 
[U.N. Personnel Convention], available at 
http://www.un.org/law/cod/safety.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003);  
15.  Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 721;  
16.  Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings [Terrorist 
Bombing Convention], U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/164 (9 Jan. 1998);  
17.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction [BWC Convention], Apr. 10, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 309;  
18.  Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA Doc. 
C/225;1456 U.N.T.S. 101; l8 I.L.M. 1419 (3 Mar. l980)  
19.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
(CWC Convention], U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/39; l974 U.N.T.S. 3; 32 I.L.M. 
800 (l3 Jan. l993)  
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Annex D – Example Intelligence Collection Plan 
The following shows an actual sample of a U.S. Intelligence Collection 
Plan. Across the top are the requirements, broken down by the 
components of the Intelligence cycle. On the left side, are the collection 
assets.132 
 
  
  
                                            
132
 From the author’s collection 
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Annex E –Financial investigation infographic 
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Annex F – Example Tear Line Report  
SIMULATION SECRET 
Report Serial: 6V92PQR-001 
Flags: TERRORISM/CIGARISTAN LIBERATION ARMY/WEAPONS/MONEY-
LAUNDERING 
Title: JOHN SMITH IDENTIFIED AS SENIOR UK-BASED PLANNER FOR 
CIGARISTAN LIBERATION ARMY. CONFIRMED INVOLVEMENT IN 
ORGANISING MOVEMENT OF FUNDS TO FACILITATE PURCHASE OF 
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES FOR ONWARD SHIPMENT TO 
CIGARISTAN 
Source Evaluation: A-3-4 
Source Description: A previously reliable source with indirect access to 
SMITH. Confirmed by Agency X. 
John SMITH has been confirmed as the senior, UK-based operational planner 
for the Cigaristan Liberation Army (CLA). Smith is believed to have held the 
role for at least two years and is responsible for all financial operations 
(including the laundering of criminally obtained funds) and the purchasing and 
transfer of weapons and explosives. 
SMITH is the director of a small logistics company which is used to facilitate 
the transfer of weapons and explosives and is also used to move other….. 
 
SIMULATION SECRET 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------Detach below this line for SIMULATION CONFIDENTIAL report--------- 
 
SIMULATION CONFIDENTIAL 
John Smith has been identified as a senior member of the Cigaristan 
Liberation Army.  
 
-------------------------------------- CONFIDENTIAL ------------------------------------ 
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Annex G - Community Engagement to Counter-Terrorism  
(Metropolitan Police Authority 2007, sec.G) 
3. What is the main purpose or aims of the policy, strategy or project? 
• Sustain and widen informed, factual debate on how our society should 
respond to the terrorist threat 
• Provide an opportunity for the police to explain what they do in this field, and 
why, and to dispel any misconceptions or misinformation 
• Heighten public understanding of the national and international dimensions 
of MPS counter-terrorism functions and roles 
• Enable the community to inform the police of their issues, considerations 
and tensions, leading to better-informed police decision-making 
• Seek policy direction and strategic steer on counter-terrorism for the police 
from the public 
• Challenge unproductive stereotyping of communities and polarisation of 
arguments with regard to terrorism and counter-terrorism  
• Enable the MPA better to scrutinise MPS expenditure on counter-terrorism 
policing and better to oversee the community engagement aspects of this 
expenditure 
• Enable the MPA to make a more informed assessment of the corporacy of 
the MPS approach to counter-terrorism 
• Elicit from members of the community new ideas for new ways of working 
• Foster a sense of public ownership of the problems, and their solutions 
• Increase the likelihood of generating future community intelligence 
• Increase public understanding of and confidence in the role of the MPA 
• Demonstrate the MPA as guarantor of police transparency and 
accountability 
• Build social capital – and therefore resilience – in London 
• Assist other organisations to appreciate the impact their activity has on 
London’s communities with regard to counter-terrorism 
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Annex H – Relevant Public Authorities – RIPA 2000  
The following bodies are authorised to conduct covert surveillance under the 
auspices of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). 
 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 c. 23 95 
S C H E D U L E S 
SCHEDULE 1 Section 30. 
Relevant Public Authorities 
Part I 
Relevant authorities for the purposes of ss. 28 and 29 
 
Police forces etc. 
1. Any police force. 
2. The National Criminal Intelligence Service. 
3. The National Crime Squad. 
4. The Serious Fraud Office. 
 
The intelligence services 
5. Any of the intelligence services. 
 
The armed forces 
6. Any of Her Majesty’s forces. 
 
The revenue departments 
7. The Commissioners of Customs and Excise. 
8. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue. 
 
Government departments 
9. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. 
10. The Ministry of Defence. 
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11. The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. 
12. The Department of Health. 
13. The Home Office. 
14. The Department of Social Security. 
15. The Department of Trade and Industry. 
 
The National Assembly for Wales 
16. The National Assembly for Wales. 
 
Local authorities 
17. Any local authority (within the meaning of section 1 of the Local 1999 c. 
27. 
Government Act 1999). 
 
Sch. 1 
 
Other bodies 
18. The Environment Agency. 
19. The Financial Services Authority. 
20. The Food Standards Agency. 
21. The Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce. 
22. The Personal Investment Authority. 
23. The Post Office. 
 
Part II 
Relevant authorities for the purposes only of s. 28 
 
 
The Health and Safety Executive 
24. The Health and Safety Executive. 
 
NHS bodies in England and Wales 
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1977 c. 49. 25. A Health Authority established under section 8 of the National 
Health 
Service Act 1977. 
26. A Special Health Authority established under section 11 of the National 
Health Service Act 1977. 
1990 c. 19. 27. A National Health Service trust established under section 5 of 
the National 
Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. 
 
The Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain 
28. The Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain.  
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Annex I – The Eight Attributes of Intelligence Excellence, as 
considered by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
In their Joint Publication 2-0 (Joint Intelligence) of 2013, the JCS (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff 2013, pp.II–6 to II–8) define eight attributes of Intelligence excellence. 
Their definitions of these attributes are provided below.  
a. Anticipatory. Intelligence must anticipate the informational needs of the 
commander and joint force staff in order to provide a solid foundation for 
operational planning and decision-making. Anticipating the joint force’s 
intelligence needs requires the intelligence staff to identify and fully 
understand the command’s current and potential missions, the commander’s 
intent, all relevant aspects of the OE (operational environment), and all 
possible friendly and adversary COAs (courses of action). Most important, 
anticipation requires the aggressive involvement of intelligence in operation 
planning at the earliest time possible.  
b. Timely. Intelligence must be available when the commander requires it. 
Timely intelligence enables the commander to anticipate events in the 
operational area. In turn, this enables the commander to time operations for 
maximum effectiveness and to avoid being surprised. Usually, the need to 
balance timeliness and completeness should favor timeliness, and if 
incomplete should be stated in the product, and followed up later. 
Recognizing and balancing the subtle differences relative to timeliness and 
completeness is one of the critical art forms for good intelligence. 
c. Accurate. Intelligence must be factually correct, relay the situation as it 
actually exists, and provide an understanding of the OE based on the rational 
judgment of available information. This judgment should evaluate the 
possibility of an adversary’s denial and deception effort. The accuracy of 
intelligence products may be enhanced by placing proportionally greater 
emphasis on information reported by the most reliable sources. Evaluate 
source reliability through a feedback process in which past data received from 
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a source is compared with the “ground truth” (for example, when subsequent 
events or information confirm the source’s accuracy). 
d. Usable. Intelligence must be tailored to the commander’s specific needs, 
and provided in forms suitable for immediate comprehension. Providing useful 
intelligence requires its producers to understand the decisions facing the 
commander, the relevance and impact of intelligence on those decisions, and 
how to deliver the intelligence to the commander in context so that it balances 
efficiency and effectiveness. Commanders operate under mission, 
operational, and time constraints that shape their intelligence requirements 
and determine how much time they have to study the intelligence provided. 
They must be able to quickly apply intelligence to the task, and may not have 
sufficient time to analyze complex intelligence reports. Therefore the “bottom 
line” must be up front used to effectively convey intelligence. 
e. Complete. Complete intelligence answers the commander’s questions 
about the adversary and other aspects of the OE to the extent possible, and 
informs the commander of significant intelligence gaps. To be complete, 
intelligence must identify relevant aspects of the OE that may impact mission 
accomplishment or the joint operation execution and offer alternative analysis. 
Complete intelligence informs the commander of all major COAs that are 
available to the adversary, and identifies those assessed as most likely and 
most dangerous. While providing available intelligence to those who need it 
when they need it, the intelligence staff must give priority to the commander’s 
unsatisfied critical requirements. Intelligence organizations must anticipate 
and respond to the commander’s existing and contingent intelligence 
requirements by evaluating the intelligence process input and output 
surrounding the mission. 
f. Relevant. Intelligence must be relevant to the planning and execution of the 
operation at hand, and aid the commander in the accomplishment of the 
mission. It must contribute to the commander’s understanding of the 
adversary and other significant aspects of the OE, but not burden the 
commander with intelligence that is of minimal or no importance to the current 
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mission. To produce relevant intelligence, the J-2 staff must remain cognizant 
of the commander’s intent and understanding of how the operational concept 
inflicts desired effects upon the adversary to achieve the military objectives 
and secure the end state. The J-2 staff must also update requirements as the 
friendly mission or the adversary situation changes. 
g. Objective. Due to the decisive and consequential impact of intelligence on 
operations and reliance of planning and operations decisions on intelligence, 
it is important for the J-2 to maintain objectivity and independence in 
developing assessments. When informing the commander, joint intelligence 
must be vigilant in guarding against biases that shade, slant, or frame 
assessments to favor the commander’s chosen COA or to fit the 
commander’s preconceived notions. In particular, intelligence should 
recognize each adversary as unique, and avoid mirror imaging while realizing 
the possible bias involved in their assessment type. For example, current 
intelligence and warning intelligence estimates may assess the same 
indicators differently. Red teams can be used to check analytical judgments 
by ensuring assumptions about the adversary are sound and intelligence 
assessments help minimize mirror imaging and cultural bias. 
h. Available. Intelligence must be readily accessible to the commander. 
Availability is a function of not only timeliness and usability, but also 
appropriate security classification, interoperability, and connectivity. 
Intelligence producers must strive to provide information at the most 
appropriate level of classification and least restrictive releasability caveats, 
thereby maximizing the consumers’ access, while protecting sources of 
information and methods of collection. 
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